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The Middle East Journal, in conformity with the objectives of its publisher, The Middle East Institute, takes no editorial stand on the problems of the Middle East. Its sole criterion is that material published be sound and informative, and presented without emotional bias. All opinions expressed, therefore, are those of the individual authors and not of the *Journal* or of the Institute.



The Middle East

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Editorial Foreword

Even though the American people may be suffering from a surfeit of periodical publications, no apology need be offered for adding a quarterly journal relating to the Middle East. Except to a very few Americans — Foreign Service and Army officers, educators, businessmen, travelers — this area is essentially *terra incognita*. Such a circumstance was a matter of no great practical consequence when the world was large and only loosely knit together. Now that the Middle East is very near the United States in point of time-distance and almost equally near with respect to matters of concern in American foreign policy, it deserves such thoughtful attention as can be initiated and encouraged through the pages of *The Middle East Journal*.

The United States already has assumed a certain amount of responsibility in such matters as the question of sovereignty in Iran, the defense of the Straits, the admission of refugees to Palestine. Yet to approach these individual problems merely as questions of power politics will not necessarily lead to a full understanding of them or even to an adequate appreciation of their international implications. The future of the peoples of the Middle East no longer will be shaped wholly by the attitude and policies of the powers; forces and factors engendered in and among these countries themselves — their national consciousness, urge for economic self-determination, cultural conditions, population pressures, regional understandings — must be taken increasingly into account if the Middle East is to attain social, political and economic stability and if the foreign policy of the United States is to be soundly based. To set forth, analyze and evaluate these forces and factors is a principal aim of *The Middle East Journal.*

There appears never to have been in the United States a very consistent view as to the exact meaning, geographically, of the terms 'Near East' and 'Middle East.' Whatever views may have been held on these points in earlier years have been modified considerably by the experiences of the late war, during which Americans in considerable numbers were closely associated with their British allies in carrying out operations in parts of Asia and Africa for which the British, a people long acquainted and concerned with these areas, had their own designations. In consequence of this experience, the term 'Middle East,' which in many respects has come to supplant 'Near East,' has no common frame of reference. It appears to be incumbent upon the *Journal*,

consequently, as the organ of The Middle East Institute, to assign boundaries to the area with which it proposes to deal. For the purposes with which this *Journal* is concerned, they will be broadly defined. Attention will be centered on the heart of the area: Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Transjordan, the Arabian Peninsula, and Egypt; but not without due reference to closely related peripheral areas, such as the Mediterranean approaches, North and Northeast Africa, Transcaucasia, Afghanistan, India and Turkestan. With a few notable exceptions, these are Moslem lands which, even in an era of increasing dependence on transportation by air, are quite as strategically located as they were in less technological times. Here essential interests of the great powers come sharply into focus and the influences that predominate in these lands will have great bearing on relationships between and among the powers in years to come.

The Middle East possesses a consistency even though it is the sum of many parts. For all the differences that exist between Moroccan, Turk, Arab and Hindu, the lands they inhabit share a common heritage. Throughout its length and breadth, the Middle East has experienced the impact of Islam: many of the trends now observable in the countries comprising the area stem from this circumstance. Moreover, virtually every part of the Middle East at one time or another has suffered (or gained, according to the point of view) from European expansionism and has been forced to make adjustments of one kind or another to western civilization. By virtue of such common experiences, the lands of the Middle East, however diverse in the distant past, have come to possess a kind of common denominator: a thorough understand-

ing of one land thus can be acquired only through a proper knowledge of all. For this reason, *The Middle East Journal* has as a further aim the presentation of particular problems and conditions in the Middle East as facets of the whole.

The Middle East Journal, reflecting the position of The Middle East Institute, proposes to take no editorial stand on issues arising in the area, although naturally it will present various points of view in its pages. For these the *Journal* assumes no other responsibility than to make every effort to ascertain that its authors have striven to be accurate in their statements and objective in their attitude.

THE ARAB TRIBAL COMMUNITY IN A NATIONALIST STATE

Afif I. Tannous

I

SINCE time immemorial the tribal community has been in existence in the Near East. Its particular way of life, crystallized over centuries of adjustment to a peculiar environment, is an integral and dynamic part of the general culture prevailing in this region. The tribal unit, existing side by side with the agricultural village and the trading city, has consciously or unconsciously in its relationship with them played a role that is as significant to the local culture as those played by the other two.

At present the Arab tribal community of the Near East constitutes a large segment of the total population and exists in various stages of transition from a completely nomadic pastoral to a fully settled, agricultural economy. This segment of the population, as never before in its long history, has been in recent years attracting much national attention and consciousness. This has come about as a result of the nationalistic awakening in the Arab world. Most of the Arab countries have already achieved complete or practically complete independence. Their leaders are taking stock of national resources, and their governments are

▼ AFIF I. TANNOUS is regional specialist for the Near East in the Department of Agriculture. He was a member of the United States agricultural mission which surveyed conditions in the Arab states during the spring and summer of 1946.

facing the future with long-range plans of reconstruction and development. The tribal community is being given due consideration and is figuring as an important factor in such national planning, for it is the general consensus among leaders both within and outside Arab governmental circles that nationhood in the Arab world cannot be achieved on a stable and permanent basis unless the tribal segment becomes fully integrated with the rest of the nation and proceeds with it along the road of development and progress.

This strong national desire for the amalgamation of the tribe with the rest of the nation is enhanced by the fear of outside political interference. In their long and bitter struggle for independence, national leaders in some of the Arab countries have come to realize that unless tribal groups are fully identified with and strongly bound to the central national organization, they tend to play the role of a minority group, constituting a point of entry for political pressure and influence from outside.

Another reason for the prevailing national concern in the affairs of the tribal community is the belief that this group constitutes a constant threat to internal public security. It is pointed out that bloody and destructive feuds erupt every now and then between tribes, and that tribesmen in practicing their rights of grazing often encroach upon the territory of settled agriculture, destroying property and causing bloodshed. It is argued that as long as nomadism exists as at present, with its peculiar type of socio-economic organization, and with its chiefs taking the law into their hands, it will be impossible for the central government to maintain full public security.

There are also administrative considerations that make the central governments acutely conscious of the tribes as a source of trouble and difficulties. In the imposition and collection of taxes, in the taking of censuses, in the application of educational and health programs, in the carrying out of agricultural projects, and in the conscription of men for military training, the authorities often find themselves frustrated at one point or another by the tribal organization. Plans, policies, programs, and projects that are formulated on a national scale have in many cases to be either modified or completely abandoned as far as the tribal segment

of the nation is concerned. It is a well-known fact that no accurate census can be taken of the roving Bedouins or of their livestock. For a variety of reasons they refuse to submit willingly to enumeration, either of themselves or of their animals; their numbers decrease or increase according to whether enumeration implies taxation, military conscription, or sugar rations. Furthermore, authorities have to deal with two sets of legal codes, the national and the tribal. Conflicts between the two often arise, especially when marginal cases are involved.

On the basis of these observations one comes to the conclusion that there is in the Arab world a widespread consciousness of and concern about the tribal community; and that in general this consciousness takes a negative form: the belief that the nomadic tribe constitutes a national problem, a source of trouble, a backward entity that stands in the way of national progress. On the other hand, side by side with this negative attitude there does exist a more positive and understanding attitude on the part of some leaders and thinkers. These men realize the significance of the tribal organization to national existence, and are on the search for positive solutions to the various problems involved. However, aside from these few exceptions, the general trend of thinking on the matter does not go beyond the consciousness that the nomadic tribe is a national problem and that the only over-all solution is "settling the tribe," a phrase which has assumed the character of a slogan.

Upon investigation one finds that there is general agreement that "settling the tribe" means transforming the roving Bedouin, who lives upon the products of his flocks and herds, into a settled cultivator of the soil. There is also general agreement that the tribe should be supplied with land on which to settle. It is taken for granted that once such a step is taken the tribal problem will be solved. Some Arab governments have gone farther than others in thinking out the various details of the proposed solution and in planning for their application. They have established special departments to deal with the tribal situation and have appointed some able administrators and officials experienced in tribal life, who are doing their best to accomplish a thorough job.

However, one can readily see that this is only a first step, and

that a much more comprehensive approach to this problem is required for its complete solution. An attempt will now be made to present some thoughts on the organization and significance of the tribal community, and to offer some suggestions regarding its integration into the national body.

II

The first point of emphasis is that the Arab tribe is a very old cultural group. Its history is continuous, reaching back several thousand years into the early stages of human development. This long history of adjustment to and survival within a peculiar type of natural environment has resulted in the development of a clearly crystallized cultural unit with definite patterns of behavior relative to various aspects of life. These patterns prescribe for the individual and the group the traditional ways of doing things within the spheres of economic activity, religion, family life, recreation, government, and other forms of human relationship. In other words, we are dealing here with a form of human organization that is highly integrated and deep rooted. In order to be understood and given a valid appraisal, it has to be approached through the perspective of its historical setting.

In the second place it should be emphasized that the tribal community has made and can continue to make fundamental contributions to Arab national existence. The first of these major contributions is purely biological in nature. The tribe is a virile and efficient biological entity. Throughout countless centuries it has been able to contend successfully with adverse natural elements in one of the most difficult environments that has ever confronted the human species. This is the desert environment, where the burning sun beats down relentlessly on every living form, where water is scarce and vegetation scanty, and where man and animal are forced to use every bit of energy and resourcefulness in their struggle for existence. In co-operation with his flocks of sheep and herds of camels, and through constant migration after the scanty water and vegetation, man has been able to survive. One can readily witness this process of struggle and survival in operation at present. A trip across the Nejd plateau in Arabia, or the desert hinterlands of Syria, Iraq, and

Transjordan is sufficient to give the observer insight into the course of human development in this area. One also can find ample proof that the process has involved the survival of the fittest, the strongest, the most virile.

In this struggle and survival, the tribal group did not merely hold its own, but succeeded in multiplying its numbers at a significant rate. It is a well-known historical fact that from the overflow of these numbers, of this sound and tested biological stock, the agricultural and urban populations of the Arab countries have been to a large extent replenished. This overflow of a relatively virile and healthy population from nomadic desert life into settled agriculture and ultimately into urban life is also much in evidence at present. In Syria, Iraq, Arabia, and other Arab countries one can witness a parade of transitional stages from pure nomadism on the one extreme to fully settled village life on the other. The tribe is still making its biological contribution to the Arab world. The question is, therefore, whether any of the countries concerned can afford to adopt a policy that would consciously or unconsciously result in the liquidation of this major national biological resource.

Not only biologically, but also economically, the tribe plays a significant role. Its contribution to the general economy of the country has been so taken for granted that it tends to be forgotten and given no serious consideration in plans of national development. Upon analysis we find that the tribal economy is certainly an efficient method of exploiting the meager resources of the desert. It utilizes profitably, to the benefit of the whole nation, the scanty grass that grows over extensive stretches of desert areas. The contribution this makes to the national economic organization is tremendous. In each of the countries under consideration livestock is a major resource, both for food and for exports. Is it? There are many millions of sheep and goats, and large numbers of cattle and camels which supply the people with their needs of meat and dairy products, and which produce exportable surpluses of wool, hair, skins, and hides. It is the nomadic or partly settled tribe of the desert and the steppe that raises the bulk of this important livestock; in doing so it depends almost entirely upon whatever vegetation the desert can offer.

Close sheep grazing causes serious erosion tho!

No erosion if no rain Wind? Lots!

Here is a significant and permanent source of national income for which there is probably no substitute. At least this type of tribal economy should not be interfered with or in any way hampered until a more efficient economy can take its place. It can be argued that with the development of irrigation, settled agriculture will become a more profitable occupation for the tribal folk than pastoral nomadism. This may be true, but only as soon as major irrigation schemes can be realized, and only as far as they can go. It seems certain that there will always be extensive stretches of semi-arid land where irrigation cannot reach and where dry farming cannot succeed. It is here that pastoral economy will continue to find a place and make an economic contribution.

In the third place, the tribal group has made fundamental contributions to the prevailing culture of the Arab world. By culture is meant a total way of life, as lived by a certain group or society, which is conspicuously differentiated from the ways of life prevailing among other groups and societies. Any culture consists of two major aspects: the material and the non-material. The former comprises a set of tools, implements, and other physical objects that the group utilizes in adjusting itself to and exploiting its natural environment. The latter consists of a definite pattern of behavior that regulates for the group its ways of doing things with the physical objects, and also the various forms of relationship that exist among its members and between itself and other cultural groups. The two aspects are in constant interaction; in the case of a simple and highly integrated unit like the tribal community, they constitute the parts of an indivisible whole. In other words, culture is a distinctly human heritage, which has emerged wherever human beings have associated over a period of time, and by means of which man achieves effective adjustment to his fellow man and his natural environment.

Culture, thus defined and understood, is not by any means the exclusive possession of the urban or educated segment of society. The tribal community, in its own right and through its own achievement, as has already been pointed out, is the possessor of a cultural heritage — as much so as are the village and urban communities of the Arab world. The material aspect of its cultural heritage is indeed simple, not going beyond a few imple-

ments, tools, and objects utilized for the satisfaction of the elementary human need for food, shelter, and self-defense. On the other hand, the non-material aspect is relatively highly developed, and consists of clearly defined patterns of behavior that cover various forms of relationship relevant to religion, family, government, economic activity, conflict and co-operation, and general community organization.

It is within this non-material or human relationship aspect of the tribal culture that we find elements which have significantly added to the meaning and color of the total Arab culture. These include basic social values; prominent among them are individual independence and prowess, reverence of leadership, respect for old age, hospitality and generosity, honoring of the promised word, respect for individual rights, mutual aid, the personal touch in human relationships, and community consciousness and loyalty. Through the overflow of tribal population and the constant contact between the tribal community and the rest of Arab society, these and other cultural values have been made a part of the Arab way of life. In fact many of them are at the foundations of this life, giving shape and direction to its development.

It is not intended to imply that the tribal way of life is the only or even the major source of cultural development in the various countries of the Near East. There are certainly other cultural origins which in some of these countries may supersede the tribal one. Furthermore, there is no intention to imply a moral judgment on whether the tribal cultural elements are "good" or "bad," but rather to present a statement of fact.

In the light of these considerations, it becomes clear that the tribal community cannot be looked upon either as a minority cultural group or as a primitive society that is extraneous to the indigenous culture. It constitutes a significant and virile segment of the population, its economic activity is an important factor in the national economy, and its way of life is an integral part of the total culture prevailing in the Arab world.

III

On the basis of this analysis and appraisal of the tribal community organization, we shall now attempt to present some sug-

gestions regarding a national plan for "tribal affairs." We refrain from using the words "tribal problem" in this connection in order to emphasize the fact that the real need is for a continuous, enlightened program of tribal development rather than for a short-term solution of a problem. In other words, we believe that the tribe does not constitute a national problem in the Arab world any more than does the village community or the urban center. Each of these presents its own peculiar set of conditions, difficulties, and needs for general reconstruction and development.

The basic essential of an enlightened national plan for the development of a certain segment of society is a clearly defined and well thought-out philosophy, with specific principles that serve as guide-posts for such development. Lacking this fundamental prerequisite, any plan or project, no matter how technically sound it may be, would run the risk of being shortsighted and haphazard, and might end in defeating its own purpose. In the case of the tribal community, the following principles are suggested as essential. These may have to be modified and others added to them in the light of an increased knowledge of the situation.

1. *Thorough research in tribal organization and comprehensive understanding of the tribal way of life should precede any attempt at drawing up plans or the application of projects for settlement.* This is nothing else than the scientific approach, the building up of an authentic body of knowledge relative to a certain problem, in the light of which an adequate solution can be devised. This approach is obvious and is normally followed in such matters as irrigation projects, plant and animal breeding, control of disease, industrial development, etc. However, when the problem at hand, as is the case with the tribal question, involves human relationships and organization, we find quite a different attitude prevailing. Here it is usually taken for granted that no expert scientific knowledge is necessary, and that common sense knowledge is an adequate foundation for plans, policies, and programs of action.

We need not go into an analysis of the basic fallacy involved in this attitude or of the various factors responsible for it. We need only emphasize the fact that the tribal problem of the Arab world

has not yet been thought out carefully and defined clearly by those concerned, and that solutions have been suggested and in some cases applied without the benefit of an authentic, scientific body of knowledge. We do not mean at all to minimize the insight and wisdom some of the Arab leaders and officials possess with respect to tribal conditions and problems; nor do we intend to ignore their genuine endeavor to arrive at a solution. Theirs is indeed an essential contribution, being the result of firsthand experience of the situation. This experience, however, would gain wider perspective and would be more fruitful if it were sharpened through a comprehensive and continuous program of rigorous scientific research.

2. *A plan for tribal development, or a project of tribal settlement, should be inspired and tested at every step by the ultimate objective of raising the standard of living of the tribal community and of enhancing its contributions — biological, sociological, and economic — to the national life.* Here is an ultimate standard by which it can be ascertained whether a certain plan or project is basically sound and is moving in the right direction. Unless such a standard is clearly defined and constantly kept in mind, the issue will certainly be confused, either consciously or unconsciously, and vested interests will have a better chance of utilizing the situation to suit their purposes rather than those of the nation as a whole.

In clarifying this issue two questions should be raised: Does the proposed plan really aim at the welfare of the tribal people as individual human beings, assuring them improvement in their health, food, housing, education, and other amenities of life? Will the proposed plan ultimately enhance or curtail the ability of the tribal community to make its contributions to the nation as a whole?

3. *Gradual settlement, involving transitional stages rather than a radical change from nomadism to agriculture, is the soundest and safest procedure in many cases.* This principle derives from the nature of the tribal community as a cultural group. As such it is the outcome of a long historical process, involving centuries of struggle, adjustment, selection, and survival, both biological and cultural. In other words, the tribal group did not come into being

within a short period of time, and cannot be changed with rapidity into something else. We are dealing here with a cultural entity consisting of a group of human beings with deep-rooted emotions, attitudes, and habits of behavior; whose way of life has crystallized throughout the centuries into a definite pattern, in the image of which they develop as human beings. Transforming them from nomadism to settled agriculture is a major operation, involving drastic changes and upheaval.

In the present national eagerness to do something about the tribal situation all of these considerations tend to be ignored or forgotten. It is erroneously taken for granted that once the tribesman is supplied with the material aspects of agricultural activity, he is readily transformed into a farmer. The process is much more complicated than that, and its consummation takes time.

The safest procedure is to follow the course taken by the tribal community in its historical development. It has been changing from pure nomadism to pure agricultural life through transitional stages, involving various degrees of both ways of life. This change has been slow, but sure, involving no major shock or upheaval. Through scientific planning and guidance this normal historical process can be hastened, but not beyond a certain limit when change becomes destructive of human life and culture.

4. *Settlement should be undertaken only on the basis of voluntary co-operation by the tribal people concerned.* Both the spirit of true democracy and a program of sound education are involved in this principle. Centralized planning and centralized administration of projects are necessary. However, the needs and the wishes of the tribal folk should be taken into serious consideration in such planning. There is a strong temptation to neglect this principle in dealing with the tribe, consisting as it does of illiterate folk who are not articulate in expressing themselves. Resentment, opposition, and frustration will certainly result unless the administration wisely assures itself at the start of their full co-operation.

When such co-operation is not readily available, the application of the proposed project should be suspended, and a campaign aimed at educating the people in the matter should be undertaken. This is, of course, a slow process that does not bring about

quick and seemingly imposing results. In the long run, however, judging by the historical experiences of various countries and communities, this seems to be the safest and most fruitful procedure for effecting major national transformations.

One practical suggestion in this connection is to initiate a national project of tribal settlement with a tribal group that is selected on the basis of its readiness for settlement and its willingness to co-operate in the project. Research in tribal organization as suggested above should provide the authorities with the knowledge and ability to classify intelligently the various tribes according to the degree of their readiness for settlement. It will be found that tribes differ a great deal in this respect. A few of them will be at the top of the list; one of these could be selected for the initiation of the project, with greater assurance of co-operation and ultimate success. Such a community would then serve as a demonstration for others.

5. *A plan for settlement should take into consideration and should provide for not only agricultural production in the narrow sense, but also all aspects of community life simultaneously.* Pastoral nomadism is a total way of life, and so is settled agriculture. Transforming a human group from one to the other is a major operation involving all aspects of living. A settlement plan cannot afford to concentrate on one to the exclusion of the others. It would be an error of unrealistic abstraction to proceed on the belief that once land, implements, and other technical requisites for agricultural activity are made available, a healthy, stable, and efficiently organized community will develop. In addition to matters that are strictly agricultural, the plan should provide for housing, sanitation, recreation, credit facilities, home welfare, and schools — in other words, an over-all organization of the proposed settlement.

In the absence of such comprehensive planning a settlement project would run the grave risk of defeating its purpose by resulting in the creation of agricultural villages that are unhealthy, disorganized, and low in morale. As such, they would constitute more of a national liability than an asset. Put in a simple and direct manner, the question is whether the process is going to transform the Bedouin into a well-housed, well-fed, healthy, and

ultimately well-educated farmer, an active member of a progressive community, or into one of those peasant sharecroppers whose low level of living already constitutes a major national problem in many countries of the Near East.

It is our belief that the primary condition of a successful transformation in this respect is the granting to the prospective farmer of some form of personal ownership of the land on which he is to settle. We are not concerned here with a discussion of the type of ownership, which may be communal, familial, individual, or some combination of these. The essential thing is that the Bedouin embark upon his new way of life with a feeling of security and stability at least equal to that he now enjoys. He should have the assurance that, by virtue of being the owner of the land, he will reap the fruit of his productive effort and not run the risk of being exploited by others.

6. *Follow-up work in the form of an extension program is extremely essential and should be made a permanent feature of the newly developed community.* This is the final and perhaps the most important step in an enlightened plan of tribal settlement. As mentioned above, the development of an effectively functioning agricultural community cannot be achieved in a short time; and work in this respect, if it is to be fruitful, does not come to an end with the granting of the necessary basic facilities. At this point, or rather at the start of the project, a long-range educational program should be devised and launched. Members of the new community have to be trained in the various aspects of their new life. Old patterns of behavior have to be modified or completely changed, and new ways of doing things and dealing with people have to be established. The skills involved in the raising of livestock in a pastoral economy are vastly different from those involved in the cultivation of the soil. A Bedouin is able to maintain a relatively effective standard of sanitation by constant exposure to the sun and by the seasonal moving of his camp. At the same time he does not have to live in close proximity to others. Consequently, the breeding of germs and the chances of contamination and contagion are reduced to a minimum. The situation is drastically different in a village community, where ignorance of sanitation methods would result in a tremendous loss

of human life and energy. Similarly, the settled Bedouin has to be taught the various techniques of agriculture and trained in his new responsibilities and privileges as a member of the new community.

And finally, an extension program would perform another essential function, that of keeping the authorities and experts concerned in constant touch with the various problems that are expected to arise in the new settlement. There will be difficulties of all sorts, such as faulty agricultural techniques, unhealthy conditions, and unsatisfactory local leadership. The extension program would attempt to handle such problems before they reach the point of disrupting the life of the community.

NATIONALISM IN MOROCCO

Walter B. Cline

IN CONTRAST to most Moslem lands under European domination, Morocco has proved to be poor soil for the growth of political nationalism. Several factors have contributed to its infertility, the chief among them being the radical divisions in Moroccan society. On this mountainous Atlantic frontier of Islam the aboriginal Berbers, the descendants of Arab invaders of the eighth century and of migrating Arab tribes of the later Middle Ages, the backwash of urban Moslems and Jews from a lost Andalusia, are still in a process of fusion. About one-third of Morocco's eight million people speak Berber; the rest speak Arabic dialects that would be scarcely comprehensible at the other end of the Mediterranean. Racially and linguistically distinct, these two major groups are united only in their loyalty to Islam. A second line of cleavage separates the towns from the tribesmen. Most townsfolk know little about rural life and are afraid of the tribes. Country people mistrust and look down upon the townsmen.

Within each of these large categories — Berber and Arab, town and country — various social groupings divert the population from national interests. Before the French established security, enmities and alliances between tribes kept much of Morocco in a state of intermittent war. Even the towns are endowed with corporate personalities which are traditionally reflected in the conduct of their members. Rabat and Salé are twin cities, divided only by the estuary of the Bu Regreg, but "the sea will turn to milk and the sand to raisins before a Rabati loves a Slawi." Few natives, when asked what they are, say that they are Moroccans;

▼ WALTER B. CLINE, Professor of Anthropology at the University of Minnesota, served in Morocco during the last two years of the war. The point of view of the Moroccan Nationalists, which he here presents, is the outgrowth of the direct contact he had with them at that time.

most of them answer with the name of their town or tribe. Guilds of artisans, religious brotherhoods, the wealthy religious aristocracy or *shorfa,* and the intermarrying families of great merchants make a more immediate and practical appeal to individual loyalty than does the Moroccan state.

A second factor tending to retard the growth of a Moroccan nationalism may be seen in the timidity of the townsfolk, particularly those of Fez, Rabat, and Salé. They avoid physical violence at all costs, and tremble at the thought of bloodshed. Those who profess nationalism have never even staged a major riot. The disturbances of January 1944, following the abortive declaration of Moroccan independence, were essentially an outgrowth of panic rather than of careful deliberation, and were scarcely worthy of comparison with Arab riots in Egypt or Syria. Nor have these self-styled Nationalists appeared capable of framing plans of action. They tend, rather, to sit and moralize; to harp incessantly on Morocco's *rights;* to typewrite petitions and manifestoes to slip under the doors of foreign consulates.

Morocco's fighting men come from the tribes, not from the towns. They fought magnificently under Abd al-Karim in 1924 and under French officers in World War II. They far outnumber the townsmen, but they have never been united; and it is unlikely that the French, the Sultan of Morocco, or the Nationalists will ever be able to use them as a consolidated force. Their tribal interests and their lust for adventure and plunder outweigh any religious or patriotic appeal which might be made to them. In the railway station at Rabat the author once had the opportunity of talking with two veteran tribesmen from the Abda country who had been maimed on the Belgian front, liberated from a German prison camp, and given their pensions and their passage home. Their chief concern was what use to make of their pensions, of which they were extremely proud. They showed not the slightest feeling toward either the Germans or the French. It is doubtful whether any propaganda could have impressed them with the fact that, as Moroccans, they had sacrificed their legs and arms for a victory from which Morocco would derive no benefit whatever. They had gone to war for personal gain. The spoils had been less than expected and the suffering greater, but all had been pre-

ordained by God and they had their pensions. Nationalist sentiment can have little hold on persons thus motivated.

A third factor which has militated against the growth of a nationalist spirit has undoubtedly been the policy adopted by the French in their administration of the Protectorate. The treaty with France in 1912 left the government ostensibly in the hands of the Sultan and his ministers; it actually made Morocco a French dependency and reduced the native rulers to puppets. The French Resident-General holds supreme authority; Morocco can negotiate with foreign powers only through him. Every native administrative office is supervised by a French counterpart. In theory the Sultan maintains his own civil service, appoints his ministers, his *qaids* and his pashas, and promulgates new laws as royal *dahirs*. But he does all of this under French direction. Resistance is futile; the French control the country's military potential, leaving the Sultan only a few hundred unarmed guardsmen to brighten his parades.

In addition to obviating an extension of self-government in Morocco, French policy has tended to emphasize those divisions in Moroccan society which already have been noted as being deterrents to a growth of nationalism. In 1930 the French promulgated through the Sultan the Berber Dahir, which gave official sanction to Berber tribal law and thus completed the division of Morocco into two cultural spheres. Several years later they built a school at Azru, in the Middle Atlas, where hand-picked Berber boys could be educated at a safe distance from the Arabs.

A young Arab teacher in Fez was once heard to remark that "Lyautey did a magnificent piece of work. He made us smile as he cut our throats." He meant to convey his conviction that the French had followed in Morocco a master strategy, beneficent on the surface but with ulterior intent. In the kindest terms, this strategy was "to let the native civilization alone." More precisely, from the point of view of the nationalist-minded Moroccan, it consisted in supporting those institutions which sapped the strength of the total community and prevented the natives from reaching a position where they could compete with the French. To follow such a strategy is easy in a country where much of the social and political structure interlocks with a medieval religion.

Most Moroccans certainly will not complain if the French fan the mystic frenzies of the brotherhoods, or leave the education of Moroccan boys to ignorant bigots, or refrain from any attempt to emancipate Moroccan women, or encourage the natives to preserve "their beautiful old culture."

But on the other side of the picture, this very policy of the French has indirectly stimulated a certain restlessness among educated Moroccans. Moors who read and travel are convinced that the world is leaving Morocco behind; that under the French Protectorate their country will never make the progress Egypt and Syria have made in the last thirty years. French attempts to isolate Morocco from other Moslem lands by banning their magazines and newspapers have aggravated this sense of frustration.

Since 1912 the Moroccans have watched the wheat fields, orchards, and vineyards of European colonists overspread the best lands of western Morocco. They have watched the growth of the French port of Casablanca, where hundreds of thousands of filthy waifs from the south, attracted only by the hope of subsistence, have swarmed to work on docks and railroads, in factories and warehouses, breeding industrial slums which are utterly repellent to the old social order. They have seen the opening of great phosphate mines at Khuribga and Louis Gentil, and have heard European promoters glory in the wealth of cobalt, manganese, and other minerals only beginning to trickle from the Atlas Mountains. To the nationalist Moroccan it matters little that these enterprises have been developed in strict accordance with the law, or that they provide wages for so many of his underprivileged countrymen. He knows that men of his own class — men who have money to invest or who want to operate modern mines and farms of their own — have no chance to compete with foreigners in the exploitation of Morocco's natural wealth. The French have even passed a law forbidding Europeans to sell land to natives. Property which the colonists obtained for a pittance cannot be repurchased by Moroccans at any price.

It is the French view that conditions have greatly improved under the Protectorate. The rebellious tribes have been pacified. Bandits no longer infest the highways. Timid townsmen can take their families to their farms with no fear of attack. A relatively

safe water supply has been installed in towns where the natives formerly drank from dirty ditches. The French have reduced the danger of malaria, typhus, and plague, and have built several hospitals for the natives. Transportation has been greatly facilitated: a network of good roads covers the country, and trains run regularly between Marrakesh, Casablanca, Tangier, and the Algerian frontier. Telephone, telegraph, and postal service make communication almost as easy as in France. The Nationalists, however, do not regard these physical improvements as fair exchange for liberty and equality. They argue that the French have made them for their own benefit; that public health and education have been neglected; and that, in any case, if the Moroccans had been given sufficient opportunity as an independent people, they could have done as well or better themselves in the past thirty-four years.

The social dislocation brought about by French influence and policy gave rise first of all to a superficial manifestation of nationalism which was largely negative in its aims. Young Moors who attended French schools became indoctrinated with a belief in the superiority of French culture. They longed to escape from the patriarchal tyranny of Islam to the free life of Paris. But they were never accepted as Frenchmen. The result of this social impasse was an obsessed personality which tended to blame the French for all its troubles. A large proportion of the self-styled Moroccan Nationalists have shared this mentality, and have been motivated by little more than a desire for equality with the French and a vague urge to be free of parental traditions.

Even the more responsible element in the Nationalist movement, which appeared in Morocco after World War I, was moved as much by opposition to the French Protectorate as by a positive urge for self-realization. Its initiators, a small group of merchants and schoolteachers, may have sympathized with the Pan-Arab movement in the Near East and with the nationalist parties which had begun to take form in Algeria and Tunisia, but they were not pleading for the Arab world at large; they were pleading for Morocco. They may have been encouraged by the success of Abd al-Karim against Spain and France in 1924, but they had no liaison with his tough tribesmen and no desire for an independent

Berber state in the Rif. It is often asserted that they drew their first inspiration from the *Société des Oulémas Algériens*, and that many of them were mystics and religious fanatics. This may have been true in 1930 but it was not in 1946. The fifty-odd Nationalists with whom the author is acquainted are neither more nor less religious than other men on the same level of Moroccan society. They congregate in the Qarawiyin at Fez, not because of any special religious tendencies, but because this sacred college gives educated young Moslems a congenial meeting-place where Europeans cannot intrude.

In 1934 the Nationalists organized a *Comité d'Action Marocaine* and published their plans for a representative government. French suppression of the *Comité* in 1937, and the imprisonment of a number of Arabs in a dispute with French colonists over a question of water rights merely gave further stimulus to the movement. Among its leaders at this time were the eloquent Allal al-Fasi, who was exiled to the Sahara and tropical Africa in 1937; Ahmad Mikwar, one of the richest and most astute merchants in the country, a generous contributor to Moslem education in Fez; Ahmad Balafraj, the director of a school for boys in Rabat; Si Muhammad Laghzawi, who operated a bus line out of Fez, organized an athletic association, and founded scholarships in the College Mawlay Idris; Si Muhammad al-Fasi, the president of the Qarawiyin, Morocco's oldest and most venerated religious college; and Umar ibn Abd al-Jalil, possibly the most intelligent of them all. Yet for all the activity of these leaders in the ten years from the organization of the *Comité* in 1934 to their declaration of Moroccan independence in 1944, probably less than three thousand men in French Morocco identified themselves with the movement. Most of those who did were young Arabs of Fez, Tetuan, and Rabat. Schoolteachers, amateur journalists, the sons of rich merchants formed the majority. They represented "the Moroccan people" only by self-appointment.

While the Nationalist movement was taking shape in French Morocco, a parallel movement was developing in the Spanish Zone. Having supported the *Comité* until its suppression in 1937, the Nationalists in the Spanish area then organized two groups of their own: the "National Reform Party", (*Hizb al-Islah al-*

Watani) under Abd al-Khaliq al-Turrays, and the "Moroccan Unity Movement" (*Harakat al-Wahdah al-Maghribiyah*) under Al-Makki al-Nasiri. These two parties formally united during World War II. Allowing themselves to be used at times as instruments of Fascist propaganda, they escaped suppression and their activities have thereby been more continuous and effective than those of the Nationalists in French Morocco. They have built several schools, established a "Moroccan House" in Cairo, sent students on scholarships to Egypt, and engaged Egyptians to teach in Spanish Morocco. The "Moroccan Unity" movement is still thriving, and Nasiri publishes in Tangier an outspoken weekly paper, *La Voix du Maroc.*

In the early phases of World War II many Nationalists were sympathetic toward Germany, largely because of their traditional enmity toward France. They undoubtedly had been influenced as well by Nazi and Falangist propaganda although nothing was further from their wishes than a fascist type of regime in Morocco. They found little choice between Vichyites and Gaullists, since neither showed a readiness to modify French administration in Morocco.

The Allied descent upon North Africa in the autumn of 1942 shook confidence in Germany's ultimate victory and, seemingly, opened new prospects for the future. The Nationalists had long since come to regard the United States as free of imperialist ambitions, eager to assist weak and subjugated peoples to attain equality in the world. American maintenance of colleges for Moslems in the Near East, American sympathy for the natives in the Rif war and then in the Ethiopian war, and the more recent American role in framing the Atlantic Charter were regarded as concrete illustrations of the United States' solicitude for the weak and oppressed.

The arrival of American troops in Morocco consequently gave rise to the most sanguine expectations. It was imagined that the Americans would prepare the land for independence, would transform Morocco into another California with their dams and ditches, and would found schools and universities to educate Moroccans in the arts of self-government. Under the circumstances, disillusionment was bound to come soon. American

agents, who previous to the invasion had lent encouragement to Nationalist hopes, were now compelled by reasons of expediency to co-operate with the local French authorities. Tea, sugar, and cotton cloth were placed for distribution in the hands of French officials, who tended to favor European consumers. Contact between natives and American officers was systematically discouraged. In Marrakesh, the French command even requested that Americans have no conversations with the local Pasha except through an official French interpreter.

Meanwhile, among the Americans sympathy for the Nationalists diminished, partly, the evidence suggests, because of French influence which was exerted to engender suspicions of Nationalist collaboration with the enemy. A good case in point will be found in the manner by which the French authorities exploited, in the spring of 1943, the conviction of a score of Moroccans accused of receiving subversive letters from one Ibrahim al-Wazzani, a resident of the Spanish Zone, who had been associated with the Nationalist movement prior to 1938. In that year he had organized in Spanish Morocco a "Bureau of National Defense" (*Maktab al-Difa' al-Watani*). When war came, he engaged in Axis activities and thus aroused the concern of American military personnel already fearful of an Axis attack upon the flank of their invasion forces. As for the Nationalists in French Morocco, they had disowned him in view of the damage which they believed he would do their cause. Nevertheless, during the investigation of Wazzani's contacts with Moroccan Nationalists, the French contrived, without too much difficulty, to persuade the more gullible Americans to believe that all Nationalists, if not all Moroccans, were collaborationists. The tales of pro-German Arab sentiment brought back by soldiers returning from Tunisia strengthened this belief. There were few who could understand that Moroccans, because of their constant antagonism to French domination, could be successively pro-German and pro-American and still be consistent.

Disillusioned at length by the failure of the Allies to relax the French grip, Moroccan Nationalists took matters into their own hands and, on January 11, 1944, presented the French Resident-General with a declaration of Moroccan independence. This cited

the failure of France to fulfill the terms of the Protectorate, Morocco's contribution to the Allied war effort, and the promises made in the Atlantic Charter as justification for the establishment of an independent Morocco under its Sultan. The framers of this document solicited the aid neither of Britain nor the United States, but the fact that they submitted it to British and American consular and military officers as well as to the French indicated their desire for Allied support. Some thirty well-known Nationalists attached their signatures and prominent Moslems everywhere were urged to sign on penalty of being branded as renegades. By January 18 the Sultan and many pashas and tribal leaders had indicated their support of the independence movement.

The French authorities at first played down the declaration while reaffirming the mutual love, loyalty, and dependence of Morocco and France. Neither press nor radio referred to the independence movement although the police authorities were busily searching out its leaders. On January 29, however, when the most prominent Nationalists were arrested, a popular storm broke down the barrier of official silence. Thousands of Moroccans massed that day on the esplanade between the Medina and the European quarter of Rabat to voice their disapproval, and, in the ensuing violence, a policeman and several civilians were killed. Casualties were fewer in Casablanca, where the French made a strong display of tanks and artillery. The largest demonstrations took place in Fez, where at least thirty Moroccans were killed by Senegalese troops and where several thousand others were herded into prison camps near Ifran. Marrakesh remained relatively quiet while its Pasha, Hajj Tihami al-Glawi, adopted a characteristically ambiguous attitude. Shops were closed for less than a day, and the few Nationalists who were imprisoned in the Bahia Palace were soon released. The Glawi appears to have temporized with both parties, and the Nationalists thereafter condemned him as a "diplomatic" patriot.

The popular support accorded the Nationalists in January 1944, was evidence at once of the extent of dissatisfaction with French rule, and of the inability of the Moroccans to unite in pursuit of a particular objective. The exigencies of the war, cou-

pled with a drought that dried up the pasture lands and stunted the crops, were depriving Moroccans of the very necessities of life. Peasants, faced with starvation, were swarming into Marrakesh, Fez, and Casablanca to beg for bread. The strictest measures were instituted against hoarding and profiteering, yet serious inflation had begun to set in. Berbers and Arabs, tribesmen and townsmen, faced starvation together, yet the Nationalist movement lacked the strength to bind and direct them.

Numerous observers have expressed the belief that the French deliberately incited the uprising in order to bring the Nationalists into the open before they became dangerously powerful. There is indeed some indication that French agents told Nationalist leaders in Fez that then was the strategic time to assert their rights. Whatever may be the truth of this, the uprising gave the French the opportunity to remove the Nationalist leaders from the scene, and through the subsequent questioning to lay up a vast amount of evidence against hundreds of Nationalist-minded Moroccans. Ahmad Balafraj was exiled to Corsica. Ahmad Mikwar, imprisoned at the time of the disturbances, was released in the autumn of 1944 but forbidden to return to his home in Fez. Eleven other prominent Nationalists were detained near Mazagan for a year and a half. Umar ibn Abd al-Jalil was allowed to keep his liberty.

The French scored these successes, however, at a high cost. The arrest and prolonged detention of well-known Nationalist leaders and the rigorous questioning of thousands of lesser individuals created popular heroes and aroused the sympathy of Moroccans at large. Previously, the Nationalists had been a small group of eccentrics more or less insulated from the rest of the population; now they included men of all social classes. Recollections of January 1944 and its aftermath, made Nationalist cities of Fez, Rabat, and Salé. Even the Berbers were affected: on a suggestion telephoned from Fez, the students of the Berber college at Azru joined in the demonstration.

While the January declaration was defeated in part, at least, by those divisive factors in Moroccan society which have always impeded development toward political unity, at the same time there may be seen in the popular reaction the beginnings of a

national solidarity. Of even greater significance, Nationalist sentiment began to find a leadership centered in the Sultan's palace at Fez, where it was largely beyond the control and ken of the French. The Sultan, Sidi Muhammad ibn Yusuf, is the titular head of the Makhzen, or native administration. His political status as head of the Filali dynasty, which has ruled most of Morocco since the seventeenth century, is inseparable from his religious position as a sherif, or descendant of the Prophet, for only a sherif may occupy the throne. To Moroccans the Sultan is *Amir al-Muminin*, the Commander of the Faithful. Though the people frequently are critical of or even hostile to the Makhzen, the authority of the Sultan and of the Alawi clan to which he belongs is unassailable; the only possible rivals are to be found in the clan of the Idrisi, the descendants of the eighth-century founders of the Moroccan monarchy.

The Sultan would appear to be an ideal focus for Nationalism, and he has indeed shown more courage and intelligence than the French authorities probably like to see. Since the Nationalist debacle in 1944, he has avoided the question of national independence, but has resisted all infringements of his sovereignty. He has worked zealously for Moroccan education, a field in which the Nationalists have done their most constructive work. The French recently sponsored several new Moslem religious centers, which could be used as media for propaganda; the Sultan has issued a *dahir* forbidding the founding of such centers and the movement of the chiefs of religious brotherhoods throughout the country without his authorization. Many of his speeches emphasize the need for public education. In the past two years he has dedicated a number of schools, and has strongly supported those founded independently by Moroccans.

Nationalism in Morocco is still far from becoming a vital movement, but neither is it dormant. Encouraged by the success of nationalist movements in other Moslem lands, and stimulated by a trend toward unity in Moroccan society, the Nationalist movement, under the cautious leadership of the Sultan, may yet begin to demonstrate a political maturity which it has lacked in the past.

THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT IN IRAN

George Lenczowski

THE FUTURE of Iran, indeed its very existence as an independent political unit, has come to be closely dependent upon the course taken by the young but powerfully supported communist movement of that country. The potential importance of Iranian communism may be appreciated when it is realized that, although organized only so recently as 1942, by 1946 it had succeeded in gaining control of Azerbaijan as well as representation, for a time at least, in the national government. No other political party in Iran can match these successes. By the same token, no other party has been able to claim such generous patronage from a great foreign power.

The fact that there is no officially organized Communist Party in Iran makes little if any material difference, for the movement has operated behind the thin masks of the "Tudeh" and "Democratic" parties, the former being national in scope while the latter is limited to the province of Azerbaijan. In this respect, the situation in Iran differs not at all from that prevailing in some of the countries of eastern Europe, where communist activity is carried on under such party labels as are locally convenient.

ORIGINS AND STRUCTURE OF THE TUDEH PARTY

The roots of communism in Iran reach back at least as far as the reign of the late Reza Shah Pahlevi, when the liberal constitution of 1906 was made largely inoperative. Working through a one-party system, resembling that of contemporary Turkey, the dictatorial Shah tolerated no political opposition.

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Communism was suppressed and many a left-wing politician ended his career in jail or in exile. At the same time Reza Shah exerted himself to ensure Iran's independence from external influence, a task in which he succeeded to a remarkable degree. One of his major achievements, of great benefit to Iran, was the cancellation and subsequent revision of the Anglo-Iranian Company's oil concession. In respect to the Soviet Union, he combined aloof political correctness with economic exchange of equal advantage to both countries.

With the outbreak of World War II, Reza Shah adopted a policy of neutrality which shortly developed into one of benevolence toward Germany. This mistake cost him his throne in August 1941, when British and Soviet troops occupied Iran in order to secure a supply route to the hard-pressed Russians. With the accession of Reza Shah's son, Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlevi, there came a noticeable relaxation of government by authority. This was followed immediately by the appearance of a score or more of newspapers and the organization of some seventeen political parties, among which was the communist-led Tudeh (Masses) Party.

The Tudeh was created on January 30, 1942, by a small group of leftist politicians who had languished in prison during Reza Shah's regime. *Zafar*, one of the Party's daily newspapers, credits the foundation chiefly to Abol Qasem Assadi, Iraj Iskandari, Dr. Morteza Yazdi, Dr. Reza Radmanesh, and Reza Rusta, who "was the first" to begin organizational activity.[1] Jaafar Pishevari, later to become famous in the autonomist movement of Azerbaijan, and nineteen other leftists joined the original nucleus somewhat later.[2] Little is known about the political backgrounds of some of these but there can be no doubt that among them were genuine communists who, in some instances, had lived in the Soviet Union and had been employed by the Comintern. At all events, this is true of Jaafar Pishevari.[3]

[1] *Zafar*, Feb. 2, 1945.

[2] Soleiman Iskandari, Dr. Mohammed Bahrami, Mohammed Yazdi, Jaafar Pishevari, Hosein Jahani, Makinezhad, Boghrati, Mohammed Ali Faridi, Ahmad Isfahani, Mir Qasem Chasm Azar, Rasuli, Rokni, Bozorg Alavi, Abdol Hosein Nushin, Farrohi, Dehgan Eghsantabari, Nur ed-Din Alamuti, Kambakhsh, Ardashir Ovanessian, Zia ed-Din Alamuti. *Zafar*, Feb. 2, 1945.

[3] According to the revelations of Maj. John R. Walsh, U. S. Intelligence Officer attached to the Persian Gulf Command, who states that Pishevari was recruited in 1920 by the Comintern agent, Raskolnikov. *Washington Post*, Mar. 20, 1946.

Professing to represent the interests of workers, peasants, and liberal intellectuals, the Party has nevertheless centered its attention primarily upon the working class.[4] In consequence, the towns, especially those in the former zone of Soviet occupation, have supplied the bulk of the membership. Judged by Iranian standards, the response has been quite extraordinary, even after due allowance is made for wide variations in official and semi-official estimates of the Party's numerical strength. Figures range from fifty to two hundred thousand, with one source claiming forty thousand for Tehran alone in the spring of 1946.[5] It is impossible even to hazard a guess as to the actual number supporting the Party, for membership is not specifically defined, estimates being based on the number willing to take part in demonstrations and other Tudeh-sponsored activities. At the same time, an inner core of the Party is compactly organized and highly disciplined, besides being aided and abetted by the Soviet Union, and is thus able to exercise a powerful influence upon national affairs.

The direction of the Party rests with a small Central Committee and an even smaller Control Commission, about which very little is known either as to composition or as to responsibilities. In August 1944, two and a half years after the Party had been founded, an Assembly of Delegates from the provincial branches of the Party was added at its first congress at Tehran. At the lower levels, the work is carried on by local committees.

The Tudeh is well served by newspapers. The principal Party organ, the daily *Rahbar*, founded in February 1943, enjoyed an estimated circulation of two to five thousand — considerable for Iran — during the years 1943–45. Among those which follow the Party line, although not claiming to represent the Party's policy officially, are: *Zafar*, important medium of the trade unions affiliated with the Party; *Damavand*, presuming to represent the Azerbaijan Turks, although it is published in Tehran; and the weekly *Mardom*, calling itself the mouthpiece of the "antifascist organizations of Iran." Besides these, there are several other newspapers either directly dependent on the Party

[4] *Rahbar*, Feb. 1, 1944; April 19, 30, 1945; June 19, 1945.

[5] *Ibid.*, July 8, 1943; *Washington Post*, Mar. 5, 1946. *Rahbar* boasted in 1943 that the party was the largest in Iran and even in Asia.

or associated with it within the framework of a coalition of newspapers called the "Freedom Front."

THE OFFICIAL PROGRAM OF THE TUDEH

Officially, at least, the Tudeh is non-revolutionary in character. It demands neither the nationalization of private property nor the collectivization of the land. On the contrary, its platform has all the essential features of traditional liberalism, as indeed do those of other Iranian parties. It demands progressive labor legislation, including social insurance; legalization of trade unions; improved standards of living for the peasantry; strict price controls to curb inflation; free education and general health services; elimination of reactionary elements from public life and the restitution of democratic practice; equality for minorities; reform of the judicial system; disarming of the nomad tribes; national industrialization; friendly relations with all of Iran's neighbors; and the elimination of foreign interference.[6] If there is any one thing which distinguishes this program from that of other national parties and gives it a certain uniqueness, it is the strong insistence upon the rights of the working classes.

It would be a mistake, however, to take the official pronouncements of the Tudeh at their face value. To find its true character, one must look behind the façade of formal declarations and observe the Party in action.

THE TUDEH IN ACTION

The first two years of the Party's existence, 1942 and 1943, were devoted largely to organizational activities. During this period the formation of trade unions was encouraged and many mass meetings and demonstrations were arranged. The Party press was also founded, and in the summer of 1943 the "Freedom Front" coalition of newspapers was created with the support of the present Iranian premier, Ahmad Qavam.

Early in 1944 the Tudeh elected eight members to the national

[6] These points were compiled on the basis of the following Party pronouncements: editorial in *Rahbar*, June 25, 1943; appeal to the electorate published by the official Party organ, *Razm*, Sept. 9, 1943; the Party's declaration containing instructions for its deputies in parliament, *Rahbar*, Feb. 28, 1944; resolutions of the Tudeh Congress, *Rahbar*, Aug. 3–15, 1944; *Journal de Teheran*, May 11, 1944.

parliament (Majlis). With the notable exception of Fadakar of Isfahan, instigator of strikes in the British Zone, all of these came from the Soviet-occupied northern provinces. Although their numbers were small, the Tudeh deputies acted as a bloc, unlike the other political representatives in the Majlis, and, so long as they found it expedient, were able to prevent the government from securing a parliamentary quorum.

In the fall of 1944 the Iranian government was confronted with a serious international crisis arising from Soviet demands for an oil concession. The Tudeh openly favored the Soviet Union, accusing the Iranian government of ill will. At the same time, increased agitation of the Party in Isfahan led to bloody disturbances in that town and the occupation of its factories by the workers. This, in turn, led to the suppression of the Tudeh in Isfahan during the spring of 1945.

Rioting against local government officials in the northern cities of Tabriz and Meshed during September 1945 was generally attributed to the Tudeh. In November of that year, the successor and counterpart of the Tudeh emerged in Azerbaijan under the name of the "Democratic Party" and organized a revolt against the government. Iranian troops stationed in the province were immobilized by Soviet forces, and those sent to quell the rising were likewise blocked. The Azerbaijani Democrats proclaimed the autonomy of Azerbaijan and elected a provincial parliament and "government." This "government," headed by Jaafar Pishevari, negotiated an agreement with the central government at Tehran in June 1946, which, however, did not alter in any material way the actual conduct of affairs.

In May 1946 the Tudeh organized an important strike at the oil refinery of Abadan, in the area of British influence, where it set up a Committee of Workers and Toilers. Repeated in July, the strike was accompanied by considerable violence between Tudeh organizers and the Company union. In August, Premier Qavam reorganized his cabinet, offering three portfolios to the Tudeh. At the same time, he reopened negotiations with the Azerbaijani Democrats only to find that this encouraged the southern tribes to revolt against the government on the ground that his policy was too acquiescent to the Tudeh; the negotia-

tions were broken off and the three Tudeh ministers left the government in October. The division of Iran into Tudeh and anti-Tudeh elements, the latter including the well-armed tribes of the south, continues to plague Iran, threatening the separation of provinces such as Azerbaijan and Khuzistan or perhaps another partition of the country into Soviet and British spheres of influence.

The Tudeh has played and continues to play a decisive role in all of these developments. Its skill in propaganda techniques and its able leadership have from the beginning stood it in good stead. Unlike its rivals in Iranian politics, it was born in maturity, and has profited much from the advice and support of the Soviet Union.

EVIDENCES OF SOVIET SUPPORT

There are indications of frequent and close contact between the Tudeh and the Soviet authorities in Iran, although prior to the revolt in Azerbaijan the Tudeh steadfastly denied that any such contact existed. Thus, for example, the official *Rahbar* asserted on May 7, 1944:

> There seems to be an established opinion that the Tudeh Party is an organ of Soviet communists. . . . Why conduct a one-sided policy? Why think that every communist wants only the incorporation of other countries into the Soviet Union? The Tudeh works for the Iranian nation, for the maintenance of our own constitution, for the defense of Iran's independence, for the freedom of Iranian citizens. The Tudeh wants to introduce in Iran democratic principles such as they are in America. If our Party publishes pro-Soviet articles, it is because the Soviets fight well against the fascists. We are sure that the Soviet government neither intends to introduce bolshevik government in Iran, nor to occupy Iran.

After the Azerbaijan revolution had begun such restraint was no longer necessary and Iraj Iskandari, a member of the Tudeh's Central Committee, could declare:

> We are often accused of being Russia's puppets, but this is completely false. We are merely realists. The Tudeh will accept aid from any nation that encourages and supports progressive elements working for the benefit of Iran's population, but it will oppose any attempt to dominate the country. Russia extended its help to us, but Britain opposed the Tudeh Party and went even further by actively supporting reactionaries. . . . So long as the Russians are not harming our country we refuse to believe

> rumors of Soviet domination of Iran. Their only interference came when the reactionary central government tried to send troops to quell the movement. This [Russian] interference was applauded by all anxious to see popular progressive movements grow.[7]

According to press despatches from Tehran, Premier Jaafar Pishevari was even more outspoken. Broadcasting from Tabriz, he openly thanked the Red Army for overthrowing "the tyrannical regime of Iran,"[8] and at another time, after affirming Soviet support in the development of the Democratic Party, inquired whether this was "the first time . . . that a foreign power has aided another country in its struggles against oppression?"[9]

Further indirect evidence of Soviet influence may be observed in the final clause of the Iranian-Soviet Agreement of April 5, 1946, which stipulated that "peaceful arrangements will be made between the [Iranian] government and the people of Azerbaijan for carrying out of improvements in accordance with the existing laws and in benevolent spirit toward the people of Azerbaijan."[10] Premier Pishevari, alluding to this clause in a broadcast during May 1946, remarked that "any attack by the Iranian army on Azerbaijan troops would constitute a breach of the agreement that Premier Qavam had reached with the Soviet Union."[11]

Admissions such as these by the leaders of the Tudeh serve merely to confirm the conclusions of neutral observers that the Tudeh and Democratic parties have been actively supported by the Soviet Union.[12] Additional proof may be found in abundance in the Tudeh press which has followed the official Soviet line with undeviating consistency.[13] The chronicles of recent times are filled with such patron-client relationships, sometimes denied

[7] *New York Times*, Apr. 12, 1946.

[8] *Washington Post*, Apr. 12, 1946.

[9] *Ibid.*, Dec. 12, 1945.

[10] *Ibid.*, Apr. 6, 1946.

[11] Quoted in the *New York Times*, May 15, 1946.

[12] "A pro-Soviet, anti-government Tudeh (Masses) Party has been helped by the Russians. . . . This revolutionary propaganda campaign in Iran at a time when the Soviet Union supposedly had its back to the wall on its German front, is considered a significant example of long-range revolutionary planning and thinking," says Maj. J. R. Walsh in the *Washington Post*, Mar. 21, 1946. See also details of Soviet help to the Democrats in Edwin Muller's article, "Behind the Scenes in Azerbaijan," *American Mercury*, June, 1946.

[13] For example *Iran-i Ma*, Jan. 31, 1945, reprinted a long article from *Pravda* in which Seyyid Zia ed-Din was described as a reactionary, fascist, and enemy of the people. *Rahbar*, Jan. 5, 1945, and *Daria*, Dec. 23, 1944, defended the Greek communists and condemned Great Britain. *Rahbar*, Apr. 27, 1945, *Farman*, Apr. 24, 1945, and *Mardom*, Apr. 27, 1945, asked the admission of the Polish "Lublin" group to San Francisco.

with self-righteous indignation and at other times freely admitted and defended on high moral grounds. It is common practice for the related parties to foster the illusion that the client pursues the local interest exclusively, whereas, in reality, the client's role is also that of advance guard for his patron in the latter's struggle for power with his rivals. Viewed in this sense, the Tudeh's campaign against "fascists" and "reactionaries" in Iran becomes merely a part of the broader Soviet pressure for position and influence in the Middle East.

THE TUDEH ATTACKS THE OPPOSITION

The Tudeh has attacked each successive Iranian government as "fascist" and "reactionary" and in this respect has differed not at all from the other strong pro-Soviet political elements of contemporary times. The formula has been a simple one and was once succinctly stated by the official *Rahbar:* "every government which fights against the worker's movement [meaning the Tudeh] is fascist, [and] every government which acts against the Soviet Union is fascist." [14]

An illustration of the way in which the Tudeh has conducted its campaign against individuals of the opposition may be found in the case of Seyyid Zia ed-Din Tabatabai, who has been a special object of Tudeh attack. Seyyid Zia was once close to the late Reza Shah, with whom he had been associated at the time of the *coup d'état* of 1920, but had later lost favor and was forced to live in exile until 1943, when he returned to Iran, allegedly with British support. He exerted himself at once to organize a nationalistic, pro-British, anti-communist party at first called the Vatan, later renamed Iradeh-yi Melli; and to establish a newspaper, *Raad-i Emruz*, edited by Prince Mozaffar Firuz,[15] which was outspoken in its denunciation of the Tudeh and hostile to Soviet penetration of the country.

Seyyid Zia was believed by many Iranians to be under British control just as the Tudeh was believed by many of them to be

[14] *Rahbar*, Apr. 19, 1944.

[15] Prince Firuz subsequently changed sides, and until his recent appointment as Iranian Ambassador to Moscow served as Vice Premier and chief supporter of a pro-Soviet policy in Qavam's cabinet.

under the control of Russia.[16] However, since he represented a rather conservative point of view even while he gave lip service to liberal ideas, he won the support of those fearing revolution and desiring preservation of the *status quo*, although they were often no friends of the British. Between the two evils — Soviet domination or British domination — many otherwise neutral people, especially among the well-to-do classes, preferred the latter.

The Tudeh had no illusions on this score and fully appreciated the probable consequences of Seyyid's selection as Premier, the office to which he openly aspired. It therefore heaped vilification and abuse upon him. He was compared to Hitler, branded as a "fascist" and "reactionary," and called a traitor and "chief of the quislings." [17] In the spring of 1945, *Rahbar* went so far as to demand of the government that he be punished, threatening that "if the government will not do it, then the Tudeh will take matters into its own hands." Premier Qavam needed no special urging and in March 1946 arrested Seyyid Zia on a charge of conspiring against the government. So far as is known he has remained in detention ever since.

These personal attacks upon Seyyid Zia were part of a broader campaign which the Tudeh has waged from the beginning against the British. The exigencies of the late war imposed some restraint until the end of 1944, but thereafter none has seemed necessary. Britain was repeatedly accused of engaging in the imperialist exploitation of Iran by means of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and was identified as the source of local Iranian "fascism." [18] One of the elements on which the British traditionally base their influence in southern and western Iran is the powerful nomadic tribes of the Qashqai, Bakhtiari, and others in the provinces of Fars, Khuzistan, and Luristan.[19] Consequently, the Tudeh has

[16] A nationalistic, progressive, neutral paper, *Mihan Parestan*, organ of a party bearing the same name, published on Mar. 11, 1944, a characteristic article under the headline: "A voice about the Tudeh and Tabatabai." We read in the text: "Looking at the struggle between Tabatabai and the Tudeh, we come to the conclusion that both parties follow a one-sided policy: the former — pro-British, the latter — pro-Soviet. Such a policy is very dangerous to Iran's independence. Only a national party such as *Mihan Parestan* can direct properly the state."

[17] *Mardom*, Mar. 8, 1944; *Rahbar*, May 7, 1945; *Mardan-i Kar*, May 6, 1944.

[18] *Iran-i Ma*, May 18, 1945; *Rahbar*, May 18, 23, June 4, 19, 22, 1945.

[19] Sir A. T. Wilson, *South-West Persia* (London, 1940).

continuously denounced them, condemning their close relations with British agents, and accusing the British of supplying them with arms.[20] At the very time when the nationalist press was deploring the violence instigated by the Tudeh in the northern provinces, the Tudeh manifested great concern over the lack of security in southern Iran, where, it was asserted, roving armed bands jeopardized the Tudeh clubs and unions.[21]

An element of great importance which the Tudeh has been forced to confront is the Shiite Moslem clergy, traditional enemies of communism, who understood the true character of the Tudeh movement from the outset and hence did not hesitate to counteract its influence.[22] In view of the average Iranian's deep attachment to his religion, the Tudeh has found it expedient to tread warily wherever the interests of the clergy are touched. Official pronouncements have therefore avoided attacks upon religion in general or the clergy in particular, but the Party has not prevented individual members, who can be repudiated, if necessary, from indulging in such activities.[23] There were persistent rumors in Tehran during 1944 and 1945 that the Tudeh had been embarrassed by such anti-religious outbursts and had therefore resolved upon a policy of benevolent neutrality toward Islam. At all events, the Party recruited a mullah named Lankarani, a native of the Caspian provinces, to propagandize for the Tudeh and to reassure those who had become estranged by the Party's materialism. This step coincided with the passage through Iran of a group of mullahs from Soviet Central Asia on a pilgrimage to Mecca, and with a visit of the Grand Sheikh of Islam from the Soviet Caucasus to the Shiite dignitaries of Iran.

United, the opposition to the Tudeh would be formidable indeed. It includes the mullahs, the devout and backward peasant masses, the governing classes, the bureaucracy and the army, the Eradeh-yi Melli Party of Seyyid Zia, the southern tribes, the independent and company trade unions, and the Iranian merchant classes who have long been friendly to the west. These groups remain, however, relatively unorganized and inactive,

[20] *Darya*, Dec. 28, 1944; *Rahbar*, Apr. 6, 1945; *Raade Emruz*, May 25, 1945.
[21] *Rahbar*, Mar. 28, 31, 1945.
[22] *Tehran-i Mosavvar*, Sept. 3, 1943.
[23] *Arzu*, Mar. 6, 1944; *Rahbar*, Nov. 29, 1944.

but even their very passivity constitutes a powerful obstruction to the Tudeh. In the parlance of the Party, most of these elements are "fascists" or "reactionaries;" some, like the peasants, the rank and file of the army, and the lesser administrative bureaucracy, are considered the "fascists'" unconscious or unwilling tools.

WHERE THE TUDEH SEEKS POPULAR SUPPORT

The Tudeh has found its chief support among the industrial working classes, the intelligentsia, and the minority peoples of the country. As has already been indicated, it was among the first of these that the Party organizers initially directed their major attention. Much effort has been expended in the organization of trade unions and the breaking down of those already formed in such places as the factories of Isfahan and the installations of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. Although the Tudeh has relied heavily upon its affiliated unions, even they have not always been completely loyal to the Party's political aims, as was illustrated during the spring of 1945 at Isfahan, an important textile center in the south, where vigorous measures were adopted to purge traitorous elements.[24]

Many of the intellectuals, frequently western trained, have long constituted a class of chronic discontent. Imbued with progressive ideas, anxious to see their country westernized, these young men have found themselves frustrated at every turn in a society still semi-feudal in character. Of course, it is also true that some of them abandon their ideals if they succeed in obtaining good positions in the administration. The fact remains, however, that there are always more members of the intelligentsia than there are jobs available; and it is those left without employment who stand ready to associate with the exponents of revolutionary change. It has been characteristic of the unemployed young intellectuals of Iran in recent years that they turn to the newspapers as a medium for voicing their grievances. This is a principal reason for the proliferation of newspapers since 1941. Many of them appear irregularly and their circulation is often so low that both publishers and editors live in a state of continual

[24] *Rahbar*, Jan. 28, 1945.

financial crisis. Nevertheless, the combined influence of their members is not slight.

The Tudeh found a ready response among many of the intellectual malcontents and saw the wisdom of pooling the influence of the so-called "Freedom Front," composed of about thirty newspapers, some of which are printed only when others are suspended by the government. Since its founding, there has been no evidence of freedom in the "Freedom Front," for all of its members follow identical editorial policies and may therefore be regarded, to all intents and purposes, as obedient instruments of the Party.

It may be observed that the alliance of young intellectuals with the Tudeh is the consequence of expediency rather than of sincere devotion to the communist cause. Basically they would prefer Western democracy to Soviet communism, but they do not find in the attitude of the Western powers toward the Middle East anything justifying the hope of wholesome support. Since many of them are sincerely desirous of radical national reforms, they have been willing to affiliate with the Soviet-supported Tudeh. For much the same basic reasons, the Tudeh has undertaken to make its doctrine more palatable to the intellectuals. It is for them that slogans of liberalism, democracy, and anti-imperialism are employed by the Party; it is for them that it has omitted the word "communism" from its vocabulary,[25] and for them that it has agitated against the employment of foreign advisers by the Iranian government.[26]

The communists have recognized a potential source of strength in the minority groups of Iran. They have consistently appealed to them as loyal and worthy citizens of Iran, and have won a measure of support from such groups as the Armenians and Assyrians.[27] Regionally concentrated peoples, such as the Kurds and the Azerbaijanis, are of peculiar importance to communist aspirations. While propaganda among the Kurds has produced no apparent lasting results, largely because of the strength of their

[25] *Rahbar*, May 18, 1945, denied vigorously that the Tudeh is communist. The Soviet Embassy also strongly protested to the Iranian government when one of the papers suggested that the Tudeh had something to do with communism. *Nedah-yi Azadi*, July 31, 1945.

[26] *Iran-i Ma*, Jan. 23, 1945.

[27] *Mardom*, Dec. 6, 1943; *Mihan Parestan*, Dec. 14, 1943; *Iran-i Ma*, Dec. 21, 1944; *Ali-Baba*, Jan. 16, 1945.

tribal loyalties, the Azerbaijanis have proved most susceptible in view of their pronounced regional aspirations. In a certain sense, the Azerbaijanis cannot be considered a minority group, for although they constitute a geographically concentrated bloc of three and a half million people in a country of fifteen million, and are linguistically and racially different from the Iranians, they have always been an integral part of the Iranian Empire. Many of the nation's best citizens, most prominent statesmen, and ablest soldiers have been Azerbaijanis.[28] It is true that there has been a long tradition of ill feeling between them and the Iranian government authorities, but this ill feeling, until very recently, never expressed itself in the desire for political separation. The Tudeh, aided by the presence of Red troops in the province, contrived to turn public discontent into a demand for regional autonomy.[29] Even if there had been no other reasons, political tactics alone were enough to justify the Tudeh's leadership of the struggle for autonomy, since the control of rich and populous Azerbaijan could determine, to a large degree, the fate and destiny of Iran itself.

AUTONOMOUS AZERBAIJAN

The revolution led by the Democratic Party in Azerbaijan and the subsequent organization of an autonomous regime are too well known to require description here. What does concern us, however, is the way in which the Democratic Party, the local counterpart of the Tudeh, behaved once it assumed power.

The first obvious consequence of the new regime was an even stricter limitation on the movements of foreigners than had prevailed since the Soviet occupation in 1941. An attempt by Colonel William T. Sexton, the American military attaché in Tehran, to see things at first hand was unsuccessful because the armed Democrats put him and those who accompanied him under arrest, and released them only with the understanding that they would return straightway to Tehran.[30] Jaafar Pishevari, the self-proclaimed provincial premier, bluntly declared to the American Consular representative in Tabriz that he could not guarantee

[28] Two recent prime ministers of Iran, Saed and Hakimi, are Azerbaijanis.

[29] Edwin Muller, *loc. cit.*

[30] *New York Times*, June 23, 1946.

his security if he were to leave the consulate and move throughout the province. Vice Consul Robert Rossow, as well as Sexton, had the experience of being arrested by the Democrats.[31] Mr. Sam Souki, the United Press correspondent, who was permitted to visit Tabriz in May 1946, wrote that the town was full of armed Democrat partisans (*fedailar*), and of regular Democratic troops clad in Soviet uniforms with Azerbaijani insignia. He described the atmosphere of Tabriz as that of the "wild west" and stated that among the armed Democrats one could see many of a Slavic type who "could more easily pass for Leningraders than Tabrizians." He added that he had heard "reports that there were persons [there] who had a greater fluency in the Russian language than in any other tongue spoken in Azerbaijan." [32] That such visits of foreign correspondents were not welcomed by the new regime became clear when a Tabriz broadcast said that "the correspondents have been guilty of visiting forbidden sections of the city and photographing. . . . The Azerbaijan Government considers these acts of espionage and has ordered them stopped." [33]

Some light is thrown on the internal working of the regime by a press report that the budget presented to the Azerbaijan parliament was adopted *unanimously* by the deputies.[34] Another report said that "the rebels consisted mostly of Armenians who had migrated into Iran from the Caucasus, and Red Army soldiers from the Caspian Sea port of Baku clad in civilian clothes.[35] Still another stated that "a secret police force along the lines of the Soviet N.K.V.D. has been organized under the leadership of thirty-eight year-old Sadeq Dadar, who recently immigrated to Azerbaijan from Russia," and that "the entire internal security organization in Azerbaijan is dominated by *mohajirs*, people of supposed Iranian birth who emigrated to Russia and recently returned to their native land." [36]

These reports seem to leave little doubt that the Azerbaijan regime did not quite implement "the liberal democracy" it was proclaiming. Men who are quoted by the press as leaders of the Democratic Party and members of its provincial administration

[31] *New York Times*, Mar. 18, 1946.
[32] *Ibid.*, May 20, 1946.
[33] *Ibid.*
[34] *Ibid.*, Apr. 11, 1946.
[35] *Washington Post*, Nov. 11, 1945.
[36] *New York Times*, July 25, 1946.

are often either Russian-born or have had in the past close affiliation with the Russian Communist Party.[37]

What about the reforms of the Azerbaijan regime? There are as yet no indications that it wants to suppress the middle class or nationalize all private property. The proposed legislation, according to Mohammed Biriya, Azerbaijani Minister of Education, "would increase workers' pay, force employers to issue bread and clothing to workers, and authorize the government to establish free health and training centers for them." Biriya also revealed that "plans had been made for a three-college university in Tabriz," adding that "under the proposed education program . . . both Turki and Persian may be taught." [38] In a report submitted by Pishevari to the Azerbaijan parliament in April 1946, it was stated that the autonomous government had started a land distribution program "by which almost 1,000,000 peasants will receive lands," [39] and that "the policy of the government has been first to improve the economic condition of Azerbaijan and then to start social reforms." The government, Pishevari said, had balanced its budget, lowered the cost of consumer goods, and cut the cost of living by "at least 40 per cent." The largest items of expense in the budget were the sums allotted to the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Roads and Communications. Another significant fact is also revealed in the report that the banks in Tabriz holding 3,000,000 tomans or more were taken over by the government.[40]

Thus far, therefore, one can perceive only two reforms of revolutionary character: the distribution of land among the peasants (presumably taken from estates of absentee landlords); and the nationalization of the larger banks. The production and distribution of goods appear to have been left to private initiative. How long this is going to last is difficult to say. Observers may point out that a similar situation prevailed in Russia during

[37] Besides Pishevari: Mohammed Biriya, educated in Russia, Minister of Education; Dr. Salamollah Javid, Minister of Interior, a communist active in the 1919–20 agitation for uniting Azerbaijan with Russia, and Governor-General of Azerbaijan since Pishevari's resignation from the premiership; Sadiq Padegan, born in Russia, chairman of the Central Committee of the Democratic Party; Adalat, member of the Russian Communist Party in Baku, founder of the Democratic Party in Azerbaijan. General Danishiyan, Commander-in-Chief of the Democrat army, speaks broken Turkish; knows no Persian; speaks, reads, and writes fluently only Russian.

[38] *New York Times*, May 23, 1946.

[39] *Washington Post*, Apr. 12, 1946.

[40] *New York Times*, Apr. 11, 1946.

the New Economic Policy period, and that the N.E.P. constituted only a tactical retreat in order "first to improve the economic condition" of the country (to use Pishevari's words in relation to Azerbaijan).

THROUGH CONTROL OF THE PROVINCE TO CONTROL OF THE COUNTRY

Do the Iranian communists want the separation of Azerbaijan from Iran? No evidence yet exists to support such an assumption. It would seem that they consider an autonomous Azerbaijan under their exclusive control as a useful means of increasing their influence in Iran rather than as a preparatory stage toward complete emancipation or incorporation into the Soviet Union.

According to a Moscow radio broadcast on September 13, 1945, the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan has demanded that the Azerbaijani people should be represented by one-third the total membership in the Iranian parliament instead of one-sixth.[41] Another report quoted Pishevari as having stated that his province did not want to be separated from Iran.[42] At the same time, the Tudeh in Tehran declared itself in favor of adding a Senate to the existing single-chamber parliament of Iran. The Party called this proposal the "first step" in bringing an autonomous Azerbaijan "back into the framework of the Persian state." [43] A foreign observer expressed the opinion in April 1946, that the Soviets desired the return of Azerbaijan to the central government because "they intend to use the Province as a lever to control all of Persia." [44]

This view seemed to have been justified by the conclusion, in June 1946, of the agreement between Premier Qavam of Iran and "Premier" Pishevari of Azerbaijan, by which Azerbaijan returned to the Iranian state as an autonomous province on the basis of Qavam's proposals.[45] The agreement, however, turned

[41] *Washington Post*, Nov. 19, 1945.
[42] *Ibid.*, Apr. 12, 1946.
[43] *Ibid.*, Apr. 10, 1946.
[44] *New York Times*, Apr. 26, 1946.
[45] These proposals, known as the "seven point program," were formulated by Premier Qavam on April 22, 1946, and ran as follows: 1. recognition of internal reforms in Azerbaijan; 2. freedom to be granted to the Democratic and other parties in Azerbaijan; 3. no action to be taken against the separatists; 4. adjustment of Azerbaijani representation in the Iranian parliament; 5. officers of civilian administration in Azerbaijan to be elected by provincial and city councils, but subject to orders from Tehran; 6. official language to be Persian, although Turki would be taught in schools; 7. central government to appoint the province's governor as well as its army and

out to be a formality which did not materially affect the situation. According to press reports in the summer of 1946, Iranian army and civil servants still did not have access to Azerbaijan.[46] These difficulties brought about a renewal of negotiations between the capital and the province which, however, broke down in October simultaneously with the dropping of the three Tudeh members from Premier Qavam's cabinet. The issue again came to a climax with the central government's occupation of Azerbaijan in December 1946, and the ultimate course of developments continues in doubt.

It is still difficult to estimate the true strength of the communist movement in Iran today. There is no doubt that, although the Party makes a strong appeal to the masses, it is far from enjoying the support of the majority of Iranians. It is not even quite certain whether the majority of Azerbaijanis supported their own autonomous administration. But if Azerbaijan, under the administration of the Democrats, gained increased representation in the central parliament, the communists and their supporters would constitute such a powerful bloc of deputies that no Iranian government would dare to disregard their attitude. In this the Party may count upon an important psychological factor — namely, the widespread fear in Iran that too strong an opposition to its activities may result in renewed intervention by the USSR. The future of the Tudeh and of Iran is thus clearly bound to the shifting balance of strength among the Great Powers and, in particular, to the advantages which the Soviet Union will feel may be gained by the withdrawal or the extension of its influence in Iran.

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police commanders on the recommendation of the provincial assembly. *New York Times*, June 12, 1946.

[46] *New York Times*, Aug. 15, 26, 1946.

THE STRUGGLE FOR MULTI-PARTY GOVERNMENT IN TURKEY

Ahmet Emin Yalman

THE people of Turkey are now facing a decision as to whether they will continue to be ruled by a single-party, highly centralized government in the control of vested interests, or by a multi-party government of their own direct choice. As in 1908 and 1919, strong pressure for domestic change has become active in the face of a foreign threat of major importance. The situation, therefore, is deserving of close study, both for its own merits and for its bearing on the world crisis.

To render a comprehensive analysis of current political trends in Turkey it is first necessary to outline at least the more recent steps in the historical process of which they are the outcome. The miracle of the establishment of the Republic of Turkey was achieved through the application of a democratic spirit in public affairs. When the revolutionary "Government of the Grand National Assembly" was set up in Ankara on April 23, 1920, Mustafa Kemal had the foresight to comprehend that it would be impossible to handle as a personal dictator the situation then obtaining, and that the consent and active co-operation of the people were essential for the success of the enterprise. A violent opposition in the Assembly, therefore, was not only tolerated

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but welcomed and respected. This experiment, successfully carried out under the most trying circumstances, demonstrated that Turkey was ready for democracy. This democratic spirit enabled Turkey to win the War of Independence, and to obtain the only peace by negotiation and consent to follow World War I. It was this spirit also that rendered possible the liquidation of old, established institutions such as the Ottoman dynasty and the Khalifate.

The fact that such sweeping revolutionary steps could be carried out, not by dictatorial measures but by persuasion, should have been proof enough that a dictatorship was by no means a necessity to continue the work so happily started. But authoritarian government returned as the result of a successful and popular leader's urge for personal power, and under the influence of the entourage of flatterers and obedient followers that formed around him and used the urgent need for reforms as an excuse for establishing a potent system based on centralized power.

Many of the leaders who faithfully co-operated with Gazi Mustafa Kemal during the War of Independence felt convinced that a democratic system of government, which had been conducted efficiently and successfully in time of war, could become a still greater success in time of peace; and that there was no necessity or excuse for falling back upon arbitrary and irresponsible methods. They became increasingly critical of the aspirations of the Gazi. They urged him, as the head of the state, to play the role of a neutral arbitrator between conflicting political groups, and so use his influence and prestige for stability and goodwill rather than for personal power. Mustafa Kemal, however, chose to be the active head of the "People's Party of the Republic" which he had founded, a decision that led to the establishment of a one-party dictatorship in which the functions of the state and government were gradually subordinated to the interests of the single political party. Those opposing this tendency formed the "Republican Progressive Party," a development which the party in power at first welcomed as evidence of the complete democratization of the country, but soon found to be undesirable as it instigated, in conjunction with a free press,

a barrage of criticism that rendered absolute personal power impossible. A revolt in 1925 of Kurdish tribes in the eastern provinces was used as a pretext for dissolving the Progressive Party and for silencing the press. All opposition and independent journalists, their papers suppressed, were arrested and sent before a "Tribunal of Independence" sitting in the revolt area. The charge was "causing the revolt by undermining the authority of the government." Although the tribunal found the charge not to correspond to the facts and released the newspaper men, the suspended papers were not allowed to reappear.

The Turkish "democracy," in the meantime, continued to function in form but with a nominated Assembly. The actual rule was one of dictatorship and tutelage under the pretense of preparing the people to govern themselves. The system was characterized by the mildest forms of repression, however, and its balance sheet shows fundamental gains against the obvious and unavoidable losses. Mustafa Kemal's regime cured Turkey of one terrible disease which has proved to be the unmaking of many national organisms: it eradicated all germs of irredentism, imperialism, and aggressive militarism. Turkey's program of radical domestic reforms also is well known. But against such achievements must be laid heavy moral losses, for no dictatorship has remained "enlightened" for long. The selection of men for public offices became dependent upon obedience to the People's Party. The government attracted either men of doubtful character trying to satisfy their personal ambitions in return for allegiance to the regime, or meek, conservative people who considered the existing order to be the best possible. People of merit, self-sacrifice, and of bold personality were excluded; the vital advantages of selecting the most fit and reliable thus were lost to the community.

The prospects in Turkey as a result of such conditions became so dark by 1930 that Mustafa Kemal considered it imperative to create a second party of opposition, and to re-establish the liberty of the press. The "Free Party" led by Fethi Okyar, a former Prime Minister, proved so popular that any real election at that time would have surely yielded results overwhelmingly adverse to the government. Those in power therefore shortly

dissolved the too militant Free Party, just as the Progressive Party had been dissolved in 1925, under the pretense that the Turkish people were not yet ready to rule themselves. The real state of things was that those in control of the vested interests established as a result of the one-party system were terrified at the prospect of the establishment of an era of equal opportunity which would put an end to privilege and favoritism.

In order to counteract further the unpopularity of the regime, extensive reforms were initiated by the government party. Two Five Year Plans were adopted for the industrialization of Turkey, the efficient exploitation of mining resources, the development of water power, and so forth. In theory the new economic policy was to be the following: Private initiative and capital were accepted as the basis of the system. However, as the people of Turkey were not in a position to accumulate the capital necessary to finance the proposed projects themselves, a provisional system of state capitalism was to be ushered in to cover any field for which sufficient private capital was lacking. Financing was to be accomplished by a series of holding banks operating in accordance with commercial methods but remaining exempt from governmental laws. Each enterprise was to manage itself as a public utility corporation; centralization was to be avoided.

The system produced good results. Since many projects had to be accomplished within a limited time, there developed a demand for an enterprising and reliable administration, in contrast with the more usual governmental red tape. The era had beneficial effects of a general character on public life, and proved to be at least a temporary remedy for evils created by the lack of freedom to criticize. Gradually this restriction also was relaxed to the extent that minor evils might be attacked, although a frontal assault on the existing system would hardly have been countenanced. Journalists of long standing whose papers had been suspended were allowed to return to their profession.

In spite of these sound tendencies, the system of centralized patronage failed to solve any basic problems. It could not create interest in public life, nor could it lead to any sustained development, for obedience to the Party still remained the keynote of selection in public life. Nevertheless, the balance sheet of Mustafa

Kemal Atatürk's period of leadership remained favorable. Its assets greatly exceeded its liabilities; the people felt genuine gratitude toward the great leader and sincerely mourned his death in 1938.

Those who feared that the regime in Turkey was merely a personal one and would fall to pieces at the death of Atatürk were agreeably surprised to find that it continued almost without a shock. Ismet Inönü, the new president, had been the closest associate of the dead leader over long years as Prime Minister of the government. He was known as a man concerned with upholding public interests as against private; he had often acted as a check on the caprices of the former head of the state.

At the time of his election to the presidency, however, Inönü was not the only leader in the public life of Turkey; the other was Celal Bayar, who had succeeded Inönü as Prime Minister in 1937. Although the two men had worked for years in the same cabinet, they represented different mentalities. Inönü, a professional soldier, believed in a centralized handling of public authority. Bayar, a banking official, stood for free initiative and a system based on mutual confidence. Upon the death of Atatürk, Bayar's political friends had urged him to attempt to keep his position as Prime Minister; but he showed remarkable abnegation in yielding to Ismet Inönü in order to avoid the possibility of an open clash between factions of the Party.

Celal Bayar was soon dismissed as Prime Minister. The whole system of dependence upon the initiative of capable and well-paid individuals in running public economic enterprises was immediately discontinued; the Maritime Bank, Bayar's last creation, was dissolved. The new *Barem* Law reduced the salaries in state banks and in state economic undertakings to the level of those of government officials, who were already very much underpaid. As a result, enterprising men left public institutions to enter private business. The administration of the government became increasingly centralized. The expenditure of state enterprises went up, while their efficiency and output decreased in comparison. The beneficial influence of free commercial methods disappeared entirely from government undertakings.

Soon after Ismet Inönü acceded to the Presidency, World

War II broke out. The foreign policy of Turkey at this time was remarkably successful and certainly should be put to the credit of the government. On the other hand, the domestic policy of the People's Party showed little of the same courageous and wise spirit. Constant intervention and half-measures created a chaos which favored the cunning, offered opportunities for illicit practices, and checked only honest people and normal activity. The cost of living rose 400 per cent in a country which was selling its products at high prices to the belligerents. The practice of taking measures without consulting competent people led from crisis to crisis, from blind experiment to blind experiment. The final outcome as a measure of financial "balance" and pretended social justice, was a law passed late in 1942 levying a heavy tax on capital. It was drawn up without any definite basis of assessment and without the right of appeal, punishing with exile those who did not pay the full sum levied although they might easily prove their total incapacity to do so. There was arbitrary discrimination in the application of the law. A similar procedure was followed in the levying of a land products tax in kind. Its application was so impractical and so unjust that dissatisfaction among the peasants became general.

Although the rise in the cost of living reached 400 per cent, the salaries of government officials were increased by only 25 per cent. As it became impossible to live on the ordinary salary, and since such factors as local differences in the cost of living and the size of the family to be supported were not taken into consideration, corruption among civil servants became almost unavoidable. Every citizen had some sort of grievance, some sort of reason to be dissatisfied with his lot. Yet grievances could not be freely discussed, because the famous Article 50 of the Press Law gave the government the right to suspend a paper indefinitely for "not complying with the policy of the government." A suspended paper had no possibility of redress.

As to criticism among the deputies to the National Assembly, some took place in the secret meetings of the People's Party Assembly Group. Since all the members of the Assembly belonged to the same party, this meant in practice that critical discussion was tolerated only in secret session. Except for occasional pas-

sionate outbursts, most of the criticism concerned minor details. Nomination as a member of the Assembly had assumed the character of an exceptional promotion in public service. Those who were lucky enough to obtain a seat were careful not to forfeit their means of subsistence by indulging in criticism, as experience showed that habitual dissenters incurred the displeasure of those who directed party nominations.

Another reason for dissatisfaction was a movement, initiated by the Party leaders, to establish a "pure" Turkish language. Thousands of familiar words of Arabic or Persian origin were eliminated in favor of others, some of which were intelligible because they were derived from Turkish roots, but many of which were entirely artificial and unknown. The forced introduction of such a language through government authority became a cause of discontent. It created a gulf between older and younger generations, a cultural break with the national past. As newspapers generally resisted the pressure to accept the new words, anarchy in the written language was complete.

Those in charge of the People's Party after the death of Atatürk again felt the need of taking measures to meet some of these causes of dissatisfaction and to prove their contention that they were gradually preparing the Turkish people to become the master of its own destiny. An experiment taken in this direction was the institution of an official opposition in the Assembly under the name of the "Independent Group." Ismet Inönü, the "unchangeable" leader of the People's Party, was at the same time the leader of this group. He appointed its executive head and members. Those transferred to this "opposition" could be put back into the normal party without their knowledge. They could be present during the meetings of the People's Party Assembly Group without taking part in any vote; but at the same time could hold their own separate meetings. The Independent Group did no more than criticize discreetly certain government measures, or vaguely hint that a particular problem needed more careful attention. In addition, the voters at by-elections were given the opportunity of voting freely for any of the independent candidates registered. In several of the general elections, the Party entered more than the candidates required

in some districts; the voters could choose among them. Although dissenters within the Party were not normally nominated for election, a single exception was made in the case of Hikmet Bayur, a former minister of education, who was a violent critic of various measures adopted by the government. His being tolerated and each time re-elected enabled the Party to pretend that it was tolerant of criticism. A similarly liberal attitude was taken in regard to newspaper criticism. The Party abstained from establishing a censorship; within certain limits, at which editors were forced to guess, the newspapers were free to publish what they liked. They had to face, of course, the risk of arbitrary suspension without any possibility of defense. Such suspensions were for a few days at first, then were more frequently extended to several months. Usually, however, the reading public showed such sympathy for these martyred newspapers that financial losses were covered by the increase in circulation which followed each suspension.

This relatively stagnant situation came to a sudden turning point in 1945 when the Charter of the United Nations came to be discussed in the National Assembly. Adnan Menderes, deputy for Aydin, emphasized that Turkey, by signing the Charter, had definitely engaged to practice genuine democracy. Celal Bayar, the ex-Prime Minister, together with Fuat Köprülü, an authority of international standing on Turkish history, Adnan Menderes, and Refik Koraltan presented a joint motion that the Party respect the word and spirit of the Turkish Constitution, and modify all laws of an unconstitutional and dictatorial character. The motion being rejected after a violent discussion, Fuat Köprülü and Adnan Menderes published articles in an independent paper explaining their views. This act was considered a breach of Party discipline and both gentlemen were expelled. Refik Koraltan showed his solidarity with his two political associates by criticizing the decision of the Party in a statement published in the same independent paper. Celal Bayar, for his part, resigned his seat in the Assembly.

These four men, together with a very limited number of associates, set themselves to work to organize the new "Democratic Party." At the same time, President Inönü's speech at the

opening of the National Assembly on November 2, 1945, proved to be encouraging to them: he recommended a change to a system of direct, secret voting, from the two-degree system provided by an electoral law originally drafted in 1876 and maintained until then with few modifications. He also expressed himself in favor of the repeal of all unconstitutional laws, particularly those concerning the press, associations, and duties of the police. He especially deplored the absence of an opposition party.

In the following winter of 1945–46 the Turkish press began to indulge in free criticism of the one-party system. No feature was spared, and the people showed intense interest in the open discussion of their troubles. Apathy disappeared, to be replaced by a reawakened optimism. The extremist tendencies of right and left, so strong among the younger generation, vanished in favor of an objective and practical attitude toward the political and social issues to be faced. The peasants of Turkey, usually so cautious and reluctant in their approach to public problems, started to show an unprecedented interest in politics. A new era seemed to be dawning.

It took the organizers of the Democratic Party several months to prepare their program and the basis of their organization. In doing this, they had to avoid numerous pitfalls. Leftist sympathizers attempted to influence and even dominate the party. Next came an effort on the part of rightists to force the party into the championship of a corporate state. A tendency to pose as direct heirs to Atatürk had also to be countered, for it was essential to keep the party from becoming a grouping of personal friends.

The program, as finally drafted, was not very different from that of the People's Party, for the latter's six fundamental principles (that Turkey is nationalist, democratic, *étatist*, laic, republican, and evolutionist) had been incorporated into the constitution of the Turkish Republic and no association disagreeing with them could be legally established. When the Democratic Party was officially registered in January 1946, therefore, its platform was largely a statement of the interpretation it placed upon these six tenets. The essential point of opposition to the People's Party lay in the Democrats' understand-

ing of *étatism*. The policy of the People's Party had been, in theory, to rely primarily on private initiative and to accomplish through state ownership only those economic ends for which private individuals did not yet possess the material means. In practice, however, this principle had been overlooked. The state had become an end in itself, and government officials had gradually formed the habit of viewing private enterprise as an undertaking of competitors not entitled to help or indulgence. The fact that state officials were underpaid, while private merchants theoretically could realize unlimited profits, contributed greatly to the formation of this attitude.

The Democratic Party accepted state ownership only for certain key industries which were to feed private enterprises. These state-owned institutions were to be kept beyond the influence of particular governmental interests, and were not to come into competition with the endeavors of private individuals. Nor should the government initiate economic ventures for profit-making purposes. The key activities reserved to the state were to be confined to transportation, the production of electric power, the regulation of water power, and mining.

The significance of the Democratic Party did not consist in the wording of its program, but in the fact that its aims and ideals had emerged from the government's failure to apply various principles which were embodied in the constitution. The men who formed the new party had had a close view of the government's shortcomings. They had shared for many years the legal and moral responsibility for tolerating them, and had learned by experience the remedies needed for a radical cure. The fierce pressure from the vested interests of the former single party created a solidarity among the Democratic Party leaders, and strengthened their determination to avoid the risks inherent in over-centralization and domination by a single individual.

Circumstances helped the Democrats. Dissatisfaction was so general that any opposition party of a serious character was sure to get a quick response. The broad-minded spirit displayed by the organizers of the Democratic Party, coupled with the strong support of a majority of the independent daily papers, created such a favorable atmosphere that branches of the party soon sprang

up throughout the country, thus assuring it wide popular support.

The Democratic Party also met, at first, a friendly spirit in certain sections of the People's Party. The Progressive Party in 1924, and the Free Party in 1930 had gone through similar, but short, honeymoon periods. In the present instance President Inönü seemed to be desirous of having his party play the new game correctly, and to accept frankly the risks inherent in a normal election. He even stated that he would enjoy becoming an opposition leader like Mr. Churchill. Such a course was not, however, to the liking of certain elements which might have welcomed a weak second party in order to fill out the picture of a democratic Turkey for the eyes of the outside world, and to render more legitimate and firm their own hold over the country, but were alarmed at the unexpected strength of the opposition. These elements in the People's Party started a general offensive to destroy confidence in the new party and its supporters among the press. The main means of agitation consisted of the insinuation that the Democrats were friendly to Russia. As a matter of fact, there was perfect unanimity in Turkey regarding the attitude to be taken towards Russian demands. The dissension in domestic politics had rendered this unanimity even more effective as it became one of conscious determination of free citizens, instead of an obedient concentration around a personal leader. The accusation levelled at the Democrats failed to produce the expected effect, for such a denial of national unity regarding the foreign danger displeased the general public and was considered by them as an unforgivable political blunder.

In the face of the increasing strength of the Democratic Party, the People's Party determined upon the expediency of advancing the elections. Although President Inönü had given reasons in his speech at the opening of the Assembly on November 2, 1945, why the elections should not take place before the normal date in the spring of 1947, he later advanced other reasons to explain why municipal elections should take place immediately in the spring of 1946 and general elections in that same summer. Speaking before an extraordinary convention of the People's Party, he asked for several changes in its program in order that a more "democratic" orientation might be possible. One of his recommenda-

tions concerned the personal title of "unchangeable national chief" which he had been given when he became President of the Republic. Others concerned the acceptance of a single-degree, direct election system, and an extension of the privilege of forming associations.

The Democratic Party countered with a proclamation declaring the advance of the elections during the very period of its formation to be unfair and unjustified by circumstances. It decided, after due consultation with its branches, to abstain from the municipal elections. In a number of localities, nevertheless, party members on their own initiative took part in the elections and were actually chosen as a result of direct popular support. The Democrats later decided to enter the general legislative elections, although they continued to protest against the methods of the party in power and had no illusions as to the manner in which the elections would be handled.

These elections took place on July 21, 1946. The official results showed that the Democratic Party and the few Independents on the ballots had won 70 of the 416 seats. The Democrats questioned the validity of the election of 300 People's Party nominees, advancing complete documentary evidence in many cases. The majority party ignored the objections and accepted the mandates of all its candidates. Following its defeat, the Democratic Party faced the choice of retiring from the Assembly and declaring it not to be legitimate, or of staying on under protest. It finally decided in favor of the latter course in view of the foreign danger to the nation, and of the progress made in the first six months of its existence. Well organized and popular, it could afford to be patient.

The cabinet of Şükrü Saracoğlu resigned on the eve of the meeting of the new Assembly in August, and a new cabinet representing politically the most intolerant elements of the People's Party, but including nevertheless a few able statesmen in the economic field, came to power. Its first act was to alter the press and libel laws in such a way that criticism of the government could be interpreted as an act of distrust in public authority, and therefore severely punishable by law. The only protection for the press now consists in the fact that the cabinet can no

longer proceed arbitrarily in the suspension of a newspaper; proceedings of this sort must pass through a court of law.

As things stand today, Turkey is still in the grip of the conflict between the Turkish people and the privileged holders of vested interests. The public is thirsty for a dependable and lasting order of things which will make democracy a living matter instead of a system existing only on paper. A great deal of distance has been covered towards this ideal; with increased opportunities of education, and with a legally organized opposition firmly established in the National Assembly, a relapse into the state of total domination by one party is hardly conceivable. In case a broad-minded rule of law and order can be made to prevail in Turkey, the Turkish nation, with its firm but peaceful good-neighbor policy and its final determination to look upon any imperialist tendency as a liability, can be expected to become an important element of stability in the Near and Middle East.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE PROBLEM OF THE TURKISH STRAITS

A Reference Article

Harry N. Howard

ALTHOUGH the political and strategic interests of the United States in the Turkish Straits are less direct than those of the great European powers, the American Government has recently displayed an interest in fostering a regime of the Straits which would contribute to the peace, stability, and security of the regions served and affected by them. The United States has also evidenced concern for the preservation of the freedom of commerce and navigation in the Straits, which the Montreux Convention of 1936 — to which the United States was not, however, a party — guaranteed in perpetuity. The stand taken has been almost entirely a matter of principle, for the Straits have never played a great role in American commerce and shipping. Only one American merchant vessel passed the Straits in 1908; in 1913 American tonnage was not even listed. In 1924 a total of 47 American ships, of 259,938 tons and representing about 2 per cent of all traffic, was reported. The average since then has been around 200,000 tons annually, although at times it has exceeded 400,000 tons (1930). American trade with Turkey as a whole also remained small in the inter-war period, although it grew steadily in the 1930's. In 1939 and 1940 Ameri-

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can imports from Turkey amounted to $11,684,854 and $7,446,-932, respectively, while exports to Turkey totalled $18,214,737 and $15,738,738.[1]

I

U. S. POLICY PRIOR TO WORLD WAR I

Before 1914 the United States did not greatly concern itself with the problem of the Straits, although American policy favored freedom of passage for both commercial and war vessels. The American-Turkish Treaty of May 7, 1830, gave American commercial vessels freedom of passage according to the most-favored-nation principle, but made no mention of the right of passage for warships. These principles were reaffirmed in the American-Turkish Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of February 25, 1862.[2]

The problem of the passage of American warships through the Straits first arose in 1858, when the United States obtained a firman admitting a light warship for legation service and promptly sent the fifty-gun frigate *Wabash* to Constantinople, although it was soon withdrawn because of British, French, and Russian protests.[3] The dispatch of the U.S.S. *Franklin* to the Bosporus in 1868 caused similar trouble and brought an Ottoman note declaring that in the future only light vessels would be allowed to pass the Straits.[4]

The conclusion of the Convention of London, March 13, 1871, which provided for closure of the Straits to warships, occasioned

[1] For a history of American-Turkish relations see L. J. Gordon, *American Relations with Turkey, 1830–1930: An Economic Interpretation* (Philadelphia, 1932).

[2] Article VII declared: "Merchant vessels of the United States, in like manner as vessels of the most favored nations, shall have liberty to pass the canal of the Imperial Residence, and go and come in the Black Sea, either laden or in ballast; and they may be laden with the produce, manufactures and effects, of the Ottoman Empire, excepting such as are prohibited, as well as of their own country." See D. H. Miller, *Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America* (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1933), III, pp. 541–98; W. M. Malloy, *Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols and Agreements between the United States of America and Other Powers, 1776–1909* (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1910), II, pp. 1321–28.

[3] C. Phillipson and N. Buxton, *The Question of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles* (London, 1917), pp. 151–52.

[4] Department of State, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States* [*U.S.F.R.*] (1868), Pt. II, pp. 110–20. The note of Safvet Pasha, September 28, 1868, declared that "henceforward, there will positively be no exception but for vessels of war which may have on board a sovereign or the chief of a foreign state."

an American statement of principle. Some weeks prior to the conclusion of this convention, Hamilton Fish, the American Secretary of State, had declared that

> the United States, not having been a party to the Treaty of Paris, may have more or less reason to complain of any curtailment of their rights under the law of nations which it may have affected. No formal complaint on the subject, however, has yet been addressed to either of the parties to that instrument, though the restriction which it imposes on the right of our men-of-war to the passage of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus is under serious consideration.[5]

On May 5, 1871, several weeks after the Convention of London had been signed, Mr. Fish advised Wayne MacVeagh, the American Minister in Constantinople, as follows:

> This Government is not disposed to prematurely raise any question to disturb the existing control which Turkey claims over the Straits leading into the Euxine. It has observed the acquiescence of other powers whose greater propinquity would suggest more intimate interests in the usage whereby the Porte claims the right to exclude the national vessels of other powers from the passage of the Straits.
>
> But while this Government does not deny the existence of the usage, and has had no occasion to question the propriety of its observance, *the President deems it important to avoid recognizing it as a right under the law of nations.*

The Turkish position in relation to the Euxine was compared with that of Denmark in relation to the Baltic Sea, "with the difference that the former is sovereign over the soil on both sides of the Straits, while Sweden owns the territory on the east of the sound leading to the Baltic." The American Government was not aware that Denmark claimed the right to exclude foreign warships from the Baltic merely because in proceeding thither they had to pass within cannon shot of her shores.

> If this right has been claimed by Turkey in respect to the Black Sea, it must have originated at a time when she was positively and comparatively in a much more advantageous position to enforce it than she now is. The Black Sea, like the Baltic, is a vast expanse of waters, which wash the shores not alone of Turkish territory, but those of another great power who may, in time of peace, at least, expect visits from men-of-war of friendly states. It seems unfair that any such claim as that of Turkey should be set up as a bar to such an intercourse, or that the privilege should in any way be subject to her sufferance.

[5] Department of State, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States* [*U.S.F.R.*] (1871), p. 1890.

> There is no practical question making it necessary at present to discuss the subject, but should occasion arise when you are called upon to refer to it, you will bear in mind the distinction taken above, and be cautious to go no further than to recognize the exclusion of the vessels as a usage.[6]

Two years later, on January 3, 1873, Mr. Fish reasserted the American policy:

> The abstract right of the Turkish Government to obstruct the navigation of the Dardanelles even to vessels of war in time of peace is a serious question. The right, however, has for a long time been claimed and has been sanctioned by treaties between Turkey and certain European states. A proper occasion may arise for us to dispute the applicability of the claim to United States men-of-war. Meanwhile it is deemed expedient to acquiesce in the exclusion.[7]

It was not until more than twenty years later that the American Government was to test the principle of closure of the Straits to warships again. In November 1895, the 2,000 ton American cruiser *Marblehead* was refused permission to enter the Dardanelles. Sultan Abdul Hamid expressed the fear "that other powers would seek to follow the example," and especially requested that the American ship not come to the Dardanelles.[8] At about the same time, Mr. Terrell, the American Minister to the Ottoman Empire, requested permission for the U.S.S. *Bancroft* to pass through the Straits, since it had been authorized to remain at the disposal of the American Legation at Constantinople; but the request appears to have been denied because the United States was not a party to the Treaty of Paris of 1856, which gave the right to signatories to have war vessels permanently stationed at Constantinople for the service of the legations.[9]

[6] Department of State, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States* [*U.S.F.R.*] (1871), pp. 902–3.

[7] John Bassett Moore, *A Digest of International Law* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1906), I, p. 667. Mr. Fish to Mr. Boker, Minister to Turkey, January 3, 1873. In December, 1872, the commander of the U.S.S. *Shenandoah* made an unauthorized request to pass the Dardanelles, but it was countermanded by the Navy Department. Mr. Fish advised Mr. Boker on January 25, 1873, that the United States was not "a party to the convention which professes to exclude vessels of war from the Dardanelles; although it is disposed to respect the traditional sensibility of the Porte as to that passage . . ." *Ibid.*, I, p. 668. Captain Rhind of the U.S.S. *Congress* made a similarly unauthorized request to pass the Straits late in 1872.

[8] *U.S.F.R.* (1895), II, pp. 1344, 1383–85.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 1461. Mavroyeni Bey, Turkish Minister to the United States, to Mr. Olney, Secretary of State, January 16, 1896.

II

U. S. POLICY FROM WORLD WAR I TO WORLD WAR II

The problem of the Straits became a significant point of American policy with the entry of the United States into World War I. At a conference held at the White House on April 30, 1917, President Wilson, Mr. Arthur James Balfour, and Colonel E. M. House discussed the problem of the post-war internationalization of the region of Constantinople and the Straits. Colonel House, while agreeing in principle with President Wilson and Mr. Balfour that the region should be placed under some kind of international regime, pointed out the implications of such internationalization in connection with a possible similar attempt to internationalize the Danish Sound or the Suez and Panama Canals. Neither President Wilson nor Mr. Balfour, however, thought these questions "had much in common."[10]

In his Fourteen Points Address of January 8, 1918, President Wilson declared that "the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees." Somewhat later Secretary of State Robert Lansing outlined a project for placing Constantinople under an international protectorate or a government which would act as mandatory. The commission or mandatory was to be charged with "the regulation of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus as international waterways."[11] In the official commentary of October 1918, on the Fourteen Points, it is proposed that Constantinople and the Straits be internationalized, either collectively or under a mandate of a league of nations.[12]

[10] Charles Seymour, *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House* (Boston, 1926–28), III, pp. 38–39, 43–45.

[11] R. S. Baker and W. E. Dodd, *The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson* (New York, 1927), III, pp. 160–61. Point XII. See also Lansing's memorandum of September 21, 1918, in Robert Lansing, *The Peace Negotiations* (Boston, 1921), pp. 192–97.

[12] Seymour, *op. cit.*, IV, pp. 199–200. In a draft memorandum of July 31, 1918, based on Wilson's twelfth point, David Hunter Miller pointed out three elements of the Turkish problem: 1) secure sovereignty for the Turkish portions of the Ottoman Empire; 2) assure security of life and opportunity for the non-Turkish portions of the Empire; and 3) guarantee free passage of the Straits for ships of commerce of all nations under international guarantees. Among other things, Mr. Miller pointed out that "if international guarantees of freedom of the Straits are to be effective, international control of those waters is essential and further, international control of the adjacent shores. If Turkish sovereignty in any form, nominal, or otherwise, is to continue over these waters and lands, or any part of them, it will necessarily be limited by and subject to such

David Hunter Miller, legal adviser to President Wilson, and Lord Eustace Percy of the British Foreign Office, discussed the problem of internationalization of the Straits on December 2, 1918, in Paris. Lord Eustace not only suggested that the region of the Straits and Constantinople should be placed under the League of Nations, and that the United States should assume the mandate both for that region and for Macedonia, but "went so far as to suggest that, if the formulation of general principles were attempted, the Panama Canal would come in the same class as the Straits." Mr. Miller, however, replied that such "a grouping seemed hardly among the possibilities" and thought that Lord Eustace's "Panama Canal suggestion was an attempt to show difficulties in the way of idealistic principles of United States."[13]

In its statement of January 21, 1919, the Intelligence Section of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace recommended the establishment of an international state in the region of Constantinople, with a power appointed as mandatory under the League of Nations. It also recommended "that the Bosphorus, Sea of Marmora, and Dardanelles be permanently opened as a free passageway to the ships of commerce of all nations, under international guarantees." This principle was "in such full harmony with the spirit of the new world order, and is so nearly axiomatic from the standpoint of international justice, as to require no elucidation."[14]

Among the many plans for solving both the general problem of the Ottoman Empire and that of Constantinople and the Straits in particular, was one by which the United States was to take the mandate for Constantinople and the Straits as well as for Armenia. President Wilson was not averse to presenting such a project to the United States Senate, although he had serious

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international control. That such international control may be effective and workable has been shown by the history of the Danube Commission, an institution whose constitution and functions may well serve as a basis for the foundation of international control of the Straits." D. H. Miller, *My Diary at the Conference of Paris, with Documents* (New York, 1928), Document 85, II, pp. 428–37.

[13] D. H. Miller, *op. cit.*, IV, Document 246, pp. 254–58.

[14] Outline of "Tentative Report and Recommendations Prepared by the Intelligence Section, In Accordance with Instructions, for the President and the Plenipotentiaries." January 21, 1919. *Ibid.*

doubts as to its acceptance. Late in August 1919, on its return from the Near East to Paris, the King-Crane Commission, sent to the Ottoman Empire to investigate conditions, proposed a general American mandate for the whole of Turkey, including the region of Constantinople and the Straits, the Anatolian plateau, and Armenia.[15] In the end, however, these proposals were not applied, and the American delegation at Paris took no real part in the drafting of the abortive Treaty of Sèvres, August 10, 1920, which provided for a new regime of the Straits.[16]

The problem of the Straits was one of the most difficult questions confronting the Lausanne Conference of 1922–23, and one in which the American Government was much interested. Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes told the press on September 26, 1922, that he approved unequivocally the proposal to insure the freedom of the Straits.[17] While the American Government refused to be represented officially at the Conference, it agreed to send observers to Lausanne. Their instructions read:

> It is of distinct interest to this Government . . . to obtain effective assurances that the Straits would be open in time of peace for both merchant ships and ships of war to proceed to Constantinople and through the Black Sea. This Sea is a highway of commerce and should not be under the exclusive control of Turkey and of Russia.

The Department of State desired to protect American interests and was "ready to throw the full weight of our influence to obtain assurances for the freedom of the Straits. . . ."[18]

The most significant statement concerning the American interest in the Straits at this time was made in a memorandum of the General Board of the Navy, dated November 10, 1922.[19] The memorandum pointed out that "that solution of the Darda-

[15] "First Publication of King-Crane Report on the Near East; A Suppressed Official Document of the United States Government," *Editor and Publisher*, Second Section, December 2, 1922, pp. i–xxviii. See also Harry N. Howard, "An American Experiment in Peace-Making: The King-Crane Commission," *Moslem World*, April, 1942, pp. 122–46.

[16] Harry N. Howard, *The Partition of Turkey: A Diplomatic History, 1913–1923* (Norman, Oklahoma, 1931), pp. 242–49.

[17] *U.S.F.R.* (1923), II, p. 879. For American documents on the Lausanne Conference see *ibid.*, pp. 879–1040.

[18] Memorandum of Instructions, October 27, 1922; *ibid.*, pp. 887–89.

[19] The Senior Member Present of the General Board, Department of the Navy (W. L. Rodgers) to the Secretary of the Navy (Denby): "American Policy as to Freedom of Navigation of the Dardanelles"; *ibid.*, pp. 893–97.

nelles question which will give the greatest prospect of lasting peace in the Near East is likely to accord best with American interests." Since the Straits were a great international highway, they should not belong to a single state. Any attempt to block or impede access to the Black Sea by world commerce would be "subversive of world organization and contrary to world interests," as it would set up "international pressures and tensions" which would lead inevitably to new wars.

> Russia, potentially one of the greatest of world powers, exports in normal times one-half of all her products *via* the Black Sea. Russia has no other sea outlet comparable in importance with that through the Dardanelles. The importance to Russia of this outlet will increase greatly with the growth of Russian population, and, especially, with the improvement of Russia's means of internal transportation. No solution that imposes an artificial barrier between so great a power and the sea can contain within it the elements of permanency — of stability.

The problem of freedom of navigation in the Straits for warships was more complicated and less capable of "permanent settlement." Whatever rights of navigation in the Straits were granted to other non-Black Sea Powers should be granted to the Black Sea Powers. The destruction of the Russian Black Sea fleet had "entirely changed the policy of Great Britain in relation to the Dardanelles." The General Board believed that "the natural solution of the question, as well as the one most favorable to American interest and influence in world affairs, is complete freedom of navigation of the Straits for all vessels of war." The Board saw, however, no parallel between the status of the Turkish Straits and that of the Panama Canal. In summary, the General Board believed that American interests demanded:

> a) That if an international commission of control of the Straits is set up, the United States should have representation on the international commission of control and in all positions subordinate to that commission, equal to that of any other foreign power.
> b) That the Straits, including the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmara, and the Bosphorus, be open to the free navigation of the merchant ships of all flags without distinction or preference.
> c) That the United States and its nationals have the same rights and privileges within and adjacent to the waters above mentioned as are possessed or may be granted to any other foreign power or to its nationals. . . .

d) That the Straits, including the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmara, and the Bosphorus, be open to all free navigation of the vessels of war of all flags.
e) That no belligerent right be exercised and no hostile act committed within the Straits including the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmara, and the Bosphorus.
f) That all fortifications commanding these waters be razed and that no new fortifications be erected.

Richard Washburn Child, head of the American delegation at the Lausanne Conference, summarized the American position concerning the Straits on December 6, 1923, as follows:

> Our position is based upon that policy of our Government which stands for complete and constant freedom, without special privilege, for our commerce and for the commerce of other nations. . . . We cannot accept the position that the future of commerce in the Black Sea is the exclusive affair of the States bordering upon it. . . .[20]

While the American Government stood for the principle of freedom of the Straits, according to Mr. Hughes' instructions of December 3, 1922, it was unwilling to assume any obligations with respect to guaranteeing the observance of this principle.[21]

The United States was not a signatory to the Lausanne Convention of the Straits, but signed a separate treaty with Turkey (August 6, 1923), Article X of which declared:

> The commercial vessels and aircraft and the war vessels and aircraft of the United States of America shall enjoy complete liberty of navigation and passage in the Straits of the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmara, and the Bosphorus, on a basis of equality with similar vessels and aircraft of the most favored foreign nation upon conforming to the rules relative to such navigation and passage established by the Straits Convention signed at Lausanne, July 24, 1923.[22]

This treaty was in turn rejected by the Senate in 1927; a *modus vivendi*, however, was established and in October 1927, diplomatic relations between the United States and the Turkish Republic were formally established. The American-Turkish Treaty

[20] Turkey No. 1 (1923). *Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs, 1922-1923*. Cmd. 1814, pp. 145-46.

[21] See especially Secretary Hughes' instructions of December 3, 1922, *U.S.F.R.* (1923), II, pp. 912-13. Secretary Hughes rejected any comparisons with the Panama Canal on the ground that it was an "artificial" waterway, constructed at great cost by the United States and under its control.

[22] For text see *ibid.*, pp. 1151-71.

of Commerce and Navigation, October 1, 1929, finally provided for most-favored-nation treatment of American vessels in Turkish waters, on a reciprocal basis, a principle which was reiterated in the Reciprocal Trade Agreement of April 1, 1939.[23]

On April 10, 1936 the Turkish Government requested revision of the Lausanne Convention in the interest of its sovereignty and security, with a view to rearming the region of the Straits. Since the primary interest of the United States at the time appeared to be in the preservation of commercial freedom in the Straits, a question which was not raised, the United States saw no reason for representation at the Montreux Conference of June–July 1936 which grew out of Turkey's request. The American Government, however, accepted the Convention of Montreux which reaffirmed the principle of freedom of transit and navigation in the Straits for commercial vessels, although it imposed restrictions on the rights of warships.[24]

III

U. S. POLICY SINCE THE OUTBREAK OF WORLD WAR II

In the years following 1936, American relations with Turkey continued on a satisfactory basis. After the outbreak of World War II the American Government watched with growing concern the advance of the German armies up to the frontier of Turkey. President Roosevelt gave evidence of the significance of Turkey to the United States when he declared in December 1941, that he had "found the defense of Turkey vital to the defense of the United States."[25]

Until the last year of the war, Turkey remained a non-belligerent ally of Great Britain. As early as August 10, 1941, however, Great Britain and the Soviet Union pledged their fidelity to the Montreux Convention and indicated that they had no designs upon Turkish territory. On August 2, 1944, the Turkish Government severed diplomatic and economic relations with Germany; in the months which followed the United States and Great Brit-

[23] For texts see *Treaty Series No. 813* (1930), and *Executive Agreement Series No. 163* (1940).

[24] For text see Turkey No. 1 (1936). *Convention regarding the Regime of the Straits, With Correspondence relating thereto. Montreux, July 20, 1936.* Cmd. 5249. See also G. H. Hackworth, *Digest of International Law* (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1940), I, p. 613.

[25] *New York Times*, December 4, 1941.

ain opened negotiations with the Turkish Government concerning the right of merchant vessels to pass through the Straits into the Black Sea in accordance with the terms of the Montreux Convention. The United States at the same time took the position that since the Montreux Convention provided for passage of merchant vessels under any flag and with any cargo, there was little question as to the right of merchant vessels to pass through the Straits, and no special agreement was therefore necessary. By the middle of January 1945, it was publicly announced that supplies to the Soviet Union were passing the Turkish Straits.[26]

In his report of August 9, 1945, on the Potsdam Conference, President Truman remarked that one of the persistent causes for wars in Europe during the last two centuries had been, "the selfish control of the waterways of Europe." Among these waterways the President included the Danube River, the Rhine River, the Kiel Canal, and the Turkish Straits. The President had proposed at Potsdam that there be "free and unrestricted navigation" of these waterways, with regulation of navigation by "international authorities." Membership in the projected agency, the President indicated, would include the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and France, together with the riparian states.[27] In his address of October 27, 1945, President Truman expressed his belief "that all nations should have the freedom of the seas and equal rights to the navigation of boundary rivers and waterways and all rivers and waterways which pass through more than one country."[28]

Following the Potsdam Conference, and in line with the general principles which President Truman had enunciated, the United States presented a note to the Turkish Government on November 2, 1945, embodying its suggestions for a revision of the Montreux Convention, including the calling of a conference on the Straits in 1946. The United States also stated that, if in-

[26] See *New York Times*, October 25, 1944; Department of State, Press Release No. 6, January 10, 1945.

[27] Department of State, Publication 2423 (1945), *The Axis in Defeat. A Collection of Documents on American Policy towards Germany and Japan*, pp. 20–21. See also Louis B. Wehle, "International Administration of European Inland Waterways," *American Journal of International Law*, January, 1946, pp. 100–20.

[28] *Department of State Bulletin*, October 28, 1945, pp. 654–55. These remarks were repeated in President Truman's annual message to the Congress on the State of the Union on January 21, 1946.

vited, it would be willing to send representatives to such a conference. As a basis for an equitable solution of the question of the Straits the following principles were set forth:

1) The Straits to be open to the commercial vessels of all nations at all times;
2) The Straits to be open to the transit of the warships of the Black Sea Powers at all times;
3) Except for an agreed limited tonnage in time of peace, passage through the Straits to be denied to the warships of non-Black Sea Powers at all times except with the specific consent of the Black Sea Powers, or except when acting under the authority of the United Nations;
4) Certain changes to modernize the Montreux system, such as the substitution of the United Nations Organization for that of the League of Nations and the elimination of Japan as a signatory.[29]

The Turkish Government welcomed the American note, indicating that it was entirely willing to participate in an international conference and to accept any international decisions regarding the Straits provided "Turkish independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity" were not infringed.[30]

The British Government was likewise receptive to the American note. In an address before the House of Commons on February 21, 1946, the British Foreign Minister, Mr. Bevin, stated that the United Kingdom was ready for the Soviet Union and Turkey either by themselves or with Great Britain as an ally to discuss the problem of revising the Montreux Convention. At the same time the British Government was "anxious to keep the international aspect of these waterways in view." Mr. Bevin was not "too sure" that it contributed to world peace "that one particular Power as against another should have bases in a particular spot." Noting that Great Britain had an alliance with Turkey since October 19, 1939, Mr. Bevin stated that he did "not want Turkey converted into a satellite state," but wanted it to be "really independent."[31] Similar views were expressed in March and June 1946.

The United States, meanwhile, took no further initiative concerning the problem of the Straits after the dispatch of its note of November 2, 1945. Nevertheless, in his Army Day address, April

[29] *Department of State Bulletin*, November 11, 1945, p. 766.
[30] See Turkish Embassy (Washington), *Press Release, No. 1*, February 1, 1946.
[31] *Parliamentary Debates* (Hansard). House of Commons. Official Report No. 87. Thursday, February 21, 1946. Vol. 419, cols. 1357–59.

6, 1946, President Truman reiterated the intention of the United States to "press for the elimination of artificial barriers to international navigation, in order that no nation by accident of geographic location, shall be denied unrestricted access to seaports and international waterways." He also made particular remarks on the significance of the Near and Middle East:

> Turning to the Near and Middle East, we find an area which presents grave problems. This area contains vast natural resources. It lies across the most convenient routes of land, air, and water communications. It is consequently an area of great economic and strategic importance, the nations of which are not strong enough individually or collectively to withstand powerful aggression.
>
> It is easy to see, therefore, how the Near and Middle East might become an area of intense rivalry between outside powers, and how such rivalry might suddenly erupt into conflict.
>
> No country, great or small, has legitimate interests in the Near and Middle East which cannot be reconciled with the interests of other nations through the United Nations. The United Nations have a right to insist that the sovereignty and integrity of the countries of the Near and Middle East must not be threatened by coercion or penetration.[32]

On August 7, 1946, the Soviet Government sent a note to the Turkish Government setting forth its position essentially as follows:

> "1. The Straits should be always open to the passage of merchant ships of all countries;
> 2. The Straits should be always open to the passage of warships of the Black Sea Powers;
> 3. Passage through the Straits for warships not belonging to the Black Sea Powers shall not be permitted except in cases specially provided for;
> 4. The establishment of a regime of the Straits, as the sole sea passage leading from the Black Sea and into the Black Sea, should come under the competence of Turkey and other Black Sea Powers;
> 5. Turkey and the Soviet Union, as the Powers most interested and capable of guaranteeing freedom to commercial navigation and security in the Straits, shall organize joint means of defense of the Straits for the prevention of the utilization of the Straits by other countries for aims hostile to the Black Sea Powers."[33]

The first three of these principles were in general accord with the first three principles of the American note of November 2, 1945. Points 4) and 5), however, called for the establishment of a new regime of the Straits by the Black Sea Powers and the devel-

[32] *Department of State Bulletin*, April 21, 1946, pp. 622–24.
[33] *Ibid.*, September 1, 1946.

opment of a joint system of defense, on the ground that the Black Sea Powers were primarily concerned and that only a joint defense system could offer genuine security to the Black Sea.

In reply to the Soviet note, the United States, on August 19, 1946, reiterated its position of November 2, 1945, and expressed the view that the establishment of a regime of the Straits was not the exclusive concern of the Black Sea Powers, a view which American representatives had set forth vigorously at the Conference of Lausanne in December 1922. The American note further declared that Turkey should remain primarily responsible for the defense of the Straits and stated that if this region became the object of a threat or an attack on the part of an aggressor, the resulting situation would clearly be a matter for action on the part of the Security Council of the United Nations. The United States also expressed the view that the regime of the Straits should be brought into appropriate relationship with the principles and aims of the United Nations, and function "in a manner entirely consistent with the principles and aims of the United Nations."[34]

On August 22, 1946, the Turkish Government rejected the Soviet proposals as to the establishment of a regime of the Straits by Turkey and the other Black Sea Powers and a joint Turco-Soviet defense system for the Straits, although it was willing to make other revisions of the Montreux Convention. The Soviet reply of September 24, 1946, reiterated the USSR's basic position, cited historical precedents for its proposals, and insisted that they were consonant with the principles and purposes of the United Nations. The Soviet note also indicated that direct pourparlers between the three governments and Turkey should precede the calling of a conference on the Straits.

Although the Soviet note of September 24 was not addressed to the United States, the American Government again expressed its views in a note of October 9,[35] reiterating its earlier position and emphasizing that the Potsdam Agreement contemplated only an exchange of views with Turkey as a useful preliminary to a conference of all the interested powers, including the United States.

[34] *Department of State Bulletin*, April 21, 1946, pp. 622–24. For text, see p. 88.
[35] *New York Times*, October 10, 1946.

DEVELOPMENTS OF THE QUARTER: COMMENT AND CHRONOLOGY

SEPTEMBER 1—NOVEMBER 30, 1946

THE FALL quarter of 1946 was a time when the first steps toward a post-war order for the Middle East were being put to the test. Except for the realization of Syrian and Lebanese independence, none of the moves stimulated by the end of hostilities had yet come to fruition. In Iran the June agreement between the provincial regime in Azerbaijan and the Central Government in Tehran was still without noticeable effect on the conduct of Iranian affairs. In India the violent and almost chronic communal riots boded ill for the successful establishment of self-government. Negotiations for a new Anglo-Egyptian treaty, which had opened with much promise in the spring of the year, had still failed to evolve a compromise acceptable to all parties. As the Egyptian Parliament prepared to debate the proposed provisions for a treaty, rioting in Cairo and Alexandria emphasized the rift between uncompromising nationalists and those willing to trim their sails to a moderate course. At Ankara each of the major powers had stated its position in regard to a revision of the regime of the Straits, thus fulfilling the agreement made at Potsdam in the summer of 1945. The lines were drawn, but division of principal remained fundamental and no actual steps toward negotiation had yet been taken. And finally, the Anglo-American Committee's plan for a long range settlement of the problem of Palestine remained only a plan, accepted in full by no one. The increase of violence in that unhappy land was evidence of the unreality of all bases for agreement.

While the fall quarter was thus a period of doubt and questioning, the succeeding weeks promised to bring more concrete, although not necessarily successful, developments in all the areas of negotiation. In so far as the settlement of Middle Eastern problems concerned the major powers, much depended on the progress made toward a settlement of peace in Europe and on the course of United Nations deliberations.

Afghanistan

American interest in Afghanistan was largely centered in the work of the Morrison-Knudsen Company, which had entered into a substantial contract with the Afghan Government for the construction of dams on the Helmand and Kabul Rivers, and the development of the irrigation and power facilities which would be made possible thereby. While there were already a number of American engineers in the field during the fall of 1946, the shipping of materials was seriously hampered by U.S. shortages and strikes; as a result actual construction had yet to get under way. Transportation remained a serious obstacle to making Afghanistan more accessible to the outside world. Efforts to establish international air lines through the country so far had been unsuccessful. While Pan American was authorized by the Civil Aeronautics Board to include Kabul in its international route, extension of its services to the entire Middle East had been delayed,

and the Afghan Government apparently preferred to await this international service rather than to initiate local operation.

CHRONOLOGY[1]

Nov. 19: Afghanistan became a member of the United Nations.

Nov. 28: According to the Moscow press the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet ratified the June 13, 1946, frontier agreement with Afghanistan.

Egypt

Although some progress was made in the negotiations for a revision of the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty, no final agreement could be reached. The Egyptian treaty delegation accepted the principle of the creation of a Joint Defense Council, but refused to concede that Egypt should be bound to aid Great Britain in case the security of adjacent areas was threatened; nor did there appear to be agreement on the defense of the Suez Canal zone. British troops were partially withdrawn from Cairo and naval units from Alexandria, yet the question of the time for their total evacuation remained outstanding.

The future status of the Sudan was the problem on which the greatest divergence of views still remained. The British, mindful of the strategic importance of the Sudan should routes of Empire communication be established across Central Africa, offered to give the Sudanese an opportunity to express a preference as to their future political status; the Egyptians were opposed to such a scheme in the belief that the British were in a position to direct Sudanese opinion. While the extreme Egyptian nationalists clamored for union now, the more moderate negotiators appeared to be willing to table the question, in order to realize the concessions offered on the other two points.

As December came, there was little optimism that the treaty proposals would meet with general support in Egypt. The cross-currents of Egyptian politics were such that on occasion the conclusion of a treaty was of less importance to certain political groups than the consideration of who would receive the credit for negotiating it. Something of this psychology may have underlain the adamant stand of the nationalist Wafd which did not take part in the negotiations with Britain, and may have accounted in part for the persistent rioting of the traditionally nationalist students. King Farouk's dissolution of the Egyptian Treaty Delegation (a majority of which had rejected the Sidqi-Bevin proposals), and Sidqi's unopposed vote of confidence in the Chamber of Deputies did little to clarify procedure.

CHRONOLOGY

Sept. 12: Egyptian Prime Minister, Ismail Sidqi Pasha, formed a new three-party cabinet, representing the Liberal Constitutional, Independent, and Saadist parties. The ministers and their portfolios were as follows:

Ismail Sidqi Pasha (Independent) — Prime Minister and Minister of Interior

Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid Pasha (Independent) — Deputy Prime Minister

Ibrahim Abd al-Hadi Pasha (Saadist) — Minister of Foreign Affairs

Abd al-Majid Badr Pasha (Saadist) — Minister of Social Affairs

Abd al-Galil Abu Samra Pasha (Liberal Constitutional) — Minister of State

Abd al-Razzaq al-Sanhuri Pasha (Saadist) — Minister of State for Arab Affairs

Mahmud Hassan Pasha (Saadist) — Minister of Justice

Hafni Mahmud Pasha (Liberal Constitutional) — Minister of Communications

Ibrahim Dassuqi Abaza Pasha (Liberal Constitutional) — Minister of Waqfs

Ahmad Atiyah Pasha (Liberal Constitutional) — Minister of National Defense

Abd al-Qawi Ahmad Pasha (Independent) — Minister of Public Works

Husayn Inan Pasha (Independent) — Minister of Agriculture

Abd al-Rahman al-Biyali (Independent) — Minister of Finance

Muhammad al-Ashmawi Pasha (Independent) — Minister of Education

Saba Habashi Pasha (Independent) — Minister of Commerce and Industry

Sulayman Azmi Pasha (Independent) — Minister of Public Health

Sept. 15: British-Egyptian negotiations on revision of the 1936 treaty were resumed in Alexandria.

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[1] Items in the Chronology are for the most part drawn from the American Press.

Sept. 18: New British treaty proposals were formally considered by Egyptian delegation.

Sept. 23: Egyptian treaty delegation rejected the British proposals although they accepted the principle of a Joint Defense Council.

Sept. 28: Sidqi Pasha resigned as Prime Minister of Egypt.

The final Egyptian reply to the British proposals, handed to Lord Stansgate, stated that Egypt was adhering to her original demands concerning evacuation, joint defense, and the Sudan.

Sept. 30: Sharif Sabri Pasha was asked to form a new Egyptian cabinet, though his attempt to do so was unsuccessful.

Oct. 2: Wafdist manifesto was issued demanding outright cancellation of the British-Egyptian alliance.

Sidqi Pasha and his cabinet resumed their duties at the request of King Farouk.

Oct. 5: Transport employees in Cairo went on strike for shorter hours.

Oct. 9: Egyptian government postponed the opening of Cairo schools and universities from October 16 to November 16, 1946.

Oct. 10: Mahmud Hassan Pasha, former Egyptian Minister in Washington, presented to President Truman his letters of credence as Ambassador to the U. S. On the same day S. Pinkney Tuck, former Minister to Egypt, presented to King Farouk his credentials as first U. S. Ambassador to Egypt.

Oct. 17: Prime Minister Sidqi Pasha and Foreign Minister Ibrahim Abd al-Hadi Pasha arrived in London for talks with Foreign Secretary Bevin on the deadlocked treaty negotiations.

Oct. 22: A delegation from the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan arrived in London to discuss the future of the Sudan with Foreign Secretary Bevin.

Oct. 25: Bevin-Sidqi talks ended. Joint communiqué expressed the hope that a "decisive result" in Anglo-Egyptian treaty negotiations would be forthcoming after the return of the Prime Minister to Egypt.

Oct. 27: Sidqi Pasha, back in Egypt, stated that Foreign Secretary Bevin had initialed a new draft treaty which agreed on unity of Egypt and the Sudan under the Egyptian crown, and provided for withdrawal of British troops from Egypt in 27 months.

Muhammad Husayn Haykal, head of Eygpt's delegation to the UN General Assembly, was recalled.

Oct. 28: Prime Minister Attlee, in the House of Commons, referred to Sidqi's statements of October 27 as "partial and misleading," and added that no commitments had been made in the Bevin-Sidqi talks and that the Sudanese *status quo* would continue.

Oct. 31: 3000 Umma Party demonstrators presented to the Sudanese Governor-General their petition opposing Egyptian sovereignty over the Sudan and expressing their desire for independence.

Nov. 1: Prime Minister Sidqi Pasha reported results of his talks with Bevin to the Egyptian delegation. According to his report, Bevin had agreed that Britain would recognize Egyptian sovereignty over the Sudan, with the provision that the present Anglo-Egyptian condominium should continue until the Sudanese could select their own form of government; that Britain would leave Egypt completely within three years; that any issue of imminent attack should be referred to the projected joint Anglo-Egyptian Defense Council.

Nov. 9: Sir Hubert Huddleston, Governor-General of the Sudan, arrived in London for conversations on disturbances in the Sudan caused by the trend in Anglo-Egyptian negotiations.

Nov. 11: Change in two cabinet posts: Salib Sami Pasha (Independent) replaced Saba Habashi Pasha as Minister of Commerce and Industry, and Ahmad Abd al-Ghaffar Pasha (Liberal Constitutional) replaced Abd al-Galil Abu Samra Pasha as Minister of State.

Nov. 13: Police and members of the Wafd clashed during the celebration of "National Struggle Day."

Nov. 14: The Egyptian Parliament opened in Cairo; speech by the King expressed the hope that negotiations with Britain for a new military alliance would be successful.

Nov. 15: Announcement was made in the press that Fayid, on the shores of Great Bitter Lake, would be the new British headquarters in Egypt.

Nov. 16: Cairo schools reopened, though for several days the students remained away from classes in order to participate in political, nationalist demonstrations of protest against line taken by Egyptian Government in treaty negotiations.

Nov. 19: Sudanese delegation of the National Front groups rejected Prime Minister Sidqi's Sudan proposal, and demanded an immediate end to the condominium and creation of a Sudanese Government under Egypt.

Nov. 21: Provisions of the proposed treaty with Great Britain were placed before the Egyptian Chamber of Deputies.

Nov. 22: Fifty-seven members of the Ikhwan al-Muslimun were arrested in Alexandria to forestall political demonstrations.

Sir Hubert Huddleston, Governor-General of the Sudan, arrived in Cairo from England.

Nov. 23: France and Egypt raised their respective diplomatic missions to the rank of embassies.

The throwing of hand grenades marked the first time explosives had been used in student demonstrations of the past year.

Nov. 24: High school boys joined university students in nationalist demonstrations in Cairo. In Alexandria, university students clashed with police for second day.

Nov. 25: Seven of the twelve members of the Egyptian treaty delegation rejected the Sidqi-Bevin treaty draft.

Nov. 26: Prime Minister Sidqi received a 156 to 0 vote of confidence from the Egyptian Chamber of Deputies for continuance of negotiations with Britain, though 54 opposition deputies refused to participate in voting.

Nov. 26: Student rioting continued in Cairo and Alexandria.

Egyptian treaty delegation was dissolved by a decree signed by King Farouk.

Nov. 27: Because of continuing student demonstrations, universities in Cairo and Alexandria were ordered closed indefinitely.

The British Admiralty announced that all British naval units had been evacuated from Alexandria.

Ahmad al-Sukkari, deputy leader of Ikhwan al-Muslimun, was arrested.

Ethiopia

CHRONOLOGY

Oct. 5: The Italian Economic Commission at the Paris Peace Conference decided Ethiopia should get $25,000,000 in war reparations from Italy.

India

Communal rioting in India, almost chronic during the fall months of 1946, came as a shock to many people who had begun to think that Moslem-Hindu antagonism had been artificially stimulated in order to give cause for Jinnah's insistence on the formation of a Pakistan. The depth of bitterness revealed, however, emphasized that the division in the population was genuine and serious. By the same token the concept of a Moslem Pakistan being set up in provinces which included large numbers of Hindus appeared increasingly impractical as a solution to India's social and political problems.

The policy of the Moslem League remained the factor of the greatest uncertainty as the Interim Government got under way and preparations were made for the Constituent Assembly to meet in December. The League's decision in October to join the Interim Government, only to be followed a month later by a declaration that it would not take part in the Constituent Assembly, led to the suspicion that Jinnah was more concerned with securing concessions for the League than with forwarding the cause of Indian unity or even self-government. London's hurried call at the end of November for Viceroy Wavell and Hindu and Moslem leaders to confer with the home government did nothing to dissipate the general pessimism.

CHRONOLOGY

Sept. 2: India's first popular government took office.

Installation of the Interim Government brought about a renewal of rioting in Bombay.

Sept. 3: Hindu-Moslem rioting in Bombay increased in violence.

The Moslem National Guard, volunteer corps of the Punjab Provincial Moslem League, called for enlistments.

Mohammed Ali Jinnah, president of the Moslem League, voiced concern over Russian intention in regard to India.

Sept. 4: Rioting spread in north section of Bombay. Official total casualties in four days: 146 dead, 557 injured.

Sept. 5: Hindu-Moslem fighting continued in Bombay; new disorders in Calcutta.

Sept. 6: Bombay became somewhat quiet for the first time in six days; Calcutta normal again.

Sept. 8: Pandit Nehru, Vice-President of the Interim Government, stated that the Congress Party would hold open its offer of five out of the fourteen seats in the Executive Council for the Moslem League. He reassured the League that the Congress Party would stand by the British Cabinet mission's blueprint for an independent India.

Sept. 9: Mohammed Ali Jinnah proposed that the Interim Government and the Constituent Assembly plans should be discarded and a new start made to find a solution to the Indian question; he stated that the rioting in Bombay and Calcutta was not part of the Moslem League's action program. The Committee for Action of the Moslem League discussed non-co-operation with the government.

Two additional members of Pandit Nehru's Interim Government assumed office in New Delhi: John Matthai (Finance) and C. H. Bhabha (Commerce).

Sept. 14: Indian Princes named a committee to represent the Indian States in negotiations concerning the States' representation in the proposed Constituent Assembly.

Sept. 15: Mohammed Ali Jinnah arrived in New Delhi for discussions with the Viceroy, Viscount Wavell.

Communal rioting broke out in Ahmedabad.

Sept. 23: Pandit Nehru announced his resignation from the presidency of the Congress Party.

Terrence A. Shone, British Minister in Beirut, was appointed first United Kingdom High Commissioner in India.

New violence in Bombay and Calcutta.

Sept. 25: Congress Party Working Committee accepted Nehru's resignation from Congress Party presidency.

Sept. 26: At a press conference Nehru outlined plans for expansion of India's diplomatic activities including a good-will mission to the Middle East, raising to formal status the diplomatic posts in Washington and Nanking, and establishing a diplomatic post in the Soviet Union.

Sept. 27: Nagpur authorities arrested 1,709 members of the Scheduled Castes who had defied a government ban and had marched to the Central Provinces Legislative Assembly.

Oct. 2: Legislature of Bombay Province passed a bill removing social disabilities of the untouchables.

Oct. 15: The Viceroy announced that the Moslem League had decided to join the Interim Government; four members of the Moslem League and the leader of the Scheduled Castes Federation received seats in the Government.

Acharya Kripalani was elected president of the Congress Party.

Oct. 16: Severe riots occurred in Noakhali district of eastern Bengal.

Several thousand frontier Moslems demonstrated in Peshawar against Pandit Nehru who arrived there to tour the frontier.

Oct. 19: Pandit Nehru escaped injury when Moslems attacked his caravan northwest of Peshawar.

Violence in eastern Bengal was investigated by Acharya Kripalani, president-elect of the Congress Party, and Bengal government officials.

Oct. 21: Pandit Nehru slightly wounded in an attack by Moslem League demonstrators near the northwest frontier.

Violence again broke out in Calcutta with the arrival of refugees from eastern Bengal.

Oct. 22: Mohammed Ali Jinnah interviewed the Viceroy.

Pandit Nehru returned from Peshawar and also saw the Viceroy.

Oct. 23: Pir Golam Sawar, alleged Moslem ringleader of the communal rioters in southeast Bengal, was captured.

Oct. 24: Moslem League was accused by the Working Committee of the Congress Party of having inspired the rioting in eastern Bengal; the British Governor-General in Bengal and the Viceroy were accused of neglect in permitting the bloodshed in Bengal.

Pandit Nehru threatened to resign as chairman of the Interim Government if the Home Ministry were offered to the Moslem League.

Oct. 26: Moslem League entered the Interim Government. Representatives of the Moslem League and the Scheduled Castes with their portfolios were:

Liaquat Ali Khan (Moslem League) — Finance

I. I. Chundrigar (Moslem League) — Commerce

Abdur Rab Nishtar (Moslem League) — Communications

Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan (Moslem League) — Health

Jogendra Nath Mandal (Scheduled Castes Federation) — Law

The consequent changes among the other portfolios:

John Matthai (Indian Christian, independent) from Finance to Industries and Supplies

C. Rajagopalachari (Congress Party) from Industries and Supplies to Education and Arts

Cooverji Hormusji Bhabha (Parsi, independent) from Commerce to Works, Mines, and Power

The portfolios remaining as before:

Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru (Congress Party) — External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations

Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel (Congress Party) — Home, and Information and Broadcasting

Rajendra Prasad (Congress Party) — Food and Agriculture

Asaf Ali (Congress Moslem) — Transport and Railways

Sardar Baldev Singh (Akali Sikh) — Defense

Jagjivan Ram (Scheduled Castes) — Labor

Oct. 26: Highest recorded single day's toll of killed and injured in Calcutta since August.

Oct. 28: Opening of the fall session of the Legislative Assembly.

Oct. 29: Indian Legislature voted unanimously to sustain a government motion for India's membership in the International Bank and Monetary Fund.

Oct. 30: Mohandas K. Gandhi conferred with the Governor of Bengal and Bengal's Moslem League Premier concerning the communal disturbances.

Oct. 31: The Viceroy arrived in Calcutta to investigate Moslem-Hindu disorders.

Nov. 1: A group of four representing the Congress Party and the Moslem League in the Interim Government united to study Hindu-Moslem tension in Calcutta.

Nov. 4: British House of Commons was informed that the toll of communal riots in India between July 1 and October 30, 1946, was 5,018 killed and 13,320 injured.

Pandit Nehru left on a tour of the eastern part of Bihar Province.

Nov. 8: Indian diplomatic mission in the United States became an Embassy.

Nov. 9: Rioting spread into the United Provinces when Hindu pilgrims returning from a religious fair were attacked.

Viscount Wavell and Pandit Nehru returned to New Delhi after a tour of Bihar Province.

Gandhi touring the eastern Bengal riot area.

Nov. 10: Renewed rioting, following the visit of the Viceroy and Nehru, flared in several districts of Bihar Province.

Nov. 12: Indian Government announced ratification of the convention on international civil aviation signed at Chicago, December 7, 1944.

Nov. 14: Air transport agreement between the United States and India was signed.

Nov. 18: The Central Legislative Assembly adjourned.

Nov. 20: India's Constituent Assembly called to session on December 9, 1946, by a Government communiqué. According to letters between Mohammed Ali Jinnah and the Viceroy, the Moslem League would not attend the Assembly.

Nov. 21: Mohammed Ali Jinnah announced that there would be no Moslem League representation at the Indian Constituent Assembly when it met on December 9, 1946.

Gandhi departed for eastern Bengal to attempt to effect a peace between Hindus and Moslems rioting there.

Nov. 26: British Government called the Viceroy and representatives of the Congress Party, Moslem League, and Sikhs to London for an emergency conference on India.

Nov. 27: Moslem League accepted the British invitation to a London Conference.

Nov. 28: Pandit Nehru and Sikh leader, Sardar Baldev Singh, consented to go to London for conference on India.

Nov. 30: Indian delegates (Pandit Nehru, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, Liaquat Ali Khan, Sardar Baldev Singh) and Lord Wavell left India for London.

Iran

The revolt of the Qashqai and adjacent tribes in southern Iran, which dominated the scene from the middle of September to the middle of October, was directed as much against the activities of the left-wing Tudeh as against the government in Tehran. Pro-Soviet Mozaffar Firuz, through his position in the cabinet and his influence with Premier Qavam, had opened the way for the Tudeh to increase its efforts to become entrenched in the southern provinces. The tribal leaders at once recognized therein a threat to their traditional freedom of action. However, the Qashqai leader, Nasir Khan, did not request so much the removal of Tudeh influence, as an extension to the southern tribes of privileges provided by the Constitution of 1906 and similar to those already granted the Azerbaijanis. The agreement between Nasir Khan and the Central Government, which was announced over the Tehran radio on October 16th (for provisions, see page 91), promised the setting up of a provincial council in Fars, thus granting in principle, at least, a measure of local self-government which might set the pattern for a solution of Iran's provincial problems.

While these disturbances were taking place in the south, Prime Minister Qavam was again negotiating with representatives of the Azerbaijani autonomous regime in an effort to clarify and put into practice the agreement concluded in June 1946. A particular point of difference was the refusal of Azerbaijani "Democrats" to permit the reoccupation of Zenjan by Iranian troops, although it had been agreed that the province of Khamseh

was not to be considered a part of Azerbaijan. The breakdown of these negotiations, the dropping of the three Tudeh members from Qavam's cabinet, and the removal of Prince Firuz through the medium of his appointment as Iranian Ambassador to Moscow, were only partially an outgrowth of the agreement reached with the southern tribes a few days before; in part they were entirely coincidental. A factor contributing to these moves was the manner in which the Soviet Ambassador in Tehran, through Prince Firuz and the Tudeh members of the cabinet, attempted to influence Premier Qavam's policy in regard to the December election of a new Majlis and its ratification of the Soviet-Iranian oil agreement. The tactic was so obvious that Qavam was forced to drop these individuals in order to avoid his own dismissal. A second factor contributing to the breakdown of negotiations with the Azerbaijanis was the refusal of Qavam to acquiesce in Prince Firuz's efforts to effect a union of political expediency between the Democrats of Azerbaijan and Qavam's own newly-formed Democratic Party of Iran, for the purpose of dominating the elections.

Qavam's policy remained one of shrewd opportunism; in his masterly handling of both extremes it remained difficult to determine whether he made concessions to the Left whenever possible, or as little as possible. At all events, as the quarter ended he appeared confident enough of his ability to control the coming elections (which, because of his dual position as Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior, he was strategically placed to do) not to seek an alliance with either extreme. His firm policy toward the Azerbaijani Democrats promised to make the conduct of the elections a test of the validity of the June agreement.

CHRONOLOGY

Sept. 2: U. S. returned Abadan base to Iranian Government.

Sept. 8: Iranian Government declared martial law in Isfahan area upon discovery of a plot to overthrow the government.

Sept. 21: Troops of the Central Government were blocked by Azerbaijani forces at Zenjan, which Azerbaijan had agreed should return to Central Government control.

Sept. 22: Anti-left rebellious tribesmen seized Ganaveh and a portion of Bushire; strong government forces were sent to Fars Province.

Sept. 23: Qashqai tribes demanded cabinet changes, home rule, more representatives in Parliament, release of Bakhtiari tribal leaders, discharge of certain army officers, and adjustment in taxes.

Sept. 24: Bushire was captured by tribesmen; government forces attacked rebels near Shiraz.

Prime Minister Qavam rejected tribesmen's demands for autonomy.

Sept. 25: Prime Minister Qavam sent a government mission to Shiraz to negotiate with the rebellious tribes.

Talks between Azerbaijani representatives and a government delegation were resumed in Tehran.

Head of the Middle East Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry arrived in Tehran.

Sept. 26: Moslem leaders in Iran's Persian Gulf ports issued ultimatum to Prime Minister Qavam demanding for their area autonomy similar to that of Azerbaijan.

Kermanshah tribesmen served demands on Central Government.

Sept. 28: Prime Minister Qavam rejected Fars tribesmen's demands for cabinet shifts.

Sept. 29: Government's delegation returned from Shiraz with an ultimatum from the tribes.

Oct. 1: Iranian Government demanded that Britain recall Charles A. Trott, Oriental Secretary of British Embassy in Tehran, accused of having a part in the revolt of the southern tribes.

Iranian cabinet members investigating recent arrest of Bakhtiari tribal leaders in Isfahan reported plot against the government had been genuine.

Government planes bombed tribal concentrations in Kazarun, Bushire, and Bandar Amir.

Government ultimatum to tribesmen to disperse or face serious consequences.

Oct. 6: Government troops battled with rebels near Shiraz.

The Shah signed a decree ordering Parliamentary elections.

Oct. 7: Note from Nasir Khan, chief of the Qashqai tribes, asked Prime Minister Qavam to reopen negotiations.

Oct. 13: Nasir Khan accepted all the Government's terms for ending the tribal revolt.

Oct. 16: In a formal statement in the House of Commons, Foreign Secretary Bevin denied that any British official in Iran had interfered in internal Iranian affairs. Charles A. Trott cleared of charges of implication in tribal uprising.

Agreement with southern tribal leaders was published. (For provisions see page 91.)

Oct. 17: Cabinet resigned; Qavam was asked to form a new cabinet.

Oct. 19: Reorganization of Iranian cabinet: three Tudeh members dropped (Fereidun Kishavarz, Minister of Education; Morteza Yazdi, Minister of Health; Iraj Iskandari, Minister of Commerce and Industry). Prince Mozaffar Firuz, Minister of Labor, was also eliminated from the cabinet to be named Ambassador to Moscow. The cabinet as reconstituted was:

Ahmad Qavam — Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Minister of Interior
Aziz Nikpey — Posts and Telegraph
Hamid Sayyah — Commerce and Industry
General Sepehod Amir Ahmadi — War
Akbar Moosavi-Zadeh — Justice
Farman Farmayan — Labor and Propaganda
Dr. Egbal — Health
Abd al-Hosein Hajir — Finance
Dr. Sadeghi — Roads and Communications
Dr. Shayegan — Education

Oct. 19: Chief of the Qashqai tribes informed Prime Minister Qavam that Fars Province was now peaceful.

Oct. 27: Prime Minister Qavam announced that elections would be held for a new Parliament.

Nov. 15: Prince Mozaffar Firuz, new Iranian Ambassador to Russia, arrived in Moscow.

Nov. 16: Zenjan was occupied by Iranian Central Government army.

Nov. 24: Government troops dispatched to Azerbaijan to supervise Parliamentary elections.

Nov. 27: Appearance of Central Government troops on border of Azerbaijan brought threat from that province that it would consider cancelled all agreements it had reached with the Central Government.

Qazi Mohammed, Kurdish leader, in a telegram to Prime Minister Qavam expressed Kurdish opposition to Government's plan to send troops into the provinces to supervise the Parliamentary elections.

Nov. 29: Prime Minister Qavam warned the Azerbaijani Governor-General that he would not allow Azerbaijan to break away from Iran and that Azerbaijani deputies would not be admitted to Parliament unless Central Government troops supervised the elections.

Nov. 30: According to a Tabriz radio report, the Azerbaijani Provincial Council informed the Central Government that it would itself supervise the elections in the province but would not tolerate the presence of Government troops there.

Iraq

CHRONOLOGY

Oct. 6: Iraqi Government presented British Embassy and U. S. Legation a note of protest against President Truman's statement urging Jewish immigration into Palestine.

Oct. 25: Announcement of a six-month interim agreement between the U. S. and Iraq permitting American commercial planes to land in Iraq and carry passengers and mail to and from non-Arab countries. The American planes were also permitted to transport diplomats, officials, and diplomatic mail within Arab League States.

Nov. 16: Resignation of cabinet of Arshad al-Umari.

Nov. 21: New Iraqi cabinet:

Nuri Said Pasha — Prime Minister and Minister of Interior
Fadhil Jamali — Foreign Minister
Salih Jabir — Minister of Finance
Shakir al-Wadi — Minister of Defense
Ali Mumtaz — Minister of Communications and Works
'Umar Nadhmi — Minister of Justice
Baba Ali — Minister of Economy
Jamil Abd al-Wahhab — Minister of Social Affairs
Muhammad Hadid — Minister of Supplies
Sadiq al-Bassam — Minister of Education

Nov. 22: A royal decree was issued for dissolution of the Iraqi Chamber of Deputies, in preparation for new elections according to constitutional provisions.

Nov. 23: U. S. and Iraq raised their respective Legations to the status of Embassies; George Wadsworth appointed first U. S. Ambassador to Iraq.

North Africa

CHRONOLOGY

Sept. 2: Exiled Tunisian nationalists charged that Tunisia was under military siege by forces of the French protectorate following arrest of nationalist leaders on August 23, 1946.

Sept. 6: Iraq asked Paris Peace Conference to grant Libya immediate independence.

Sept. 23: Last of the Destourians arrested August 23 by the French were released.

French Resident-General Charles Mast in Tunis outlined a series of administrative reforms for Tunisia, including six, instead of four, Tunisian members in the cabinet; removal of

wartime system of French regional controller; increase of the power of the native governors; liberalized election law.

Palestine

The discussions in regard to Palestine which opened in London on September 10 and were adjourned three weeks later met with little apparent success. There were many factors contributing to their failure: the hesitancy of Zionist groups to agree to negotiation; the absence of Arab representatives from Palestine; the continued detention of Zionist leaders; the inability of the American and British governments to come to any agreement on the Morrison-Grady plan, in particular on the question of immigration into Palestine. Nor was the season favorable for negotiation, for the American elections in November made it a time when political considerations received undue attention, and the World Zionist Congress scheduled for December promised a review of Zionist policies which might prove abortive any stand taken in the months previous.

With the death, on the average, of about one Britisher a day in Palestine, the authorities were making strenuous efforts to maintain at least a semblance of public security. Nevertheless, Jewish terrorist activity continued unabated, while the Arabs proceeded to build up their para-military organizations. The prestige of the United States continued to suffer among the Arabs, who blamed the U.S. for the crisis in Palestine and voiced threats of retaliation should it persist in urging increased Jewish immigration.

CHRONOLOGY

Sept. 2: British captured blockade runner *Four Freedoms* with over 1000 unauthorized immigrants. This was the first ship to bring illegal immigrants to Palestine since British announcement that such immigrants would be deported to Cyprus.

Sept. 4: H. L. G. Gurney, administrator of Gold Coast Government, appointed to replace Sir John Shaw as Secretary-General of the Palestine Government.

Sept. 6: Colonial Office published notes on Jewish Agency demands for Palestine Conference.

Sept. 8: Five hundred Jews detained at Latrun since June 29, 1946, began a 24-hour hunger strike.

Sept. 9: Irgun Zvai Leumi opened attack on Palestine's railroad system; British major, British sergeant, and an Arab constable were killed in explosions that blasted a public building and railroad installations in Tel Aviv.

Sept. 10: Prime Minister Attlee opened the London Conference on Palestine, which met without the presence of Jewish and Palestinian Arab representatives. Representatives of the Arab League States met with the British delegates.

Arrest of 101 Jews after intensive search of Tel Aviv and environs; events deplored by Jewish Agency and Wa'ad Leumi; Irgun Zvai Leumi attempted unsuccessful raid on Government hospital at Haifa to free wounded IZL members imprisoned for life.

British moved 200 Polish soldiers out of Rehovoth.

Sept. 12: Delegates of Arab League States at London Conference on Palestine gave seven reasons for rejecting the Anglo-American (Morrison-Grady) provincial-autonomy plan for Palestine.

Sept. 13: Jewish terrorists robbed three Palestine banks (Tel Aviv and Jaffa branches of Ottoman Bank, Jaffa branch of Arab Bank).

Sept. 14: Haganah censured Irgun Zvai Leumi and Stern Group for violence, including the bank robberies of September 13.

Sept. 15: Palestine police prevented terrorists' raid at police post near Tel Aviv.

Irgun Zvai Leumi radio announced intentions of continuing terrorist activities, and hinted at severance of all relations with Haganah.

Jewish Agency and Wa'ad Leumi condemned terrorist activities.

1200 Jewish immigrants released under the quota from detention at Athlit.

Sept. 16: Arab Higher Executive presented a five-point memorandum to the British in Palestine demanding dissolution of the Jewish Agency, control of Jewish Agency funds, imposition of collective fines on Jewish community, and certain measures to combat terrorism.

Sept. 17: Dr. Chaim Weizmann, President of the World Zionist Organization, informed Foreign Secretary Bevin of the willingness of the Jewish Agency to enter the London Conference on Palestine provided it be permitted to discuss its plan for "a viable Jewish state in an adequate area of Palestine."

Sept. 19: Arab delegates presented their counter-proposals on Palestine to the London Conference.

Sept. 22: British forces battled for 12 hours with strongly resistant refugees aboard blockade runner *Palmach*.

Sept. 23: Illegal immigrants aboard the *Palmach* were transported to Cyprus.

British Government notified the Jewish Agency that it would not release the Zionist leaders in Latrun to attend the London Conference.

Sept. 25: Zionist Inner Council in Jerusalem voted 16 to 6 against participation in the London Conference.

Release of 192 Jews from detention at Latrun and Rafa was announced.

Arab States' plan for Palestine as presented at London Conference provided for provisional Arab-Jewish Government, the drafting of a constitution, and arrangements for the election of a Constituent Assembly.

Sept. 28: Stern Group manifesto warned Britain and condemned Haganah's attitude toward Britain.

Oct. 2: Anglo-Arab Conference on Palestine adjourned to December 16, 1946.

British forces arrested 50 Jews, believed to be Irgun Zvai Leumi leaders, in Tel Aviv.

Oct. 4: President Truman issued a statement expressing regret on the adjournment of the Palestine Conference in London and restating his views on the Palestine situation. He urged that immigration into Palestine of Jewish refugees begin at once, that immigration laws in other countries including the U. S. be liberalized. (Text in *New York Times*, October 5, 1946, page 2.)

Oct. 5: Arab Higher Executive announced the amalgamation of the two Arab para-military organizations — Futuwwah and Najjadah.

Oct. 6: Governor Dewey urged admission of "hundreds of thousands" of Jews into Palestine in a speech before the United Palestine Appeal in New York.

Oct. 8: Zionist leaders presented their plan for restoring peace in Palestine to the British Colonial Office; the plan included a request for increased Jewish immigration.

New outbreak of terror, instigated by Stern Group: Palestine's arterial roads mined; mines found on road leading to home of the High Commissioner for Palestine; two British soldiers killed.

Zionist leaders conferred in London with Arthur Creech Jones, Colonial Secretary, regarding measures to restore British-Jewish amity and co-operation.

Oct. 13: Terrorists, thought to be Irgun Zvai Leumi members, escaped with a $12,000 payroll in Tel Aviv.

Oct. 18: Jewish terrorists resumed their sniping and land mine-laying campaign after a ten-day lull.

Oct. 19: Jerusalem was under curfew for the first time since the bombing of the King David Hotel, because of the resumption of terrorist activity.

Oct. 21: Arab headquarters of Jewish boycott leaders in Haifa was raided by British forces; members of the boycott committee were arrested.

British forces intercepted the blockade runner *Alma* with 800 illegal immigrants aboard.

Oct. 22: British War Office announced that Lieut. Gen. Sir Evelyn Barker, widely criticized for his "anti-Semitic" letter to his officers shortly after the King David bombing, would relinquish his post as commander of British forces in Palestine to head Army's Eastern Command in England. Maj. Gen. G. H. A. MacMillan named as his successor.

Oct. 24: In a letter to Rabbi Stephen S. Wise, Secretary of State James Byrnes assured him that he was in agreement with President Truman's statement on Palestine of October 4, 1946.

Oct. 25: 150 Jerusalem residents were detained by police following a night of bomb and mine blasts.

Oct. 28: Palestine Jews voted for the delegates to the World Zionist Congress scheduled for December 9, 1946, at Basle, Switzerland.

Oct. 29: Zionist Inner Council in Palestine adopted a resolution which condemned terrorism.

Oct. 30: Irgun Zvai Leumi attacks, including the blasting of the Jerusalem railway station, resulted in the death of two British soldiers and one British police sergeant, and injury to 13 British soldiers and one Arab.

Oct. 31: Wa'ad Leumi appealed to Jews to refrain from encouraging and supporting the terrorists.

1200 Jewish refugees aboard the *Latrun* were taken by British forces inside Palestine territorial waters.

Irgun Zvai Leumi broadcast, in reply to Inner Zionist Council appeal for an end to violence, stated that it did not intend to cease its activities.

Nov. 1: Announcement was made in London to the effect that the British Colonial Office had issued instructions for the release of several Jewish Agency leaders and "700 other Jews" held without charge in Palestine detention camps since June 29, 1946.

1279 unauthorized Jewish immigrants were deported from Haifa to Cyprus.

Nov. 2: Palestine Arabs held a one-day strike on the anniversary of the Balfour Declaration.

Jewish extremists continued land-mining activities at Petah Tiqvah and near Haifa.

Nov. 3: Jews and Arabs clashed in land dispute near Lake Hula in northeastern Palestine.

Nov. 4: Palestine Government announced that it would resume payments of grants-in-aid to the Wa'ad Leumi. These payments had been suspended some weeks before because of a Jewish campaign to collect funds for illegal immigration; however, the Wa'ad Leumi had assured the Government that it neither administered nor spent the fund.

Nov. 5: Several hundred Jewish suspects and eight Jewish leaders held at Latrun detention camp since June 29, 1946, were released. The released Jewish leaders were: Moshe Shertok, Dr. Isaac Gruenbaum, Dr. Bernard Joseph, David Remez, David Ha-Cohen, David Shingarevsky, Joseph Shoffman, Mordecai Shatter. It was also announced that David Ben Gurion and Moshe Sneh were no longer under threat of arrest.

Palestine curfew was lifted.

Amnesty was also extended to 23 Palestinian Arabs in exile since the 1936–39 disturbances.

Nov. 10: Bombs destroyed railroad station, north of Lydda — an act for which the Irgun Zvai Leumi took responsibility.

Nov. 12: Palestine Government communiqué announced permission for 1050 Jewish refugees from Cyprus to enter Palestine under quota.

Nov. 13: Two police trucks were blown up by land mines outside Jerusalem.

Nov. 16: Palestine Government announced that it would continue the 1500 person per month immigration policy for the next two months.

Nov. 17: Four Britishers killed on outskirts of Tel Aviv by a mine. Irgun Zvai Leumi continued activities against Palestine railroads.

Nov. 18: British constables, in reprisal for the slaying of the four Britons on November 17, rioted against the Jews in Tel Aviv.

Palestine Government announced that 16,500 immigration certificates had been issued in the past eleven months.

Nov. 25: Palestine court, at Jewish request, issued a writ of habeas corpus against Palestine Government officials regarding Jewish refugees aboard the *Lochitta* (renamed *Hameri Ha Ivri*) who were to be deported to Cyprus.

Nov. 26: Unauthorized Jewish immigrants aboard the *Hameri Ha Ivri* put up strongest resistance yet met by British deportation forces.

Nov. 28: Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery arrived in Palestine to survey Palestine defense.

Nov. 29: Palestine Supreme Court rejected the Jewish habeas corpus petition aimed at preventing the deportation to Cyprus of the latest unauthorized Jewish immigrants.

Three ships with refugees aboard left for Cyprus two hours after the Court's judgment.

Palestine High Commissioner announced authorization for admission to Palestine of 1000 Jewish refugees already in Cyprus.

Nov. 30: Terrorist outbreaks in reprisal for court judgment backing deportation of refugees increased in Jerusalem.

Saudi Arabia

CHRONOLOGY

Oct. 17: Letter from King Ibn Saud to President Truman criticizing the President's Palestine position was released in London. (Text in *New York Times*, October 18, 1946, page 1.)

Oct. 28: Letter from President Truman to King Ibn Saud repeated the President's stand for the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine and for the admission of 100,000 Jewish immigrants. (Text in *New York Times*, October 29, 1946, page 14.)

Nov. 24: American experts arrived in Jidda to study cost and possibilities of a proposed railroad from Dhahran to Riyad.

Syria and Lebanon

CHRONOLOGY

Oct. 2: Syria and Lebanon admitted to membership in the International Monetary Fund.

New Lebanese Labor Code went into force. (For digest of Code, see p. 89.)

Oct. 29: Speech of Faris Bey al-Khuri, chairman of the Syrian delegation to the United Nations General Assembly, expressed conciliatory attitude toward refugees and a warning against any attempt to resettle refugees in any country against the wishes of its inhabitants.

Nov. 19: Syria was voted to membership in UN Security Council, beginning January 1, 1947.

Nov. 23: American joint mission to Syria and Lebanon terminated: each country to have a U.S. Minister. Lowell C. Pinkerton appointed Minister to Lebanon.

Transjordan

CHRONOLOGY

Sept. 20: King Abdallah returned from a visit to the Regent of Iraq and stated that the two

countries were planning to enter a form of union soon.

Nov. 11: King Abdallah in a speech before the Transjordan Legislative Assembly stated that his country was willing to join a union with Iraq or any Arab state.

The Legislative Assembly ratified Transjordan's new constitution.

Turkey

The continued exchange of notes on the regime of the Straits added nothing to the principles already laid down by the U.S., Turkey, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. The line of division between Russia and the other three powers, clearly set forth in the U.S. note of August 19, 1946 (for text see page 88), remained fundamental. The question to be decided was no longer what ships should have the right of passage, for the U.S. proposals offered the Soviet Union complete freedom of the Straits while drastically restricting the passage of the warships of non-Black Sea powers. The basic point at issue was rather whether the rights of passage were to be guaranteed by an international convention, as maintained by the U.S., or by the physical might of the riparian states, as urged by Russia.

While the question of the Straits was largely quiescent during the fall of 1946, it still loomed as the great question mark to the Turks and continued to affect materially both their domestic and foreign policies. The development of an effective two party system in the new National Assembly was slower than might have been expected from the outspoken advocacy of such a system during the previous year, possibly out of necessity for preserving the unity of the Turkish body politic. The army remained mobilized, with a third of the ordinary budget assigned to its use. Since the most salient feature of the reconsideration of the Straits regime was U.S. initiative in the matter, the Turkish attitude toward the U.S. continued to be characterized by a pronounced cordiality. In general, however, Turkey's policy was to avoid as far as possible any undue international attention, in the manner of one who half expects his turn to be the next.

CHRONOLOGY

Sept. 7: Turkish lira was devaluated to 2.80 to the dollar. Premiums of 40% were removed.

Sept. 20: Mumtaz Ökmen became Vice-Premier and Minister of State.

Sept. 24: Second Russian note to Turkey on the subject of the Straits. Russia renewed her demands for control of the Straits by Black Sea Powers.

Sept. 30: U.S. Department of State indicated the U.S. would continue to follow the same lines as laid down in its note to Turkey of August 19, 1946. (For text of August 19 note see page 88.)

First official Turkish comment since receipt of the second Russian note on the Straits indicated that Turkey would stand firm in her resistance to Russia's proposed common defense plan.

Oct. 2: Turkey admitted to membership in the International Monetary Fund.

Turkish budget, larger than budgets of the war years, announced as T.L. 1,134,000,000 of which one-third was slated for defense purposes.

Oct. 9: British presented note to Turkey and Russia on the Straits.

U.S. note to Russia reiterated U.S. support of Turkey.

Oct. 18: Turkish reply to second Soviet note on revision of Montreux Convention was given to the Russians.

Oct. 23: Radio Corporation of America announced the signing of a contract with the Turkish Government to install modern radio communications equipment aboard 31 ships of Turkish merchant marine.

Nov. 13: British Foreign Office announced that the British Government had received another Russian note on the Dardanelles.

DOCUMENTS

Statement by Loy W. Henderson, *Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, Department of State, summarizing the objectives of United States policy in the Near and Middle East. (From an address delivered in Los Angeles, September 19, 1946.)*

The main objective of the United States in the Near and Middle East is to prevent rivalries and conflicts of interest in that area from developing into open hostilities which eventually might lead to a third world war. This part of the world is of tremendous strategic value, in view of its importance as a common highway by sea, land, and air between the East and West; it possesses great mineral wealth, and it has potentially rich agricultural resources. In spite of the fact that some of these countries are the heirs of great civilizations the majority of the populations in them, for reasons which I do not have the time to advance here, are poverty stricken and are not so advanced politically, economically, and technically, as the peoples of the Western world. Many of these peoples during recent years have become conscious of the fact that they are not playing a role in world affairs commensurate with their great native abilities and distinguished history and are beginning to demand that they be given opportunities to create for themselves a way of life comparable to that of the peoples of the West. They are demanding more and better educational facilities, they are insisting that steps be taken to improve their economic position; they are asking that they be given the right to govern themselves and to work out their own destiny with the aid of foreign cultural and technical assistance of their own choosing. They wish to use the experience of the more advanced countries in order to build a society and civilization upon the foundation of their own culture and traditions. They are beginning to have a sense of frustration at the slowness of their progress and are becoming restless and discontented.

The disintegrating effect of many groups of dissatisfied citizens weakens the governments of some of the countries of the Near and Middle East. Without foreign assistance, these governments in their weakened condition encounter difficulties in taking effective measures to remove the very causes of discontent. The presence of large numbers of disaffected citizens also impairs the ability and undermines the determination of these countries to resist pressure from without. Until all the countries of the Near and Middle East are politically and economically sound, and until their governments become stable and are able to preserve internal order and to take measures to improve the living standards of their populations, the Near and Middle East will continue to present a temptation to powers outside the area. As long as this temptation exists the danger of conflict which may lead to war will continue to be present. Our Government has taken the attitude that this danger is too real for it to ignore and our policies with regard to the Near and Middle East have been formulated accordingly.

Our primary policy with regard to that area therefore is to take whatever measures may be possible and proper to promote directly and indirectly the political and economic advancement of the Near and Middle Eastern peoples and to support in that area the principles of the United Nations. We should give appropriate assistance to developing the economies of the countries of the Near and Middle East and to creating a higher standard of living for their people. We should do what is possible and proper to encourage greater political and economic stability. We should endeavor to create conditions favorable to the orderly development of the

resources of the area, free from the exploitative, discriminatory, and restrictive practices which have caused friction in undeveloped areas in the past. Among the specific policies which are being followed in promoting the advancement of the Near and Middle East might be mentioned:

(1) The lending of our support to enable the independent countries in that area to maintain their political independence and territorial integrity;

(2) The initiation by the United States of an expanding program of assistance which would vary in each country according to its individual needs and in response to its specific requests. Such assistance may be cultural, economic, financial, or technical; it may be implemented by sending special missions, by providing technical experts or advisers to the interested Government or, in some instances, by facilitating the extension of credits for purposes of rehabilitation or modernization of the country's economy.

In addition we are endeavoring to strengthen the economic relations existing between the United States and these countries in a manner which would be to our mutual advantage and which would be compatible with the spirit of the United Nations by

A. Insisting upon non-discriminatory treatment of United States nationals and interests and by giving appropriate encouragement to the gradual elimination of such special economic privileges of other foreign governments as tend to create international resentment or to impede the progress of the peoples of that area.

B. Actively promoting our commercial and business interests and trade with the United States and supporting the development of industries and extractive projects in which United States companies are involved along lines which promise to be beneficial to the Near and Middle East, to the United States, and to a world economy in general.

C. Promoting American communication facilities to and through the Near and Middle East — I am referring here to aviation, telecommunication, and shipping.

In general we consider it important to the security and prosperity of the world as well as of the Near and Middle East that the doctrine of the open door be fully applicable to that part of the world. We would, therefore, be opposed to any trend in the direction of preventing that area from enjoying untrammeled economic relations with foreign countries.

Text of the Agreement between the United States *and the* Kingdom of the Yemen

Sana'a, *May 4, 1946*

Excellency:

I have the honor to make the following statement of my Government's understanding of the agreement reached through conversations held at Sana'a April 14 to May 4 by representatives of the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Kingdom of the Yemen with reference to diplomatic and consular representation, juridical protection, commerce and navigation as hereafter defined. These two Governments, having in mind the letter dated March 4, 1946, from the President of the United States of America to the Imam Yahya ibn Muhammad Hamid al-Din, King of the Yemen, by which the United States of America recognized the complete and absolute independence of the Kingdom of the Yemen, and desiring to strengthen the friendly relations happily existing between the two countries, and to respect the rights of this independence recognized by the above-mentioned letter as the basis for all their relations and to maintain the most-favored-nation principle in its unconditional and unlimited form as the basis of their commercial relations, agree to the following provisions:

ARTICLE I

The United States of America and the Kingdom of the Yemen will exchange diplomatic representatives and consular officers at a date which shall be fixed by mutual agreement between the two Governments.

ARTICLE II

The diplomatic representatives of each Party accredited to the Government of the other Party shall enjoy in the territories of such other Party the rights, privileges, exemptions and immunities accorded under generally recognized principles of international law. The consular officers of each Party who are assigned to the Government of the other Party, and are duly provided with exequaturs, shall be permitted to reside in the territories of such other Party at the places where consular officers are permitted by the applicable laws to reside; they shall enjoy the honorary privileges and the immunities accorded to officers of their rank by general international usage; and they shall not, in any event, be treated in a manner less favorable than similar officers of any third country.

ARTICLE III

Subjects of His Majesty the King of the Yemen in the United States of America and nationals of the United States of America in the Kingdom of the Yemen shall be received and treated in accordance with the requirements and practices of generally recognized international law. In respect of their persons, possessions and rights, such subjects or nationals shall enjoy the fullest protection of the laws and authorities of the country, and shall not be treated in any manner less favorable than the nationals of any third country. Subjects of His Majesty in the United States of America and nationals of the United States of America in the Kingdom of the Yemen shall be subject to the local laws and regulations, and shall enjoy the rights and privileges accorded in this third Article.

ARTICLE IV

In all matters relating to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in connection with importation or exportation or otherwise affecting commerce and navigation, to the method of levying such duties and charges, to all rules and formalities in connection with importation or exportation, and to transit, warehousing and other facilities, each Party shall accord unconditional and unrestricted most-favored-nation treatment to articles of growth, produce or manufacture of the other Party, from whatever place arriving, or to articles destined for exportation to the territories of such other Party, by whatever route. Any advantage, favor, privilege or immunity with respect to any duty, charge or regulation affecting commerce or navigation now or hereafter accorded by the United States of America or by the Kingdom of the Yemen to any third country will be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the commerce and navigation of the Kingdom of the Yemen and of the United States of America, respectively. The advantages relating to customs duties now or hereafter accorded by the United States of America to the Republic of Cuba shall be excepted from the provisions of this Agreement.

ARTICLE V

There shall be excepted from the provisions of Article IV of this Agreement advantages now or hereafter accorded: by virtue of a customs union of which either Party may become a member; to adjacent countries in order to facilitate frontier traffic; and by the United States of America or its territories or possessions to one another or to the Panama Canal Zone.

The last clause shall continue to apply in respect of any advantages now or hereafter accorded by the United States of America or its territories or possessions to one another irrespective of any change in the political status of any such territories or possessions. Nothing in this Agreement shall prevent the adoption or enforcement by either Party within the area of its jurisdiction: of measures relating to the importation or exportation of gold or silver or the traffic in arms, ammunition, and implements of war, and, in exceptional circumstances, all other military supplies; of measures necessary in pursuance of obligations for the maintenance of international peace and security or necessary for the

protection of the essential interests of such Party in time of national emergency; or of statutes in relation to immigration and travel. Subject to the requirement that, under like circumstances and conditions, there shall be no arbitrary discrimination by either Party against the subjects, nationals, commerce or navigation of the other Party in favor of the subjects, nationals, commerce or navigation of any third country, the provisions of this Agreement shall not extend to prohibitions or restrictions: imposed on moral or humanitarian grounds; designed to protect human, animal, or plant life or health; relating to prison-made goods; or relating to the enforcement of police or revenue law.

ARTICLE VI

The provisions of this Agreement shall apply to all territory under the sovereignty or authority of either of the parties, except the Panama Canal Zone.

ARTICLE VII

This Agreement shall continue in force until superseded by a more comprehensive commercial agreement, or until thirty days from the date of a written notice of termination given by either Party to the other Party, whichever is the earlier. Moreover, either Party may terminate Articles I, II, III or IV on thirty days' written notice.

If the above provisions are acceptable to the Government of the Kingdom of the Yemen this note and the reply signifying assent thereto shall, if agreeable to that Government, be regarded as constituting an agreement between two Governments which shall become effective on the date of such acceptance.

Accept [etc.]

William A. Eddy
Chief, Special U. S. Diplomatic Mission to the Kingdom of the Yemen

Al Qadi Abdul Karim Mutahhar
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Kingdom of the Yemen

Text of the United States Note to the Soviet Union concerning the question of the Turkish Straits, August 19, 1946

August 19, 1946

Sir:

I acknowledge receipt of your note of August 7, 1946, which sets forth the text of the note addressed on the same day by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Government of the Republic of Turkey and express the appreciation of this Government for the courtesy of the Soviet Government in making this information available.

It will be recalled that the American Embassy in Moscow made available to the Soviet Government in November 1945 a copy of the note which the American Embassy in Ankara delivered to the Turkish Government on November 2, 1945.

This Government has given careful study to the views expressed by the Soviet Government in its note to the Turkish Government. It would appear from a comparison of this Government's note of November 2, 1945, with the Soviet note to the Turkish Government of August 7, 1946, that the views of the Governments of the United States and of the Soviet Union, while not in entire accord, are in general agreement with regard to the three following proposals set forth in the Soviet note:

1. The Straits should be always open to the passage of merchant ships of all countries.
2. The Straits should be always open to the passage of warships of the Black Sea powers.
3. Passage through the Straits for warships not belonging to the Black Sea powers shall not be permitted except in cases specially provided for.

The fourth proposal set forth in the Soviet note does not appear to envisage a revision of the Montreux Convention, as suggested in our note to the Turkish Government of November 2, 1945, but rather the establishment of a new regime which would be confined to Turkey and the other Black Sea powers. It is the view of this Government that the regime of the Straits is a matter of

concern not only to the Black Sea powers but also to other powers, including the United States. This Government cannot, therefore, agree with the Soviet view that the establishment of the regime of the Straits should come under the competence of the Black Sea powers to the exclusion of other powers.

The fifth proposal set forth in the note of the Soviet Government was that Turkey and the Soviet Union should organize joint means of defense of the Straits. It is the firm opinion of this Government that Turkey should continue to be primarily responsible for the defense of the Straits. Should the Straits become the object of attack or threat of attack by an aggressor, the resulting situation would constitute a threat to international security and would clearly be a matter for action on the part of the Security Council of the United Nations.

It is observed that the note of the Soviet Government contains no reference to the United Nations. The position of the Government of the United States is that the regime of the Straits should be brought into appropriate relationship with the United Nations and should function in a manner entirely consistent with the principles and aims of the United Nations.

The Government of the United States reaffirms its willingness to participate in a conference called to revise the Montreux Convention.

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my high consideration.

Dean Acheson
Acting Secretary of State

Digest of the Labor Code of Lebanon, October 2, 1946

Late in October 1946, the Lebanese press published the text of the first comprehensive Labor Code ever introduced in Lebanon. Passed by Parliament early in September and signed by President Bishara al-Khuri on September 23,[1] it regulates the relationship between individual employers and employees, and makes provision for employers' associations, labor unions, and arbitration. The Code, subdivided into seven titles, consists of 114 Articles and two Appendices.

The Code applies to individual and corporate employers, including foreign enterprises which have establishments or agents in Lebanon, charitable and religious organizations, and foreign and domestic schools. Not included are government services, businesses which employ only the members of one family under parental supervision, certain types of agricultural undertakings, and domestic help in private employ. Also excluded from the Code are the establishments of craftsmen provided that they do not employ more than fifteen workers. In the undertakings to which it applies, the Code covers all types of employees, including day laborers and apprentices.

Titles I and II deal with all aspects of the individual relationship between employer and employee, and with working conditions. The contract of labor can be either oral or written; if the latter it is to be in Arabic. The Service of Social Affairs of the Ministry of Economics is to supply all employees with booklets containing a copy of the employee's identification card, a description of his special skills, a record of medical examinations, and data concerning his various places and periods of employment.

The Code restricts the employment of women and children. Children under eight years of age may not be employed at all; children between the ages of eight and thirteen may not be used in mechanical industries and a large number of occupations, enumerated in Appendices 1 and 2, which involve strenuous labor or potentially jeopardize the worker's health. Adolescents, that is persons between thirteen and sixteen, may not be employed at all in a number of the occupations enumerated in the Appendices, and in others only after medical examination. Neither children nor adolescents may be made to work more than seven hours a day. The employer is responsible for the deter-

[1] The Code was published in the *Journal Officiel* on October 2, 1946, and went into effect on that date. A French translation was published in *L'Orient*, October 25, 26, 27, and in *Le Commerce du Levant*, October 26, 1946. It should be noted that comprehensive labor legislation was enacted in Syria on June 11, 1946.

mination of the age of the children or adolescents.

Women may not be used in night work in industries, and may not be employed for certain heavy jobs or jobs involving hazards to health. Provisions are made for leave during pregnancy and the post-natal period. Any infraction on the part of employers, parents, or guardians, of the stipulations referring to the employment of women, children, or adolescents constitutes a criminal offense.

The Code establishes a forty-eight hour week. Work may be extended to twelve hours a day in cases of urgency. The week may be shortened by order of the Ministry of Economics in cases where work is very heavy or constitutes a hazard to health. Time and a half is to be paid for overtime. The employee has a right to a paid vacation of fifteen days after one year's employment, and to sick leave of a length varying in accordance with the period of employment.

Minimum wage and salary rates are to be fixed by the Ministry of Economics. These rates are to be adjusted according to prevailing economic conditions. Salaried employees are to be paid at least once a month, wage earners at least twice a month.

Except in cases where it has been concluded for a definite period, a contract of employment may be dissolved by either the employer or the employee upon one month's notice if the period of employment has not exceeded three years, and two months if it has been longer than three years. If the employee is discharged by the employer he has a right to receive, aside from wages earned, a terminal bonus which amounts to one month's wages for every year spent in this particular employment. If he has served less than a year he receives half a month's wages as bonus.

An employer may discharge an employee without notice and without terminal bonus for a number of reasons enumerated in the Code. Among them are conviction of the employee of certain crimes and misdemeanors, absence from work without valid reason for fifteen days a year or seven consecutive days, infringement of the written work rules three times during one year, or misrepresentation with regard to citizenship by the employee.

The employee, for his part, has the right to dissolve the employment contract without notice for several reasons which are likewise enumerated in the Code. Among them are false statements on the part of the employer concerning conditions of work when the contract was entered into, failure of the employer to fulfill his obligations under the Labor Code, and assault against the employee. As a rule the employee has no right to the terminal bonus if he leaves the job of his own accord. However, in those instances where the law allows him to leave without notice he may claim the terminal bonus. This stipulation is a logical counterpart to the employer's right to withhold the terminal bonus in cases where he is allowed to discharge the employee without prior notice. If an employee leaves his job without notice for any reason other than one expressly enumerated in the Code, he is liable to damages equivalent to one or two months' salary.

All enterprises which employ more than fifteen persons are to establish written work rules and personnel regulations which are to be approved by the Ministry of Economics. Infraction of these rules may be punished by fines. The Code deals briefly also with the health and safety measures to be taken in various enterprises. The details of such measures are to be set forth by decrees of the Council of Ministers. Several statutes already enacted are expressly upheld.

Title III deals with the arbitration of labor disputes. A Council of Arbitration is to be established in each provincial seat, and is to consist of a member of the judiciary as president, a representative of the employers, and a representative of the employees. All members of the Councils of Arbitration are to be Lebanese citizens over twenty-one years of age, without criminal record, and with at least five years' experience in their profession or trade. The Councils have jurisdiction in all disputes arising from the application of the Labor Code, in workmen's compensation cases, and in conflicts concerning the establishment of minimum wage rates.

According to Title IV of the Code, employers and employees exercising the same profession or trade may form organizations to represent their interests. These organiza-

tions have a legal personality and are to be approved by the Ministry of Economics, which also is to approve their constitutions and by-laws. The executive organ of each association is to be a committee composed of four to twelve members. The committee may be dissolved by the government if it does not fulfill all its duties or if it exceeds its jurisdiction. A new committee is to be elected within three months in such cases. For the same reasons, the government may force the replacement of an individual member of the committee and may prosecute him in court if circumstances warrant. All associations are to keep records of their membership and of all receipts and expenditures. The acceptance of donations exceeding one thousand Lebanese pounds must be authorized by the Ministry of Economics. Foreigners may become members of such associations if they have a labor permit but they are not permitted to vote or hold office. They may, however, select one delegate to represent their interests before the committee. Though these associations are basically restricted to persons exercising the same profession or trade, federations of associations may be formed. The Code thus regulates employers' organizations and labor unions on exactly the same basis, and places both under fairly close government supervision. There are no provisions concerning collective bargaining or strikes.

The brief Title V contains the penal sanctions to be imposed in case of infraction of the provisions of the Code. Title VI deals with the establishment of employment services by the municipalities in each provincial seat. Such services are to be supervised by the Service of Social Affairs of the Ministry of Economics.

The new Lebanese Labor Code is a well drafted, modern law. It embodies a number of features which are strongly reminiscent of the European labor legislation enacted in the period between World Wars I and II, as for example the detailed regulation of terminal bonus payments. A notable feature of the Code is the extent of government control which is especially apparent in the establishment of a minimum wage structure and the supervision of employers' associations and unions. What influence the new Code will have upon Lebanese labor relations as a whole, however, cannot be estimated until it has been in operation for a considerable period and its provisions have been submitted to the test of practical application.

Herbert J. Liebesny
Foundation for Foreign Affairs

Provisions constituting the basis of agreement between Ahmad Qavam, Prime Minister of Iran, and Nasir Khan, leader of the Qashqai Tribes, in respect to the Province of Fars, October 16, 1946. (As broadcast over the Tehran radio, Oct. 16, 1946.)

1. The full execution of provisions of the Constitution has received and always will receive the attention of the Prime Minister.

2. The Prime Minister will order the formation of a Provincial Council in Fars.

3. As soon as the Fifteenth Majlis has been elected, a law to increase the number of deputies from Fars Province will be proposed.

4. The State Railway system will be extended to Fars Province at the first possible opportunity.

5. The present Government will soon initiate its program to improve roads and communications in Fars Province.

6. The Government has approved a large appropriation for the support of public health and public education in Fars Province.

7. The general economic plan now being discussed by representatives from Fars Province will soon be put into operation.

8. A special commission has been appointed to study existing legislation, and to prepare amendments which will be submitted for approval at the next meeting of the Majlis.

9. Official positions in the Province of Fars are to be filled, as far as possible, by residents of Fars.

10. The Prime Minister has granted a general amnesty to those elements in the towns or among the tribes who, in the course of the

National Movement in Fars, may have committed actions which were illegal and contrary to the spirit and aim of the Movement.

11. The National Movement of Fars, based on the principle of maintaining the independence, unity, and integrity of Iran, will remain in existence with the support of the Prime Minister.

REVIEWS OF RECENT BOOKS

GENERAL

Medieval Islam: A Study in Cultural Orientation, by Gustave E. von Grunebaum. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1946. vii + 365 pages. $4.00. An Oriental Institute Essay.

The word "medieval" which appears in the title of Gustave E. von Grunebaum's new book, *Medieval Islam*, would appear to indicate a chronological limitation of the subject. Such is only partially the case, however, for the book deals with Islam as a civilization, stressing its intellectual and spiritual aspects, rather than its political and economic phenomena. The "temper and flavor of the Muslim Middle Ages" are the elusive qualities which the author, professor of Arabic at the University of Chicago, has attempted to present between the covers of his book.

To this end, von Grunebaum has selected a number of topics which he considers best suited for an understanding of the complex, yet strangely uniform, character of Moslem civilization. The first two brilliant chapters contain a comparison of the significant features of medieval Islam with those of eastern and western Christianity, and offer abundant proof of the essential oneness of what might be called the "Western Third" of the pre-Columbian world. The following four chapters are devoted to a sketch of Moslem religion, Moslem law, and the political and social organization of Islam. The remaining three chapters of the investigation probe into the Moslem attitude toward the individual. Since man is the decisive element in all civilizations, the degree of consciousness of the human values which is found in a particular civilization is an infallible indication of its true character. Von Grunebaum admirably examines the human ideal of Islam, individual self-expression in Moslem literature and history, and the intellectual struggle with manifold foreign influences, as mirrored in the *Arabian Nights*.

A concluding chapter presents an evaluation of Moslem civilization as a whole. It is understandable and, perhaps, unavoidable that von Grunebaum uses criteria of evaluation which have been evolved to suit our modern Western civilization. On this basis, Islam is necessarily considered a failure. Intellectual "timidity," and such poor substitutes for the western "self-enjoyment of the advancing mind" as are "peace and repose," appear to von Grunebaum to be the dominant traits of medieval Islam. Obviously, critical judgments concerning the value of civilizations other than our own depend not so much upon our factual knowledge of those civilizations as upon our insight into the forces of history and the realization of what makes a civilization "tick." It remains doubtful whether, in the last analysis, any satisfactory judgment is possible concerning a historical phenomenon which is so fully saturated with diverse and even contradictory elements as is Islam.

Medieval Islam contains only a few incidental references to the modern Moslem East. Von Grunebaum points out the persistence of a very diluted Sufic pantheism throughout modern Islam. He characterizes the tendency to advocate the adoption of only the material achievements of Western civilization, observable in certain modern Moslem circles, as being based upon a misunderstanding of the real nature of Western civilization. Nevertheless, the student of modern Moslem life will find *Medieval Islam* a book well worth pondering. While the economy of the modern Middle East is being diverted from inherited patterns, and while its political trends reflect the vicissitudes of world affairs, nobody will deny that the in-

tellectual structure of Islam has not yet been seriously undermined by modern influences. What that structure is can be understood only through the study of Islam in the days of its growth and power.

One of the questions of immediate urgency for which von Grunebaum's book contains an implicit answer is that of the receptivity of Islam to influences from other civilizations. Islam maintained itself in a constant struggle with greatly superior cultural forces, especially of Graeco-Byzantine and Iranian origin. It selected and adopted those elements which appeared suitable, and erected the wall of Moslem tradition and theology as a protective measure against complete loss of identity. As a result of this process, which extended over centuries, Islam has developed an unlimited capacity to appropriate foreign ideas and provide for them, as it were, Moslem alibis, which only a very detached and discerning observer would recognize as false. From this fact we must derive a simple lesson: namely, that we would not be justified in assuming that any modern ideology per se is incompatible with Islam.

A related problem is that of the individual Moslem's capacity for change and development. Von Grunebaum's conclusion denying the existence of Moslem consciousness of the concept of *change* might easily mislead. Much of the most important material concerned with the attitude of Moslem scholars, in particular those of the tenth century, toward the concept of progressive *development* is still buried in manuscripts as yet inaccessible to Islamists. As far as our present knowledge goes, it would seem that the positivist concept of development as a steady, if slow, progress of human intellectual endeavor toward greater perfection never gained a firm foothold in Moslem thought. However, the concept of change as a perpetual and dominant force in human affairs was widely accepted. Truth and perfection, one and unchangeable, were considered to exist, and in theory to be ready for human beings to grasp on earth. But in fact, no human being ever reaches them. Constant efforts are made by individuals and generations of human beings to come as close to them as possible, and constant changes characterize the relationship of man with truth and perfection. The notion that in the other world a Moslem could be assured of eternal, unchangeable perfection may have put an occasional check on the intellectual restlessness which possessed the majority of Moslem scholars, but it is hardly before the sixteenth century that that notion temporarily superseded the deep-seated consciousness of the element of change inherent in man's intellectual activity. Only against this background can the spirited response of educated Middle Easterners to Western ideas, their constant readiness to switch from one grandiose scheme to another, be properly understood.

A correct appreciation of the historical arguments which play so important a role in present-day discussions of the pan-Arab and pan-Islamic movements may be better gained from a consideration of the factors which made Islam a separate entity in the medieval world than from any modern source. And the western and eastern elements in modern Near Eastern nationalism can be disentangled only by the observer who has in mind the fundamental facts of medieval Moslem thought. In his efforts to understand these and similar problems which concern him, the student of the modern Moslem East will find it extremely helpful to delve into the cultural history of Islam at the hand of such a thoughtful guide as von Grunebaum. His work combines the results of mature scholarship with a fine feeling for the skillful presentation of a difficult subject.

Franz Rosenthal
Hebrew Union College

Two Queens of Baghdad: Mother and Wife of Harun al-Rashid, by Nabia Abbott. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1946. 277 pages. $3.50.

Details about the influence of women over men in prominent public positions are particularly hard to determine in the Near East because the orthodox historians were not brought up in a tradition of objective reporting. They lacked academic scruples and thus felt free to underplay or suppress entirely references to the "ruler of the ruler." It is therefore quite pleasant to find in Miss

Abbott's *Two Queens of Baghdad* a documented presentation of the facts in the case of two women whose behind-the-scenes roles were significant in shaping one of the greatest empires in the Middle Ages.

The two queens are Khaizuran and Zubaidah, respectively the mother and wife of Harun al-Rashid, whose position in English literature, as a result of his fabulous activities in the *Arabian Nights*, is rivaled only by that of Saladin. Using their beauty, charm, wit, and intelligence — the last particularly useful in coping with their most formidable enemies, the harem rivals — they were able to reach positions of eminence which, in spite of temporary setbacks, they were able to maintain until the end of their lives. Although Khaizuran, through her influence on Harun's father, was literally a "king-maker," the Moslem historians, misogynists only professionally, almost unanimously engaged in a conspiracy of silence regarding her activities. In fact, as Miss Abbott says, this conspiracy might have continued indefinitely had not Khaizuran's clash with her eldest son resulted in her defeat and brief humiliation, a development which presumably pleased the historians. Zubaidah, for whom Harun almost renounced his claims to the throne, seems to have had less taste for and skill in political intrigue. She divided her attentions between the pomp of court life and spectacular philanthropic ventures that are still remembered in the Orient.

The period from about the middle of the eighth century to the middle of the ninth century A.D. was the "golden age" of the Abbasid empire — golden, that is, chiefly for the rulers, courtiers, and those who catered to their pleasure. It was indeed a time of political machinations. In the absence of a firm and generally accepted principle of regal succession or merit basis of appointment to office, where almost everything turned on the whims of one man or sheer luck, and where the rise from slave girl to queen was no more difficult than that of poor boy to president, success most frequently came to those whose brains were nimblest and whose moral sense was either dulled or nonexistent.

It is therefore somewhat disappointing to the layman, for whom the *Two Queens of Baghdad* was chiefly written, to find that while the atmosphere of this period is well recreated, the characters do not quite come to life. There is a blur and feeling of confusion, largely the inevitable result of the seemingly endless introduction of new personalities, many of whom are unimportant. Unhappily, too, the force of numerous events of potentially high drama is weakened or lost by premature revelation. Another minor weakness is the author's yielding to excessive caution in refusing to voice an opinion on several vital questions that were left unanswered by the Moslem historians.

The book, nevertheless, remains quite readable. Miss Abbott has an eye to the picturesque detail and the amusing anecdote and she reveals a pleasant, unmannered style of writing. The student will find the book extremely valuable for its wealth of references to the primary materials painstakingly assembled and analyzed. Its usefulness as a reference tool is increased by a good index and a chart of the family relationships of the principal *dramatis personae*. Miss Abbott's scholarship is first-rate and, combined with her enthusiasm and love of subject, has produced a book rewarding to those seeking solid information about an important and fascinating period in the history of the Arabs.

SIDNEY GLAZER
Library of Congress

Guillaume Boucher, a French Artist at the Court of the Khans, by Leonardo Olschki. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1946. viii +125 pages, 10 plates. $2.50.

In 1242 Guillaume Boucher (or Buchier), a versatile Parisian artist, was captured by the Mongols in Belgrade, which then belonged to the Hungarian Kingdom. He became a slave in the house of the mother and, later on, the brother of the Emperor Mangu (1250–59) to end finally as the chief artist and engineer at the Emperor's court. Boucher, like other artists and skilled workers, received better treatment than that which generally awaited the prisoners of the Mongols. Since none of the works of Master

Guillaume have thus far come to light all information available about him comes from the report of the Franciscan missionary, Friar William of Rubruck, who stayed in the Mongol Imperial winter camp from December 1253 until March 1254 and in Karakorum, capital of the Mongol Empire, from April till August of the same year. By his skillful interpretation of the source material, Dr. Olschki is able to trace Boucher's work "in the cosmopolitan center of a dominion stretching from Korea to the Mediterranean"; indeed, his activity "reveals some characteristic aspects of Asiatic life and civilization in which Chinese traditions amalgamated with Byzantine and Western influence, Indo-Tibetan inspiration fell in with Mohammedan culture and the last ramifications of Asiatic Christianity merged in the pagan superstitions of an age-old autochthonous Shamanism."

Among Boucher's artistic achievements were the contributions which he made for the small Catholic community in Karakorum, of which he was the intellectual leader. Friar William tells of various religious images and implements which he made, such as a silver crucifix, an iron to make holy wafers and a silver pyx to hold them, a portable altarpiece with a sculptured image of the Virgin, and an oratory on a cart decorated with sacred scenes, apparently a kind of movable chapel for private devotion and adapted to the semi-nomadic conditions under which the Christian community lived. As Dr. Olschki shows, all these various creations were done in French style and according to the contemporary mood of Catholic devotion in France. They were, therefore, in strong contrast to the ideas of the Nestorians, who were continuously at loggerheads with the representatives of the Latin church. This conflict, leading even to the theft of Boucher's crucifix, is one of the most interesting subjects of the book.

More ambitious than the objects made for the Catholic slave community was his main work for the court: a fountain built by fifty workmen under Boucher's direction. The Mongol Emperor felt that the traditional drinking bouts during the great receptions should have a more dignified, orderly organization. To serve this purpose, Boucher constructed a great silver tree at whose feet four lions belched forth the dregs of kumiss for the slaves, while four other conduits led to dragons in the tree tops and poured out different intoxicants for the aristocracy and guests. The whole was crowned by an angel which trumpeted whenever more liquor was needed. Dr. Olschki shows that this tree fountain was apparently a symbol of the dignity and power of the Mongol rulers and at the same time must have had the most varied religious connotations for the representatives of the many beliefs who gathered in the reception hall of the Mongol court. Although the ideas and the technical devices for such a structure derive ultimately from Classical writings, the main contemporary sources must have come from the Middle East, especially from the writings of al-Jazari, who, in 1206, wrote in Amid (Upper Mesopotamia) an often copied treatise on Automata.

To the example given by Dr. Olschki one could add Kai Khusraw's richly jeweled silver tree showering "musk worked up with wine" on the enthroned king beneath. This legendary artifice is described in the *Shah Namah* (see Mohl's ed., III, pp. 364–65, and the translation by A. G. and E. Warner, III, p. 329) and is illustrated in a Persian miniature of the early fourteenth century in the Freer Gallery of Art (No. 29.44). It is this relationship to Arabic and Persian literature and the obvious assistance given by Persian and Turkish artisans to Boucher which will be of special interest to readers of the *Journal*.

One object of Master Guillaume's workshop is not mentioned by Olschki. When the Franciscan friar left Karakorum the goldsmith not only sent "endless salutations" and prayers to St. Louis, his former sovereign, but also "a girdle ornamented with a precious stone, such as they wear against lightning and thunder" (Rockhill's ed. p. 254). This girdle was, no doubt, made by Boucher himself who, although for many years a slave in a far distant country, was eager to send his gift to the king who personified France for him.

One can only admire Dr. Olschki's erudition which covers in a well-integrated fashion

European and Oriental religions, history, literature, art, and technology, although a few of his interpretations might seem to be a little farfetched. It is also well-nigh impossible that he should be equally versed in every field, but although one can, for instance, adduce different or more specific dates for the Persian manuscripts from which he brings illustrations, this in no way affects his main thesis.

The book is to be recommended to everybody who is interested in the period of Marco Polo and wants to witness "a broad panorama of human activity and intercourse throughout the mediaeval world."

RICHARD ETTINGHAUSEN
Freer Gallery of Art
Washington, D. C.

Life Line to a Promised Land, by Ira A. Hirschmann. New York: The Vanguard Press, 1946. 208 pages. $2.75.

Although the central theme of Ira Hirschmann's *Life Line to a Promised Land* — his efforts on behalf of the War Refugee Board to rescue Jewish victims of Nazidom in southeastern Europe — does not fall within the field of interest of *The Middle East Journal*, two circumstances caused him to include chapters which do deal with the area. These are that Mr. Hirschmann used Turkey as the base of his activities, and that the refugees he helped to save were prospective immigrants to Palestine.

Mr. Hirschmann's intensity of feeling toward the refugee problem makes his story absorbing reading, but unfortunately it also highly distorts his writing on Turkey and Palestine. The chapter "Turkey at the Crossroads" contains many accusations which are undoubtedly true in themselves, but the absence of any setting by which they might be evaluated throws them out of proportion. Turkey's failure to measure up to the West's ideals of efficiency is presented without reference to the country's degree of westernization twenty-five years ago. Mr. Hirschmann attacks the Turkish Government for not relaxing its ruling that no refugees from the Balkans were to be admitted in transit unless permits of entry to some other country had been secured. Yet for Turkey to have relaxed this ruling would have been to adopt a policy which would in practice have run counter to Britain's policy of immigration into Palestine; Turkey's attitude was in accordance with the rule of noninterference in other nations' affairs. One suspects that much of the criticism leveled at Ankara arises from the circumstance that it was unfortunately the government on the spot. It was faced with the unenviable choice of deciding whether to abide by a law which in normal times would be perfectly reasonable; or to supersede it, and possibly national interests as well, for the sake of humanity. It is a moral question all countries face to a greater or less degree in time of war, and no nation is so blameless as to be in a position to hurl the stone of accusation at another.

Mr. Hirschmann inclines to view Palestine simply as a refuge for the homeless Jews of Europe, and the Palestine question as the problem of how to get them established there. A "Palestinian," as Mr. Hirschmann uses the term, is a Jewish inhabitant of Palestine. In regarding the Palestine problem as almost entirely centered in the question of economic absorptive capacity, and the source of obstruction as British imperialistic machination, Mr. Hirschmann is able to simplify his arguments, but would seem to overlook the mainspring of the conflict.

The Arabs, according to Mr. Hirschmann, are nothing but the "foils" of British imperialism. He writes the Arab League off as "a useful tool": "The truth is, as anyone knows who is familiar with the political machinations of the Middle East, that the League is a British creation — a device for world propaganda and furthering British imperialistic aims. It is no secret that the Arab leaders are financed by the British." Although, says the author, "the majority of the Arabs do not bear the Jews any malice," they "have been spurred on by the British" who "hoped to use the Arabs to strangle the Jews." It is thus the British who emerge as the arch villains in the piece, both in the work of rescuing refugees and in the tragic division that has arisen over Palestine. "The time has come," says Mr. Hirschmann, "when the British must stand responsible for

the tragedy of Palestine; for their silent acquiescence in and deliberate effort at the destruction of a people."

Mr. Hirschmann's solution for procedure on Palestine is to remove it "from the clutches of imperialists and imperial strategy," and make it "the responsibility of the United Nations." Strangely enough, Mr. Hirschmann will find many Arabs in agreement with him on this point.

HARVEY P. HALL
The Middle East Institute

ARAB STATES

Syria and Lebanon: A Political Essay, by Albert H. Hourani. New York: The Oxford University Press, 1946. 402 pages. 12 s. 6d.

The Near East and its problems have become fashionable topics in recent years and have inspired an abundant literature. Unfortunately, much that has been written is superficial, uninformed or romantic, whenever it is not outright partisan and propagandist. Aside from a handful of expert treatments of specific problems and a few penetrating comments on general trends, there is hardly any outstanding study combining an accurate presentation of facts with an analysis of the enduring forces which govern Near Eastern life. Mr. Hourani has written such a book, drawing his premises from and testing his conclusions by first-hand observation of the area over a period of years.

Although the study is extended in part to the whole Arab East, the author has selected Syria and Lebanon for detailed treatment because these two countries are particularly well equipped to play an important part in "the great changes which are remoulding the life of the Arabic-speaking peoples." Besides, his study of the common background of these two countries with the rest of geographical Syria, as well as of their pioneering role in the awakening of Arab nationalism, has provided a clear perspective for an understanding of the various schemes for the union of geographical Syria, the union of Iraq with geographical Syria, and finally of a wider union of the Arabic-speaking peoples.

The author's method of approach in describing the relationships of the several political elements at work in the Near East deserves special appreciation. Throughout his examination of historical developments, the attitudes and policies of the powers, the nationalists, individual leaders, and the minorities, Mr. Hourani considers each of these parties as a legitimate cause which needs recognition. As a result, he has achieved a high degree of objectivity which enables him to give proper perspective to the policies followed by the various groups.

Above all, the particular merit of Mr. Hourani's book lies in his apt analysis of the manifold moral and material forces which must be balanced before "healthy" relationships can be established among the Arabic-speaking peoples themselves, and between them and the Western powers. Perhaps Mr. Hourani's presentation is an oversimplification; yet, if the complex of Near Eastern problems — unfortunately too often described as a hopeless tangle — are to be discussed with any clarity, they must be reduced to their simplest expression.

Starting from the premise that the basic difficulties confronting the Arab East today result from the "problem of a traditional society changing fundamentally under the impact of Western civilization," Mr. Hourani examines the processes and the consequences of this meeting of two modes of life. The West came to the Arabs "asserting, in act if not in word, its own superiority and its contempt for the East"; it came as a challenge to an old way of life and thought; it vindicated its views not only by propagating its spiritual beliefs but by means of its mechanical strength and the efficiency of its economic organization. For their part, the Arabic-speaking peoples, having been struck broadside by this mighty impact, found themselves torn between their old traditions and the new Western ideas. It is this conflict between old and new which has given rise to Arab nationalism — a movement which strives to "defend the existence of the Arab community against forces which threaten to disrupt it, and to control and direct the

process of Westernization in the light of the principles which the Arabs accept as valid." Whether this force will consume itself in fighting Western influences or devote itself to "the reconstruction of Arab society through a fundamental assimilation of the best elements in Western life," will depend largely on the capacity of the West to set its relationships with the Arab East on a basis of equality and mutual respect.

The comprehensive character of this study, coupled with the almost complete accuracy of the events reported, makes *Syria and Lebanon* a first-class reference book as well as a sound evaluation of conditions in the Arab East.

ROBERT D. SETHIAN
Department of State

An Arab Tells His Story: A Study in Loyalties, by Edward Atiyah. London: John Murray, 1946. 226 pages. 12s. 6d.

In this autobiography, Edward Atiyah recounts his early fervent love for everything British, and reveals his slow, unwillingly accepted disillusionment upon contact with the British colonial system in the Sudan; the trying of his faith during the days of vacillating British foreign policy prior to September 1939; and the final amalgamation of his concepts of Arab nationalism and British imperialism.

Edward Atiyah, a sensitive, serious-minded boy of Christian Arab parentage, grew up in Beirut prior to World War I with an acute awareness of the differences existing between the local Christians and Moslems. In his overwhelming need for a feeling of security he turned increasingly to Western culture, particularly the British, for comfort. Learning English at an early age, he poured over English history and literature, and secured his education at Victoria College in Alexandria, Egypt, and at Oxford.

As his admiration for Western culture grew, Mr. Atiyah struggled with an inner repulsion toward the Orientalism of his family and people. The problem is well presented of the native of the Near East who, having acquired an almost completely westernized education, returns to his people and attempts to reconcile the ways of East and West — and finds himself in the half-way region between Europe and the Arab world, torn by his loyalty to both.

After seven years at Victoria College and Oxford, Mr. Atiyah became an instructor at Gordon College in Khartoum where he was deeply mortified at being "flung back at one bound into a world of group barriers, a world in which an obnoxious fence was erected between East and West, and in which I, despite my long and passionate struggle to assimilate England and be assimilated by her, was consigned to that side of the fence on which I was born." Ignored by the British tutors, Mr. Atiyah also learned that outside the College the British in Khartoum had likewise erected this barrier between themselves and the governed. For the first time, he felt great sympathy for and understanding of Arab nationalism. He was able to overcome some of the social barrier only when he took a position with the Sudan Government as interpreter of native thought to the officials, and of Government policy to the public.

The author goes to great lengths to justify his belief in British imperialism at its best, and his incapability as a Christian to embrace wholeheartedly Arab nationalism. He explains his growing awareness of a need greater than that of national independence: the emancipation of the Arab peasant. For aid in this need, he turned hopefully toward the British Left Movement, though he admits that he began to think of Russia as the "herald of a new dawn," and that his young son was growing up with an admiration for Russia comparable to that he himself had held for England.

In the last thirty pages of his autobiography, Mr. Atiyah describes briefly the stand of the Arabs during World War II and their mounting nationalism since then. He closes with a warning to Great Britain that there can be no genuine friendship between the West and the Arab world unless the former fully realizes the intransigence of Arab desire for independence and unity. He urges an understanding based on a cultural and spiritual integration and aimed at a relationship of equality and friendship.

KATHLEEN PETERSON
The Middle East Institute

A Pilgrim in Arabia, by H. St. John B. Philby. London: Robert Hale Ltd., 1946. 198 pages, with 90 photographs. 16s.

For those concerned with modern Arabia the publication of a book by Philby is an event of the first importance. Although the present work appeared in 1943 in a limited de luxe edition, it is being reviewed here because of the greatly increased circulation which it will undoubtedly enjoy as a result of its appearance in a less expensive format.

This book constitutes a valuable addition to the existing store of knowledge on the politics, society, and topography of Saudi Arabia. The only elements which detract from the value of the work and the unity of its subject matter are the dubious philogogical speculations (which have always been a weakness of the author) and the final chapter, which deals with experiences in Iran after World War I and has no bearing on the previous chapters.

From the preface, with its good analysis of the present state of mind of the Arab world, especially with respect to the Western world, Philby proceeds in the following three chapters to a detailed description of the pilgrimage to Mecca which he performed in 1931. This section of the book will be of great interest not only to the general reader, but also to the scholar, since its careful and accurate description of the *hajj* ceremonies, and the life, topography, and environs of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, make it the fitting modern counterpart of Burton's classic work of nearly a hundred years ago.

For those who are interested primarily in the political aspect of Saudi Arabia, the chapter on Riyad will throw welcome light on the strength and weakness of Ibn Saud and on the personalities of the men upon whom he relied fifteen years ago; and since many of these advisers are still in the royal service, Philby's observations are frequently as relevant today as when they were made. To some readers it may seem that the pessimistic tone of the author in this respect may be a reflection of the differences between himself and Ibn Saud which eventually led to the former's departure from Arabia. Philby himself admits that in his position as adviser to the King he was not always correct in his judgments, but the near-collapse of the Saudi financial structure during World War II indicated that his criticism of the lack of an economic policy in his time was well founded.

The conclusion to be drawn from this chapter on Riyad is that while the present structure of the Saudi state is capable of governing a primitive, largely tribal society, it is finding increasing difficulty in dealing with the complex problems arising from the steady modernization of the country and the ever-widening range of contacts with other nations. It seems fairly clear that the gravity of the situation will increase until Ibn Saud is able to attract to key posts in his government a larger number of adequately trained public servants. Conversely, it would appear that Saudi Arabia stands little chance of acquiring the services of such badly-needed personnel until, by relaxing in some degree the rigid and primitive Wahhabi puritanism, it is able to make residence in the country more attractive to outsiders more accustomed to the modern world.

Harold W. Glidden
Library of Congress

Arabia Phoenix, by Gerald de Gaury. London: George G. Harrap & Co., 1946. 154 pages, with 2 maps and 64 photographs. 10s. 6d.

This book is an expansion of the author's *A Saudi Arabian Note Book*, which was published in Cairo in 1943, and was little more than an album of photographs supplemented by a few pages of miscellaneous data on such matters as tribes and government of Saudi Arabia.

In *Arabia Phoenix*, Lt. Col. de Gaury has combined this earlier material with an account of his trip across Saudi Arabia from al-Uqayr on the east coast through Riyad to Jidda; he was acting at the time as companion and interpreter to Sir Andrew Ryan, who in 1935 presented his credentials in Riyad as first British minister to the court of Ibn Saud.

The main value and interest of this book lie in its description of the topography of the route taken, and particularly of the life and customs prevailing at the court in Riyad at

the time of the author's visit. However, the author, perhaps purposely, does not penetrate beneath the surface of his subject. In style and approach de Gaury's writing may be said to belong to the Gertrude Bell-Freya Stark school, though it is more tenuous than the best work of either of these ladies.

The author is at his best when relating the everyday doings of those about him. On subjects of a more academic nature he is less capable. This weakness is most obvious in the historical introduction in the first chapter and in the bibliography. The first chapter contains certain inaccuracies, such as the now-discredited idea that the victory of Charles Martel at Tours blocked Arab subjugation of the whole of Europe; with reference to more recent times, the statement is made that King Husayn abdicated in 1925, whereas this event actually took place on October 3, 1924. The bibliographical supplement must win praise for the author's industry rather than for his powers of judgment and discrimination. As an example of errors of other kinds, it may be pointed out that "stimulants" are not forbidden in the Koran, as the author states with reference to coffee; what the Koran does specifically forbid is the use of wine (*khamr*) which by extension has been interpreted to mean intoxicants of all kinds.

At the present time, there is a much greater need for authoritative works on Saudi Arabia along the lines of the natural and social sciences, than for this type of traveler's account. Indeed, the day of the traveler and non-professional explorer in Saudi Arabia is passing, but the work of the scientist and scholar has hardly begun.

HAROLD W. GLIDDEN
Library of Congress

PALESTINE

Palestine: Problem and Promise, An Economic Study, by Robert R. Nathan, Oscar Gass, Daniel Creamer. Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, American Council on Public Affairs, 1946. x + 675 pages. $5.00.

The services of Messrs. Nathan, Gass, and Creamer were retained by the American Palestine Institute to prepare "an authoritative and objective appraisal of the economic potentialities of Palestine." Their findings are published in *Palestine: Problem and Promise*. Part I is a summary of these findings, while Part II, entitled "Perspectives in Time and Space," is an historical and political narrative.

The authors' main attention is focused on Palestine's economic potentialities. Part III of the book is a detailed compilation of most of the factors relating to the economic life of Palestine, and is probably the best single presentation of economic data pertaining to Palestine, especially to the Jewish segment of the country. While some of the chapters are largely descriptive, those on "National Income," "Money and Finance," "International Economic Relations," and "Public and Quasi Public Finance" are more analytical. The authors point out some of the alleged shortcomings of the Palestine Administration in discharging its responsibilities toward the people of Palestine. For example, in the chapter on "Manufactures Today," it is stated that ". . . in Palestine the official policy was one of turning a deaf ear to any industrial expansion which might enhance the absorptive capacity of the country." Spokesmen for the Administration of Palestine have retorted that such charges are not founded on fact.

The most controversial aspect of the book is dealt with in Part IV, "Palestine in the Next Decade." The chapter entitled "The Immigration Potential" may be considered the thesis of the book. The authors attempt to present an analytical economic approach to the problem of immigration — the core of the whole Palestine problem. The chapter represents the basis of the authors' conclusion that ". . . having regard to the character of the immigrants and all the attendant circumstances, 615,000 would be a low estimate for the next ten years, while 1,125,000 would be a high but not unattainable" estimate of the number of Jewish immigrants who could be absorbed in self-sustained economic activities. This estimate is based on the assumption that a political settlement

opening the country to immigration will be reached and will make rapid economic growth possible. The hypothesis underlying this conclusion is that "pure economic" considerations will be operative in a political vacuum. However, the economic aspects of the immigration problem are believed to be, at present, definitely secondary to the political.

The sections of the book on the cost of immigration to Palestine are of special interest in connection with the Anglo-American Committee's recommendations and President Truman's request for the admittance of 100,000 Jews into Palestine. The authors estimate that about $200 per adult and $940 per child immigrant will be required for transportation to Palestine. Assuming that approximately one-quarter of the immigrants will be children, the transportation cost of a program for the immigration of 100,000 will be approximately $40,000,000. This amount would also include maintenance in the transition period. Assuming that the average per capita requirement of the 615,000 immigrants would be the same as that of the 100,000, the capital needed for this larger program would be approximately $300,000,000. The authors point out wherein the necessary capital for these purposes can be obtained.

The chapter on "Water and Power Potentialities" is of special interest in connection with the various irrigation and conservation schemes suggested by Walter Clay Lowdermilk in his book, *Palestine Land of Promise*, and more recently by James B. Hayes.

In the introduction the authors stated that they ". . . have attempted to contribute to the clarification of a group of issues which are inherently extremely difficult and in which judgment is most subject to distortion by strong emotional predilections." It is believed by the reviewer that this aim has been achieved in the purely technical-economic aspects of the book, and that in this respect the work embodies a valuable fund of data on which to base an estimate of the Palestinian situation.

GIDEON HADARY
Department of State

The River Jordan, by Nelson Glueck. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1946. xvi + 268 pages, 3 maps, 114 photographs. $3.50.

This latest of the valuable productions of the Westminster Press presents in popular form an archaeologically and historically reliable account of "earth's most storied river." It may be a matter of question whether Palestine's Jordan can lay a stronger claim to this appellation than Egypt's Nile, for example, but it cannot be denied that as a focal point of much of the history and legend of two of the world's most wide-spread religions, the Jordan is worthy of the attention which Dr. Glueck has lavished upon it.

In presenting this account to his public, the author was faced with two alternative methods of treatment: the historical and the topographical. In choosing the latter, Dr. Glueck was perhaps determined by his preoccupation with the archaeological topography of the Jordan Valley and Transjordan from the Early Bronze to the Iron Age — a field to which he has contributed more information than have any of his predecessors or contemporaries. Within the framework of his chosen pattern, and despite a degree of historical discontinuity which his approach involves, Dr. Glueck has written a digestible and "humanized" story of the cultures and civilizations which, from the time of Galilee Man to the early Christian era, have left their impress on the Jordan Valley and its environs.

The chief emphasis lies on sites whose history fits into the context of the Old and the New Testament. This is the period in which the author is most at home and in which the majority of his readers presumably will be most interested.

It might have been more useful to the reader if the true scope of the book had been more explicitly defined in the title and in the preface. The treatment of the post-Biblical period is tangential, at best, and is noteworthy chiefly for a number of excellent and largely unfamiliar photographs of early Islamic monuments in the area.

HAROLD W. GLIDDEN
Library of Congress

IRAN

Americans in Persia, by Dr. Arthur C. Millspaugh. Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution, 1946. 282 pages. $3.00. Illustrated.

This volume is the third in a trilogy dealing with the three American Financial Missions in Iran. The first was the classic *The Strangling of Persia* by Morgan Shuster describing his brief but tumultuous career in 1911. The second, entitled *The American Task in Persia*, was Dr. Millspaugh's earlier report on his first mission in 1923–28. The third book, *Americans in Persia*, covers the work of the second Millspaugh Mission in 1943–45. After reading this last book, one might justifiably get the titles mixed and call it "*The Strangling of Dr. Millspaugh by the Persians.*"

Of the three missions, only the second was a success, and that only temporary in its effects. Dr. Millspaugh's first book, *The American Task in Persia*, which describes it, reflects satisfaction for a job well done. In it he expressed qualified praise for the desire of Iranians to reform and strengthen their national life, but he feels this was abused by the dictatorship which followed. The two other missions, that of Morgan Shuster and the last Millspaugh mission, failed under dramatic circumstances and largely for the same reasons: violent opposition from selfish vested interests and from Tsarist and Soviet Russia, the policies of both being opposition to growing American activity in Iran, and the crippling of Iranian independence. In this latest work Dr. Millspaugh thrashes about him, flailing Iranian politicians for their cupidity, warning against Soviet infiltration, and criticizing the U. S. State Department for lack of vision and judgment — factors which, in his opinion, account for the "passing of the mission."

The first two chapters of *Americans in Persia* sound the approaching doom in staccato headings: "Stagnation, Strangling and Revolt," followed by "War, Respite and Dictatorship." According to Dr. Millspaugh, Riza Shah by his militant dictatorial methods opened the Pandora's box which let loose the evil spirits of private and public corruption and terror. The Allied invasion of August 1941 exposed the financial and moral bankruptcy as well as the political impotency of the nation. Faced with collapse, Iran again turned toward the United States and requested advisory missions — a move which resulted in Dr. Millspaugh's assignment as Financial Adviser to the Iranian Government.

According to the theme presented by Dr. Millspaugh, the Iranians expected miracles. Dr. Millspaugh offered ceiling prices, budget balancing, and income taxes; he asked for sweeping emergency powers. Efforts to stabilize prices met the fervid opposition of war profiteers and speculators who were reaping a harvest of fantastic fortunes; the budget cuts aroused the fear and ire of all entrenched bureaucrats and the army; income taxes threatened the traditional "right" of the aristocracy to place the burdens of state upon the underprivileged. It struck at the security of parliamentary deputies and their friends, who preferred to keep their financial dealings secret. The Soviet Union joined the opposition, sabotaging Iranian finances by forced and costly contracts, by blocking legitimate government operation in the zone under Red Army control, and by manipulating a bloc of vociferous deputies in Parliament. For a while British and U. S. support gave a semblance of balance to the bitter struggle. Then came the fatal "oil incident" of August 1944 which touched off a Soviet attack against the Iranian Government as well as against Dr. Millspaugh. Various dissident elements joined in the hue and cry. The U. S. State Department withdrew support — after which came the "passing of the mission."

The final chapters are analyses and discussions of Soviet policies and goals, of British attitudes and actions, of American principles and practices, and a presentation of Dr. Millspaugh's prescription to heal the "festering sore." He suggests a Three Power Treaty between the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States which would at once protect the territorial integrity of the country from unwholesome foreign encroachment and quarantine those anti-social internal elements which retard progressive

development. To implement such a treaty, Dr. Millspaugh suggests a Three-Power Trusteeship which, over a period of time, would guide Iran into an independence which she does not in reality now possess.

To the thoughtful reader, this book is a disturbing one. It indicates that Soviet non-co-operation and unilateral action in respect to the smaller nations and the Western Allies were prominent factors in Iran throughout the war. From the moment that Allied armies met in Iran in 1941, the Soviet army used strong-arm methods, violated agreements, and hid everything under a cloak of secrecy. Millspaugh's portrayal of Iranian political leaders is uniformly dismal. He has few compliments for anyone outside his mission — while he repeatedly defends himself and those under him from criticism.

The book gives the impression that Dr. Millspaugh recognized no weaknesses in his administration or in his group which might have contributed to the failure of the mission. No trace of self-analysis is found. It is not an objective study, but rather an apologia. One can almost hear the author prefacing the book with the thought, "I made no mistakes. Yet the mission failed. Why?" This book is the answer as seen by Dr. Millspaugh. It is the story of a modern St. George tilting with many dragons, only on this occasion the dragons united and evicted St. George from the field. The book is replete with quotations, facts, and descriptions hitherto unrecorded and deserves careful reading. But the impression remains that in writing it Dr. Millspaugh has been interested primarily in explaining a sense of defeat. He therefore stresses material which confirms his thesis; the rest he passes by in silence.

Iran, by William S. Haas. New York: Columbia University Press, 1946. 273 pages. $3.50.

The author of this volume has been associated with the Iranian Institute and School for Asiatic Studies in New York since 1943. For five years previous to his coming to the United States in 1940, he served as adviser to the Iranian Ministry of Education, during which time he traveled widely throughout Iran gathering materials for the National Ethnological Museum which he helped to found in Tehran. He is, therefore, in a position to write a good, useful book on this too little known and appreciated country, which has become so prominent in the post-war world and is likely to remain so for some time to come.

Written for the intelligent layman and not for the specialist, whom he rarely enlightens and frequently annoys with avoidable errors and omissions, the book is about equally divided between Iran's past and present. There is just enough of the past portrayed in the chapters on "The Fate of a Nation," "Country and People," "Religion," and "Society and Government" to form an adequate background for the treatment of "Reza Shah and His Reform," "The Cultural Situation," "The Economic Situation," and "The Outlook." In the historical treatment it is especially commendable to find the author giving proper attention to the often neglected eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. But the real bridge between these halves of the book, and indeed its heart and soul, is the very fine central chapter on "Persian Psychology" which manifests searching analysis and fine feeling. Here the author is at his best and puts every reader under his debt. As a compact and comprehensive general treatment of Iran and its colorful pattern of life yesterday and today, this work deserves to stand at the head of the Iranian shelf.

In spite of its good qualities, however, it should be recorded that the book has limitations and errors — most of them avoidable and, therefore, all the more lamentable; indeed, one has the suspicion that the manuscript may have been rushed to completion and through the press to meet the recent unexpected and widespread interest in Iran aroused by the United Nations publicity of last spring. Oddly enough, most of the errors caught by this reviewer are in the edges of this Iranian picture — in the initial and concluding chapters. In the preface the author states that American Presbyterians "still conduct a missionary hospital," whereas on page 171 he correctly implies that these

are in the plural. On this same first page it is said that America has sent financial advisers to Iran in 1911, 1922, and 1944; the last date should be 1943.

Several errors occur in the early pages devoted to ancient Persian history. Too hasty checking must explain why Shapur III is said to have captured the Roman Emperor, Valerian, while a few pages further on this exploit is rightly attributed to Shapur I. Yet why on this latter page should the relief depicting this remarkable victory be placed at Shapur instead of at Nakhsh-i Rustam? It is also rather inexplicable that the author should let slip the statement that an inscription he quotes as from Darius should have been "found at the Palace of Pasargadae," when this particular inscription is located at Nakhsh-i Rustam.

In the final chapter, when treating events subsequent to 1940, the author falls into some unfortunate errors. Iran declared war on Germany in September 1943, not in 1941. The information on page 229 is out of date: the Fourteenth Parliament, which terminated its legal two-year session last March, seated eight representatives of the Tudeh Party; and the name of the party headed by Zia ed-Din Tabatabai has for some time been *Eradeh-yi Melli* (National Will) instead of *Melli* (National; not Nation, as given). Other parties — such as Edalat, Iran, and Istiqlal — might have been added as of publication date, although the author may well be pardoned for not keeping up with the latest spawning of political parties in Tehran.

Quite in a different category are the erroneous statements explicable on the basis of the author's recent separation from the country: that the Logantè Restaurant is now the most popular in Tehran; that the crown jewels are in the Gulistan Museum instead of the vault of the National Bank; that Public Health is supervised in a Department connected with the Ministry of Interior instead of the independent ministry it now is; and the implication that Iranian pilots and planes have continuously conducted regular passenger service between Tehran and Baghdad since 1935.

Of still a different character are a reviewer's questions in regard to an author's interpretation of given facts, and there are a number of places where such queries might be made of this book. But a few examples must suffice. In Chapter I it is the reviewer's belief that the discussion of Achaemenian art and architecture, especially in their relation to other parts of the Persian Empire, will have to be modified in the light of Professor Herzfeld's treatment of this subject in his recent work, *Iran in the Ancient East*. One has serious doubts that it is possible to say that as a result of Reza Shah's work "the millenarian epopee of the Persian tribes (has) come to an end, and they are now an integral part of the realm." This, however, may be only a difference of definition or emphasis. After viewing the remarkable Persian Art Exhibit of the spring of 1946 sponsored by the Irano-Soviet Cultural Relations Society in Tehran, one is inclined seriously to question the assertion that "with regard to painting, nothing has been produced within the last decades which could claim originality." Would that one might agree that "the larger towns (are) amply provided with physicians," or that the agricultural and veterinary school at Karaj deserved the adjective "great!" Finally, events since this book's publication may indicate why one is hesitant in sharing the author's apparent easy confidence that the independence and future of Iran are guaranteed by the Tripartite Treaty and the Tehran Declaration.

But all these and other possible criticisms aside, it is certain that the author has made a major contribution toward the future of Iran and her independence by interpreting her to English readers in such an able and sympathetic fashion.

T. Cuyler Young
University of Toronto

INDIA

The Discovery of India, by Jawaharlal Nehru. New York: The John Day Co., 1946. xi + 595 pages. $5.

Here is the one indispensable book for an understanding of India. It is mature, lucid, eminently readable, the product not merely

of a master of English prose style, but also of one of the most active participants, on the highest political levels, in the national struggle for India's independence. While not a conventional history text, it runs the full gamut from ancient to contemporary times, sketching the superstructure of the chronological chain of events upon the essential foundations of Indian literature, philosophies, religions, and the social and economic conditions of the various epochs.

The first two chapters of the book are in an almost purely subjective vein, sometimes autobiographical, sometimes achieving a height of poetic feeling which evokes a responsive and continuing state of emotion. Then, in full justification of his title, the author sets forth upon a personal voyage of discovery and exploration, to seek the answers to the questions: "What is this India, apart from her physical and geographical aspects? What did she represent in the past; what gave strength to her then? How did she lose that old strength, and has she lost it completely? Does she represent anything vital now, apart from being the home of a vast number of human beings? How does she fit in to the modern world?"

That quest, undertaken almost in the spirit of an "alien critic," leads him to the conclusion that, with all the indigenous ills of caste, of purdah, of communalism (expressed in its extremes by the Moslem League and the Mahasabha), of the nostalgic yearning over a dead past, there remains a residue of virtues amply sufficient for the revivification and rejuvenation of India. For these ills, serious as they be in themselves, are comparatively minor excrescences on the Indian scene. Nehru deplores them and concedes that they must be treated successfully before India can assume her full stature in the contemporary world. But the major ill is British imperial policy in India. Conceived in loot, accompanied throughout its career by famine and the imperialistic concomitants of division, discrimination, and violence, that policy remains the greatest single political anachronism in this brave, post-fascist world, and affords a cynical paradox to the ideals for which England has just fought an anti-Nazi war.

The British propaganda line has been so pervasive as to have become dogma: every schoolboy now knows that India was never a nation; that the Pax Britannica brought law and order to India out of chaos and anarchy; that Indians cannot get along with each other; and that, of course, India is unfit to rule herself. This book, by itself, is a smashing refutation of that propaganda.

BENJAMIN SCHWARTZ
Library of Congress

Restless India, by Lawrence K. Rosinger. New York: Foreign Policy Assoc., 1946. 128 pages. $.25. (Headline Series No. 55.)

Restless India summarizes in some one hundred pages of text India's history, general economy, government, political parties, relations with Great Britain, and recent political developments up to the end of 1945. This work, which originally appeared in pamphlet form, provides the ordinary reader who is not a student of Indian affairs with a highly compact statement of the best scholarly research on India's background and current problems. The author has set himself a high objective, for he has aimed not simply to put down facts about India but to put down "those things that are *most* true — those facts and ideas giving the clearest picture of the country as a whole, showing where it is going as well as where it has been." In view of the vast expanse of subject matter covered and of the sharp bias that is given to so much of the written material on India, the author has done a masterly job of indicating conflicting views while confining himself strictly to a presentation of some of the most relevant and illuminating facts. These facts are further illuminated by a number of valuable charts and maps.

The book appears at a particularly appropriate time, when Indian leaders with substantial popular followings are, for the first time, taking responsibility at the top level of Indian government. While it is true that these leaders are still ultimately responsible to the British Parliament, it is already apparent that they are going to exercise con-

siderable influence in shaping India's foreign relations as well as her internal affairs. For this reason it is important to note that Mr. Rosinger's book was written toward the end of 1945 when Mr. Attlee had already announced that the British Labor Government was planning to go forward with transferring power to Indian hands. The forward-looking emphasis of Mr. Rosinger's text assures it of value for some time to come. Nevertheless, so much has happened at the political level in the last ten months, that certain sections of his original pamphlet might well have been supplemented before it was in book form.

The introduction by Lord Halifax, stating the British official position today, requires two important qualifications. The Labor Government has officially stated that India is free to leave the Empire altogether. At the same time, the plan which three of its representatives put forward as the basis for drafting a constitution for India makes no provision for independent negotiations between the British and any non-acceding Indian province or state. Both these modifications of the 1942 proposals have been of first importance. Previously, Indian nationalists had been sharply critical of the Coalition Government's failure to make any official use of the word "independence." Furthermore, the provision for an independent arrangement between Britain and non-acceding provinces or states promised to be a stumbling block to Congress Party co-operation inasmuch as that Party tended to view the provision not simply as an invitation to obstructionism by the Moslem League, but as a disguised attempt to retain strong British influence in certain parts of India after that influence had been formally withdrawn elsewhere.

While brevity was apparently one of Mr. Rosinger's main objectives, it is unfortunate that in view of the problems looming ahead some space was not devoted to a specific discussion of India's food situation, the background of "paramountcy," and the relationship of the native states to the rest of India.

FREDERICKA COBREN
Department of State

The Sikhs in Relation to Hindus, Moslems, Christians, and Ahmadiyyas. A Study in Comparative Religion, by John Clark Archer. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1946. 353 pages. $3.75.

The Sikhs, who are generally known to the West as men of great stature, beard, and prowess in battle, form a small but important minority community whose five-century history consistently records an influence disproportionate to the size of the group. According to the 1941 census there were a few more than 5½ million Sikhs in India. In no political division of India do they form a population majority, yet their political significance, particularly in the Punjab, is considerable. To students of the religions, modern history, or contemporary scene of India they offer fertile ground for research; little has been written about them, and certainly very little in this country that is good.

Professor Archer designated his work "a study in comparative religion." From a formal point of view this is a somewhat misleading description, for in addition to what the author has to say in concentrated or scattered form about the relations of five religions functioning in the North Indian home of the Sikhs, there is a great deal of purely historical narrative, biographical material, and general detail about the Sikhs.

The first two chapters of the work "depict the Sikhs of today in their north Indian habitat, primarily, and indicate many of the most influential factors in their history. This contemporary entrance into their midst is intended to be realistic, to give a picture of the living Sikh community." The author here employs a highly personal approach and presents his material in the form of a travelogue as he follows or joins in a pilgrimage to holy and historical places. The reader becomes acquainted with a sampling of Sikhs, and visits places familiar to the author, who uses them as a background for speculation and commentary.

Chapter three discusses the influence of the ideas of Kabir upon the founder of Sikhism, Nanak. The emergence of a way of living which was both a compromise between Hinduism and Islam (with elements of Hin-

duism predominant) and a conflict with both is the substance of this position. In the following, historical chapters, the growing enmity of the Sikhs toward Moslems and their amicable relations with Hindus come gradually to light. The historical chapters also include Professor Archer's very readable translation of Nanak's "peculiar" book of psalms, the *Japaji*. The Western reader is fortunate to have this eloquent "message" of the founder of the Sikh religion.

The last chapter "includes a comparative view of many things in prospect, with some reference to the Sikhs' own prospective role in Indian reconstruction." This is the most valuable chapter for the reader who is not a specialist on Sikhism but is interested in the Sikhs as a part of the modern Indian scene.

Professor Archer has sympathy and personal enthusiasm for his subject, and erudition. But the enormous amount of detail, presented often with no recognizable measure of proportion or standard of choice, together with a very individual method of ordering and developing ideas, do not indicate this book for the general reader.

Horace I. Poleman
Library of Congress

Background to Indian Law, by Sir George Claus Rankin. London: Cambridge University Press, 1946. 223 pages. $2.75.

The task which the author, a former Chief Justice of Bengal, set himself in this book was to present a history of the development of the codes at present in force in British India, rather than to prepare an exhaustive manual of Indian law. By the very nature of the problem such an historical account had to center upon the question of the adaptation of Western law to the needs of a people whose basic legal and social concepts were altogether different. Thus the book is of interest not only to students of Indian law but to all who are concerned with the problem of the superimposition of a European legal system upon an Oriental one.

As Justice Rankin shows in his book, the task of establishing a modern structure of law and procedure in India was complicated on the one hand by the variety of local legal systems, chiefly those of the Hindus and Moslems, and on the other by the early British judges' and administrators' ignorance of local laws. As in other Oriental countries and in medieval Europe, private civil law in India was not uniform for all persons in a given territory, but varied according to their racial origins and religious affiliations. This situation was responsible for the existence of a confusing multitude of legal concepts which the outsider could hardly grasp without protracted study. It is interesting to note that right up to the present time, the British have shown great respect for the special rules of Hindu and Moslem law, especially with regard to family relations and inheritance, but have largely disregarded the laws of other communities such as the Parsees, Armenians, and Jews, mainly because of difficulties in ascertaining them.

When the problem of codifying the laws applicable to India was approached by the British, it appeared a foregone conclusion that the new codes would be based upon the law of England with only such modifications and simplifications as were necessary because of special local conditions. In the first part of the book dealing with civil law, Justice Rankin presents in considerable detail the interesting discussions which developed in the nineteenth century among British lawyers concerning the methods to be used in elaborating these codes. Among the general problems encountered by them were the differences in approach between the experts in England and the British lawyers on the spot, numerous political considerations, and the special interests of British settlers in India.

After discussing the development of the various Indian codes, Justice Rankin devotes the last chapter of the first part of the book to the problems of the development of Moslem and Hindu law under British rule. Of particular interest are the sections dealing with the role of Moslem and Hindu legal experts in the British courts in India, the modern collections of Hindu laws, and the attitude of the local population toward codification of their laws.

The second part of the book, considerably smaller than the first, deals with the develop-

ment of criminal law. Here the author discusses the early stages of the administration of criminal law based upon the Moslem system, and then traces the development of the present day Indian Penal Code.

Justice Rankin's book bears abundant evidence of the author's thorough familiarity with the development of the legal system of India and with the history of British administration in the country. This very familiarity appears, however, to be the reason also for the book's one major shortcoming. The author seems to presuppose on the part of the reader a knowledge of Indian affairs almost equal to his own. There are many unexplained technical terms which would be unfamiliar even to a lawyer unless he is an expert in Indian law; a basic knowledge not only of English law but also of Moslem and Hindu law is taken for granted. The value of the book, especially for the American reader, would have been further enhanced by a bibliography.

These minor flaws, however, should not detract from the fact that Justice Rankin's book constitutes an important contribution to the history of the development of westernized law in Oriental countries.

Herbert J. Liebesny
Foundation for Foreign Affairs

BOOKS ALSO NOTED

General

The Agricultural Development of the Middle East, by B. A. Keen. London: His Majesty's Stationery Press, 1946. 123 pages, 32 plates, 2 maps. 5s. New York: British Information Services. $1.50. A report prepared for the Middle East Supply Centre, Cairo, during 1943-45.

Baalbek-Palmyra, by David M. Robinson, with photographs by Hoyningen-Huene. New York: J. J. Augustin, 1946. $7.50.

Come, Tell Me How You Live, by Agatha Christie Mallowan. New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1946. 225 pages. $3.00. The account of two winters the authoress spent in Syria before the war, when her husband was engaged in archaeological work.

A Factual Survey of the Moslem World, by Samuel Marinus Zwemer. New York: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1946. 32 pages. $.75. Contains maps and statistical tables.

The Great Religions of the Modern World, edited by Edward J. Jurji. Princeton: Princeton University Press. $3.75. A chapter on each of the major religions of the Middle East.

Journey Down a Blind Alley, by Mary Borden. New York: Harper & Bros. 364 pages. $3.75. Based on the war experiences of the authoress while managing a field hospital in France and North Africa, and while residing in Syria and Lebanon as the wife of Sir Edward Spears, British Minister to the Levant States.

A Journey to the Interior, by P. H. Newby. New York: Doubleday, Doran, & Co., 1946. 240 pages. $2.50. A novel set in a small Persian Gulf port where a few British men and women were operating an oil well.

Middle East Science: A Survey of Subjects other than Agriculture, by E. B. Worthington. London: H. M. Stationery Press, 1946. xiii + 239 pages, 16 plates, 5 maps. 7s. 6d. New York: British Information Services. $2.15. A report prepared for the Middle East Supply Centre, Cairo, during 1943-45.

Oil Across the World: The American Saga of Pipelines, by Charles Morrow Wilson. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1946. 310 pages. $3.50. A general historical account of pipeline developments with brief discussions of the Iraqi oil fields and pipeline, the Saudi Arabian pipeline project, and the Arabian and Iranian oil fields.

Rural Education and Welfare in the Middle East, by H. B. Allen. London: H. M. Stationery Press, 1946. v + 24 pages. New York: British Information Services. $.45. A report prepared for the Middle East Supply Centre, Cairo, during 1943-45.

Under the Red Sea Sun, by Commander Edward Ellsberg. New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1946. 500 pages. $3.50. The factual account of Commander Ellsberg's restoration of the naval base at Massawa, Eritrea, during the late war.

Until Summer Comes, by F. M. Al Akl. Springfield: The Pond-Ekberg Co., 1946. Reminiscences of a Lebanese doctor who trained at the American University of Beirut, and emigrated to the United States for his medical career.

Whose Promised Lands?, by Samuel Van Valkenburg. New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1946. 96 pages. $.25.

Arab States

Limelight for Suez, by Claude Dewhurst. Cairo: R. Schindler, 1946. P.T. 50. Dramatic story of the Suez Canal, with a historic map showing the canal area during Pharaonic times.

Survey of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1898–1944, by K. D. Henderson. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1946. 59 pages. 2s. 6d.

Transjordan: An Economic Survey, by A. Konikoff. Jerusalem: Economic Research Institute of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, 1946. 2d ed. 120 pages. 16s. Contains a 16-page supplement titled "Selected Bibliography of Eastern Palestine."

Iran

Persia and the Powers: An Account of Diplomatic Relations, 1941–46, by A. H. K. Hamzavi. London: Hutchinson and Co., 1946. 125 pages. 7s. 6d.

India

Fascist India, by Patrick Lacey. London: Nicholson and Watson, 1946. 146 pages. 7s. 6d. An exposition of the theme that nationalism in India is really a disguised fascism.

Hindu Psychology: Its Meaning for the West, by Swami Akhilananda. New York: Harper & Bros., 1946. xviii + 241 pages. $2.50.

India Today: An Introduction to Indian Politics, by G. Raleigh Parkin. New York: John Day Co., 1946. 397 pages. $3.75.

Indian Album, by Cecil Beaton. London: B. T. Batsford, 1946. 8 pages, 106 illust. 12s. 6d.

India's Hindu-Moslem Questions, by Beni Prasad. London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1946. 152 pages. 6s.

India's Population: Fact and Policy, by Sripati Chandrasekhar. New York: John Day Co., 1946. 117 pages. $2.00.

Myths and Symbols in Indian Art and Civilization, by Heinrich Zimmer; ed. Joseph Campbell. New York: Pantheon Books, 1946. 248 pages, 70 plates. $4.50. The Bollingen Series VI. Interpretation of legends, myths, and folktales taken directly from the Sanskrit.

Planning for India, by Bimal C. Ghose. New York: Oxford University Press, 1946. 2d ed. vi + 87 pages. $1.00.

North Africa

Histoire de l'Afrique du Nord, by Pierre Jalabert. Paris: Société Privée d'Imprimerie et d' Éditions, 1945. 239 pages. Fr. 90.

North Africa Speaks, by Guido Rosa. New York: John Day Co., 1946. 247 pages. $3.50.

Palestine

Great Britain and Palestine, 1915–45, Royal Institute of International Affairs. Information Paper No. 20 (third edition). London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1946. xii + 177 pages, maps. $2.00.

The Jewish Problem in the Modern World, by James William Parkes. New York: Oxford University Press, 1946. 242 pages. $1.25.

Nisi Dominus: A Survey of the Palestine Controversy, by Nevill Barbour. London: George G. Harrap & Co., 1946. 248 pages. 8s. 6d.

Palestine: Jewish Homeland?, compiled by Julia E. Johnsen. New York: H. W. Wilson Co., 1946. 342 pages. $1.25. Vol. 18, No. 6 of The Reference Shelf. A collection of writings setting forth the background and various aspects of the Palestine problem. Thirty pages of bibliography.

Rebellion in Palestine, by John Marlowe. London: Cresset Press, 1946. 279 pages. 12s. 6d.

Report to the United States Government and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, by the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. Washington D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1946. (Department of State, Publication 2536, Near Eastern Series 2) viii + 92 pages, 5 maps.

Survey of Palestine, prepared for the information of The Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. Jerusalem: Government Printer, 1946. 1084 pages. L. P. 2. A comprehensive survey of Palestine's economy since 1917.

Thieves in the Night, by Arthur Koestler. New York: Macmillan Co., 1946. 357 pages. $2.75. A novel centering around the founding and growth of a Jewish colony in Palestine. The hero becomes a member of a terrorist group.

To Whom Palestine?, by Frank Gervasi. New York: Appleton-Century Co., 1946. ix + 213 pages. $2.50.

Underground to Palestine, by I. F. Stone. New York: Boni & Gaer, 1946. $2.50. An eye-witness account of Haganah's efforts to bring Jewish refugees out of Europe into Palestine.

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF PERIODICAL LITERATURE

Prepared by Sidney Glazer, Near East Section, Library of Congress, *with contributions from:* Nabia Abbott, Elizabeth Bacon, John Dorosh, Richard Ettinghausen, Carl Ginsburg, Sidney Glazer, Harold W. Glidden, Herbert J. Liebesny, Ralph Marcus, I. Mendelsohn, George C. Miles, Leon Nemoy, A. Omar, Horace I. Poleman, C. Rabin, and Benjamin Schwartz.

Note: It is the aim of the Bibliography to present a selective and annotated listing of periodical material dealing with the Middle East roughly since the rise of Islam. In order to avoid unwarranted duplication of excellent bibliographies already dealing with certain aspects and portions of the area, the material included will cover only North Africa and Moslem Spain, the Arab world, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Turkey, the Transcaucasian states of Soviet Russia, Iran, Afghanistan, Turkestan, and India. The ancient Near East, Byzantium, Zionism and Palestine [1] are excluded; in the case of India, only material dealing with history and the social sciences since 1600 will normally be considered.[2] An attempt will be made to survey all periodicals of importance in these fields, with the exception of those published in the languages of India.

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[1] Palestine, Zionism, the Jews of Palestine, etc. are omitted only because of the existence of a current, cumulative bibliography devoted to this field, i.e. *Zionism and Palestine*, a publication of the Zionist Archives and Library in New York.

[2] Art and archaeology, language and literature, etc. are well covered by the following: Kern Institute. *Annual bibliography of Indian archaeology* (Leiden); Braz A. Fernandez. *Annual bibliography of Indian history and Indology*, Bombay Historical Society; George M. Moraes. *Bibliography of Indological studies 1942–*, (Bombay), Konkan Institute of Arts and Sciences.

ABBREVIATIONS

ENGLISH

Acad., Academy
Amer., American
Bull., Bulletin
Cent., Central
Contemp., Contemporary
East., Eastern
Geog., Geographical
Gt. Brit., Great Britain
Hist., Historical
Illust., Illustrated
Inst., Institute
Internat., International
J., Journal
Mag., Magazine
Mus., Museum
Natl., National
Numis., Numismatic
Orient., Oriental
Pal., Palestine
Philol., Philological
Polit., Political
Quart., Quarterly
Res., Research
Rev., Review
Soc., Society
Stud., Studies
Trans., Transactions

ARABIC

K., Kitāb
Maj., Majallah, Majallat

ITALIAN

Mod., Moderno

RUSSIAN

Akad., Akademii
Fil., Filosofii
Ist., Istorii
Izvest., Izvestiya
Lit., Literaturi
Otdel., Otdeleniye
Ser., Seriya
Yaz., Yazika

GEOGRAPHY

(General, description, travel and exploration, natural history, geology)

1 "Cyrenaica and the Senussi: a people with a claim on British gratitude." *Illust. London News* 208 (Je 29 '46) 715. Pictures of country, architecture, and people.

2 "Iran: two worlds collide in a rich and troubled land." *Life* 20 (My 20 '46) 61–7. Photographs.

3 ABEL, F. M. "Jaffa au Moyen-Âge." *J. Pal. Orient. Soc.* 20 (1946) 6–28. Topographical description of medieval Jaffa, based on contemporary Western sources.

4 'AṬĪYAH, 'AZĪZ SURYĀL. "A trip to Barqah." I, II (in Arabic) *Al-Kātib al-Miṣrī* (Cairo) 2 (Mr '46) 235–467, 435–40. An account of a tour through Barqah, with particular stress on its antiquities.

5 CHASE, FRANCIS. "Palestine today." *Natl. Geog.* 90 (O '46) 501–16. On a miniature scale, "a visit to Palestine today is much like a visit to America of yesterday." Footnote on p. 516 lists previous articles on Palestine that have appeared in this magazine.

6 DROHOJOWSKI, JAN. "A war-time journey through Central Asia." *Royal Cent. Asian J.* 33 (Ja '46) 70–4. Travel in both Soviet and Chinese Central Asia.

7 DYAKOV, A. "India and her peoples." *New Times* (Moscow) 5 (Mr 1 '46) 25–31. Geographico-political description of the provinces and states, including languages, cultures, races, and economy.

8 GOTTMANN, JEAN. "French geography in war-time." *Geog. Rev.* 36 (Ja '46) 80–91. Contains notes on French geographical publications and research on North Africa and Syria.

9 GVOZDETSKII, N. A. "The Black Sea." (in Russian) *Nauka i Zhizn'* (Moscow) 4 (1946) 8–15. Historical, geographical, and geological description with illustrations and maps.

10 ḤABĪBĪ, 'ABD al-ḤAYY. "Bīrūn and al-Bīrūnī." (in Persian) *Āryānā* (Kabul) 4 (Thōr 1325) 884–8. Adduces new manuscript evidence to show that al-Bīrūnī's birthplace must have been the fortified town of Bīrūn, on the border between Khorasan and Khwarizm.

11 INGRAMS, HAROLD. "A journey in the Yemen." *Royal Cent. Asian J.* 33 (Ja '46) 58–69.

12 MALAKHOV, M. "Afghanistan." *New Times* (Moscow) 7 (Ap '46) 23–29. Good discussion of the geography with a useful map.

13 PRICE, M. PHILIPS. "Soviet Azerbaijan." *Royal Cent. Asian J.* 33 (Ap '46) 188–200.

14 SCOTT, IAIN. "Rural Palestine." *Asiatic Rev.* 968 (Ap '46) 102–6. An amiable description of the climate, fruits, trees and flowers, animals and birds by a colorful writer.

15 SMITH, THOMAS R. and BLACK, LLOYD D. "German geography: war work and present status." *Geog. Rev.* 36 (Jl '46) 398–408. Brief references on pp. 399 and 401–2 to German maps made during the war for Turkey, the Caucasus, and North Africa.

16 TOLSTOV, S. P. "The Khwārezm archeological and ethnographical expedition of the USSR Academy of Science." (in Russian) *Izvest. Akad. Nauk SSSR, ser. ist. i fil.* 3 (1946) 83–86. This is an account of an expedition to Khwārezm conducted in 1945 by the author, which resulted in the uncovering of an ancient civilization, designated as "Su-Yarganian" after a tributary of the Amu Darya.

17 ULLYOTT, PHILIP and ILGAZ, ORHAN. "The hydrography of the Bosporus." *Geog. Rev.* 36 (Ja '46) 44–66. Includes sections on native knowledge of currents and hydrographic exploration of the Bosporus as well as the hydrology of the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea.

18 WILLIAMS, MAYNARD OWEN. "Back to Afghanistan." *Natl. Geog.* 90 (O '46) 517–44. A well-illustrated account of a trip through most of the country.

19 WRIGHT, DENIS A. H. "Trebizond and north-eastern Turkey." *Royal Cent. Asian J.* 33 (Ap '46) 121–32.

HISTORY AND POLITICS

(Ancient, medieval, modern)

20 AGLIETTI, BRUNO. "La confraternità senussita." *Oriente Mod.* 26 (Ja–Je '46) 2–12. An account of the origin, development, and contacts of the Senussi with England, France, and Italy. The author concludes that the intemperance, xenophobia, and inability of certain leaders were responsible for compelling Italy to assume direct administration of inner Cyrenaica.

21 ANTONOVA, K. A. "Sir George Dunbar's *History of India*." (in Russian) *Izvest. Akad. Nauk SSSR. ser. ist. i fil.* (Moscow) 3 (1946) 97–101. Praises the compactness and consistency of Dunbar's history (3rd ed. London, 1943) but asserts that the author "does not rise above the tendentiousness peculiar to the bourgeois English historians of India." Makes strictures on his failure to treat of the evil economic effects of British rule in India, the famine-producing agrarian policy, and the role played by the masses in India's battle for national freedom.

22 ARMALAH, AL-KHŪRĪ ISḤĀQ. "The Christians of Ghassān and the Aramaeans." (in Arabic) *Al-Mashriq* n.s. (Beirut) 1 (Mr '46) 15–36. An account in question and answer form of the religious and political history of the Ghassānids, derived from many sources.

23 ASHKENAZI, TOUVIA. "Kurdistan for the Kurds?" *Asia and Americas* 46 (Ap '46) 164–7. An account of the major political events since World War I.

24 BELGRAVE, SQUADRON-LEADER RICHARD. "A visit to Sheikh Sulaiman Murshid, the Alawite 'Lord'." *Royal Cent. Asian J.* 33 (Ap '46) 155–160.

25 BOSE, S. M. "The states and the new constitution." *Modern Rev.* (Calcutta) 80 (Ag '46) 107–109. Discusses the vexed question of the so-called sovereign Indian states. Urges a union of Indian states to discuss with "British India" the future of the states during and after the interim government.

26 BYRNES, JAMES F. "Security council; discussion of Soviet-Iranian matters." *U. S. Dept. of State Bull.* 14 (Ap 14 '46) 620–1.

27 AL-CHALABĪ, DĀ'ŪD. "Badr al-Dīn Lu'lu'." *Sumer* (Arabic section) 2 (Ja '46) 19–28. History of the Zangids and of Badr al-Dīn Lu'lu'. Islamic buildings and architectural ruins in the city of Mosul from the time of the Umayyads to the conquest of the city by the Mongols, with emphasis on the Zangid period.

28 DENNEN, LEON. "Arab ferment and power politics." *Commentary* 1 (F '46) 21–26. Discusses the political, social and economic confusion in the Near East.

29 DE GAURY, GERALD. "The end of Arabian isolation." *Foreign Affairs* 25 (O '46) 82–89. A survey of the factors leading to the opening-up of Saudi Arabia. The author is confident that the character of the people will enable them to make a successful adjustment to the new life.

30 DEVA, AYANA. "India's role in Asia in the post-war world." *Asiatic Rev.* 42 (Jl '46) 221–31. The place that India is to have in the international realm is dependent upon the nature and extent of the solution of her immediate political problems.

31 DYAKONOV, M. "The history of ancient Iran." (in Russian) *Voprosy Istorii* (Moscow) 1 (1946) 130–139. A detailed preview by the author of his projected voluminous history of Iran, the first volume of which, covering the subject from the beginnings to the seventh century, has appeared. The author analyzes the broad guiding ideas of his work, with particular emphasis on the social structure of ancient Iran, the relations between church and state, and the impact of Hellenism.

32 EPPSTEIN, VICTOR. "Empire and Zionism: a bankrupt partnership." *Commentary* 2 (S '46) 212–219. Predicts the ultimate cooperation of Arab and Jew based on common interests, including the need for expelling the British.

33 GHOSAL, U. N. "Position and possibilities of our food production." *Modern Rev.* 80 (Jl '46) 32–35. The problem of food and its distribution in India.

34 GRÉGOIRE, HENRI. "An Armenian dynasty on the Byzantine throne." *Armenian Quart.* 1 (Spring '46) 4–21. An important and scholarly contribution to Byzantine studies, supplemented by a special bibliography on the subject.

35 ḤABĪ BĪ, 'ABD al-ḤAYY. "The place where Saboktegīn died." (in Persian) *Āryānā* (Kabul) 4 (Jōza 1325) 933–935. Concludes that Saboktegīn died in Mārmol (near Balkh), not at Tirmidh, as stated in some sources.

36 "Henricus." "Patterns of power in the Arab Middle East." *Polit. Quart.* 17 (Ap '46) 93–122. A well-informed review of Anglo-French relations in Syria and Lebanon, with a special section on the USSR, by a "progressive" English imperialist.

37 IOANNISIAN, A. R. "The Armenian movement of national liberation in the 60's of the 18th century." (in Russian) *Izvest. Akad. Nauk SSSR, ser. ist. i fil.* (Moscow) 3 (1946) 135–144. Deals with the attempts of Emin Joseph Emin (1726–1809) and, secondarily, of Bishop Ovnan to liberate Armenia with the co-operation of King Heraclius of the then independent Georgia and to obtain a Russian protectorate over the two countries. The attempts came to naught chiefly as a result of Russia's lack of interest, but also because the Armenian people were not yet ready to rise.

38 ḤUZAYYIN, SULAYMĀN. "The Arab League." (in Arabic) *Al-Kātib al-Miṣrī* (Cairo) 1 (Ja '46) 529–542. A scholarly study of the geographical and historical inter-relationships among the countries forming the Arab League and of the growth of the idea of unity.

39 KLAUSNER, LEOPOLD C. "India — yesterday, today, tomorrow." *World Affairs Interpreter* 16 (Winter-Ja '46) 345–368. An elementary but comprehensive review of India's history and of the racial, religious, and social conditions of the present. The author is not too hopeful for the future.

40 KOHZĀD, AḤMAD 'ALĪ. "The capitals of the Kūshān empire." (in Persian) *Āryānā* (Kabul) 4 (Jōza 1325) 967–975. Discussion of Kapisa and Purushapura, the summer and winter capitals of Kanishka.

41 KRUG, MARK M. "An unpublicized coup." *New Palestine* 36 (O 4 '46) 254–5. The potential effect of the establishment May 29, 1946 of an Arab Higher Front as an act of open rebellion against the Mufti was nullified by 'Azzām Pasha's creation of a Higher Palestine Executive which gave the Mufti a majority of the seats.

42 LAMBTON, A. K. S. "Some of the problems facing Persia." *Internat. Affairs* 22 (Ap '46) 254–72. A detailed account of Iranian history since January 1942. The author is pessi-

mistic about the chances of Iranian success in solving the problems of Russian policy, inflation, balance between urban and rural life, the tribes, and parliamentary government.

43 MACKINTOSH, C. A. G. "Aspects of Middle-East press censorship during the war." *Royal Cent. Asian J.* 33 (Ap '46) 178–187.

44 AL-MAGHRIBĪ, 'ABD AL-QĀDIR. "Al-Malik al-Ẓāhir Baybars II." (in Arabic) *Maj. al-Majma' al-'Ilmī al-'Arabī* (Damascus) 21 (My–Je '46) 227–35. Another in the series of lectures on the life and accomplishments of this Mameluke sultan. (To be continued.)

45 AL-MĀZINĪ, IBRĀHĪM 'ABD AL-QĀDIR. "Problems of the Arab states." (in Arabic) *Al-Kitāb* (Cairo) 1 (Ap '46) 775–79. Concludes that most of the important problems of the Arab countries stem from European rivalry and imperialism, and that Britain's course of action in the Near East is dictated by fear of the USSR.

46 MOORHOUSE, SYDNEY. "Forbidden land of the Gurkhas." *Contemp. Rev.* 968 (Ag '46) 110–13. An historical sketch of Nepal, one of Britain's "most loyal friends."

47 MOSCATI, SABATINO. "Nuovi studi storici sul califfato di al-Mahdī." *Orientalia*, n. s. 15 (1946) 155–79. Treats of the internal events of the reign of al-Mahdī, his personality and historical position. Al-Ṭabarī and Ibn al-Ṭiqṭaqā' are the principal sources.

48 NAIR, P. MADHAVAN. "Egypt and unity of the Nile valley." *Modern Rev.* 80 (Jl '46) 56–62. The Anglo-Egyptian problem; Egypt's position in the Arab League; discussion of the Sudanese problem.

49 NICHOLSON, GODFREY. "The parliamentary delegation to India." *Asiatic Rev.* 42 (Ap '46) 153–60. Special attention is given to the problem of Pakistan. Suggests an Indian confederation as a possible solution.

50 PORGES, WALTER. "The clergy, the poor, and the non-combatants in the first Crusade." *Speculum* 21 (Ja '46) 1–23. Holds that the non-combatants participating in the First Crusade greatly outnumbered the fighting men and hampered their movements against the Moslems.

51 RAJKOWSKI, WITOLD. "Another danger spot — Kurdistan." *World Rev.* (Je '46) 29–31. A description of the Kurds with an account of the most recent events.

52 RICHARDSON, SIR HENRY. "India in transition." *Asiatic Rev.* 42 (Ap '46) 127–137. Three-fold transition: internal politics, with special reference to Pakistan; transition from peace to war; and transition from war to peace economy.

53 RIF'AT, MUḤAMMAD. "Story of the departure." (in Arabic) *Al-Hilāl* (Cairo) 54 (My '46) 360–65. Foreign immigration into Egypt and the history of the British occupation since 1883.

54 RIF'AT, MUḤAMMAD. "The problem of Alexandretta." (in Arabic) *Al-Kātib al-Miṣri* (Cairo) 1 (Ja '46) 474–81. An historical account of its fortunes since its founding by Alexander the Great.

55 ROTH, CECIL. "Jews in the Arab world." *New Palestine* 36 (O '46) 239–42. A demonstration that Moslem treatment of the Jews has been only comparatively better than the Christian. Zionism did not cause Arab intolerance, although it may intensify it.

56 SAREL, BENNO. "L'Iran, clef du sud-ouest asiatique." *Politique* (Paris) 20 (Ja '46) 44–53. Brief survey of Russian-British-U.S. position in Iran, with special attention to the position which Azerbaijan occupies in the Anglo-Soviet contest for influence in Iran.

57 SEREZHIN, K. "The Anglo-Transjordan treaty." *New Times* (Moscow) 8 (Ap 15 '46) 11–14. Reviews the history leading up to the signing of the treaty and concludes that it is a step backward for Transjordan and a source of potential discord throughout the Near East.

58 SEREZHIN, K. "The events in Egypt." *New Times* (Moscow) 5 (Mr 1 '46) 7–10. Discusses the attempts made since 1936 to secure the withdrawal of British troops from Egypt.

59 SHEEAN, VINCENT. "The Straits question." *Asia and Americas* 46 (S '46) 416–7. Russia's right to control the Dardanelles is defended on the grounds of inherent necessity.

60 SPEAR, PERCIVAL. "Indo-British relations in the future." *Asiatic Rev.* 42 (Jl '46) 232–243. Relates the possible nature of future politics, trade relations, business exchange and cultural relations between India and the United Kingdom.

61 SPRY, GRAHAM. "The independence of India." *Internat. J.* 1 (O '46) 288–301. A detailed discussion of the second Cripps mission to India.

62 TAYLOR, ALAN. "Great Britain and the Middle East." (in Arabic) *al-Mustami' al-'Arabī* 7 (1946) 6–7. Argues that Britain has occupied the Near East solely to preserve the peace of her routes to the Far East; recognizes the importance of the area to the USSR also.

63 T.E.M.N. "Russia, Turkey and the Straits." *World Today* 2 (S '46) 396–405. Questions whether Turkey could or should insist on absolute sovereignty over the Straits.

64 WEINRYB, BERNARD D. "The Arab League: tool or power?" *Commentary* 1 (Mr '46) 50–57. "The inner weakness of the League, the fact that its military, economic and even political potential is negligible and that the states are economically dependent on Great Britain, does not render it entirely

ineffective. It has a nuisance value for 'export'."

65 ZACHARIAS, H. C. E. "The road to Indian autonomy." *Rev. of Politics* (South Bend) 8 (Jl '46) 307–30. A review of Anglo-Indian history. If "the mulish obstinacies of successive conservative governments in Britain as well as the fantastic follies of the Mahatma" can be written off, the road to autonomy will not be unduly arduous.

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

(General, finance, commerce, agriculture, natural resources, labor, transportation and communications)

66 "British industry's success in Turkish market . . . splendid harvest prospect." *Gt. Brit. and East* 62 (S '46) 47–8. Describes British industry's achievements on obtaining important Turkish contracts.

67 "Commodity statistical tables; capital stock and share lists." *Capital* (Calcutta) 116 (My 23 '46) 950–60. Index numbers of wholesale prices of certain articles in India; investors' guide and shareholders' gazette, the official quotations of the Calcutta, Bombay, Madras, Punjab, and London stock exchange associations.

68 "Employment injury and maternity insurance in Turkey." *Internat. Labour Rev.* 53 (Mr–Ap '46) 262–64. Factual report on recent Turkish social legislation.

69 "The outlook for Anglo-Egyptian trade." *Gt. Brit. and East* 62 (Jl '46) 53–4. Report of the "Goodwill" trade mission headed by J. C. Hanbury-Williams.

70 "Passing stagnation in Turkish trade." *Gt. Brit. and East* 62 (Jl '46) 48–9. The present commercial situation in Turkey is becoming very serious because of the scarcity of sterling and dollar exchange, the postwar letdown, and the administrative red tape which discourages American and British firms, banks, etc.

71 "A programme of social reform in Egypt." *Internat. Labour Rev.* 53 (Ja-F '46) 68–9. Brief factual report on the program outlined by the speech from the throne of November 12, 1945.

72 "Scientific research in Indian states." *Gt. Brit. and East* 62 (S '46) I 51–2. A survey of recent developments in the states of Hyderabad, Mysore, Baroda, Travancore, and others.

73 "The story of an Egyptian farm." *Gt. Brit. and East.* 62 (Ag '46) 46–7. Description of the work and conditions on a typical farm.

74 "The trade union movement in the countries of the Middle East." *New Times* (Moscow) 13 (Jl '46) 12–14. Interview with Muṣṭafá al-'Aris, chairman of the executive committee of the Trade Union Federation of Workers and Employees of Lebanon. Description of history of unions in Lebanon; also a brief note on the situation in Iran.

75 "Turkish contracts for British firms." *Gt. Brit. and East.* 62 (Ag '46) 43–4. Records some British successes in Turkey. Discusses the Zonguldak mining project; the order for the power station was placed with Metropolitan Vickers Export Co.

76 AL-BARRĀWĪ, RĀSHID. "The economic basis for the liberation of the Arab East." (in Arabic) *Al-Kitāb* (Cairo) 1 (Ap '46) 800–5. Holds that the basis of Western imperialism in the Near East is economic, and proposes economic counter-measures to be taken by the Arab states.

77 BOSE, S. C. "Soil erosion in the Damodar Basin." *Science and Culture* (Calcutta) 12 (Ag '46) 70–75. Detailed topographical analysis of affected area; suggestions for treatment.

78 DATTA, JATINDRA DATTA. "Are the Bengali Hindus getting poorer? Yes. An analysis of the number of assembly voters." *Modern Rev.* (Calcutta) 80 (Ag '46) 146–49. Since the chief electoral qualifications of Bengal voters is payment of a certain amount of money, a statistical study of the question is possible. Inferentially, an indictment of Moslem discrimination against the Hindus.

79 EMAN, ANDRÉ. "Les rélations commerciales entre la France et l'Egypte." *L'Égypte Contemporaine* (Cairo) 37 (Ja–F '46) 65–82. Analyzes the nature, volume, and tendency of the pre-war commerce and concludes that in spite of appearances France is in a very favorable position to develop its export trade with Egypt.

80 LEES, G. M. "Oil in the Middle East." *Royal Cent. Asian J.* 33 (Ja '46) 47–57.

81 MUKERJEE, KARUNAMOY. "Some aspects of socio-economic consequences of the Bengal famine of 1943." *Modern Rev.* (Calcutta) 80 (Ag '46) 142–44. A factual account of the toll taken by the famine. The figures as presented constitute a severe indictment of the government.

82 MUKERJEE, RADHAKAMAL. "Economic dismemberment of India." *Asia and Americas* 46 (S '46) 389–93. A strong and effective plea for economic unity and nation-wide planning. Political independence will mean little to the common man if it is acquired at the cost of the poverty and agricultural depression that will immediately result from interregional economic confusion.

83 MUKERJI, DR. KRISHNA PRASANNA. "Ceylon; the economic background." *Modern Rev.* (Calcutta) 80 (Ag '46) 130–3. Details the economic history of the island from the time of the British rule. Complains of the sorry plight of Ceylon, declaring that this is essentially the result of its dependence for

foodstuffs on foreign countries and its lack of industries.

84 PERCIVAL, DR. F. G. "Road improvements in Singhbhum and adjoining states." *Tisco Rev.* (Bombay) 14 (My '46) 79. Relations of the food problem to the communications problem.

85 SINHA, BIMAL CHANDRA. "Rack and ruin; a study of Bengal finances, 1937–1947." *Modern Rev.* (Calcutta) 80 (Ag '46) 107–9. Charges government policy with altering a surplus province to a deficit province. Suggests as remedies more equitable taxation internally, and material and financial assistance from abroad. Full statistical tables.

SOCIAL CONDITIONS

(*General, education, population and ethnology, medicine and public health, religion, law*)

86 "Education is the solution of Egypt's health problems." *Gt. Brit. and East* 62 (Ag '46) 49–50. Describes the problems and achievements of public health officers, emphasizing the importance of education.

87 "An employment service in Turkey." *Internat. Labour Rev.* 53 (My–Je '46) 405. Factual report on legislation.

88 "A salute to Ranjit." *Filmindia* (Bombay) 12 (My '46) 3–7. The Ranjit movietone, under the partnership of Sardar Chandulal Shah and Miss Gohar, has produced 100 motion pictures in 15 years.

89 'ABD al-'AZĪZ, AḤMAD. "Problems of Education in Lebanon." (in Arabic) *Al-Kātib al-Miṣri* (Cairo) 3 (S '46) 700–8.

90 ABRAHAM, C. C. "Health, physical education and recreation for India." *Indian J. Social Work* (Bombay) 6 (Mr '46) 253–63. Suggestions for physical training and the training of teachers of physical education.

91 BACON, ELIZABETH. "A preliminary attempt to determine the culture areas of Asia." *Southwestern J. of Anthropology* 2 (Summer '46) 117–132. Contains sections on Southwest Asian sedentary and pastoral nomadic cultures.

92 BANERJEE, G. R. "Rescue homes for women in Bombay." *Indian J. Social Work* (Bombay) 6 (Mr '46) 239–52. This article is one of the products of a research scholarship awarded to a woman physician, active in the treatment and rehabilitation of Indian prostitutes.

93 BINT AL-SHĀṬI'. "What we have encountered." (in Arabic) *Al-Hilāl* (Cairo) 54 (My '46) 327–332. An essay discussing the disappointments and difficulties faced by Arab women during their college and later years.

94 BOWMAN, HUMPHREY. "Some aspects of education in the Arab world." *English* (London) 6 (Spring '46) 4–9. Outlines the situation in the various Arab countries, with special emphasis on the Sudan and Palestine.

95 CHATTOPADHYAY, KAMALADEVI. "The place of women in the new society." *Modern Rev.* (Calcutta) 80 (Jl '46) 21–24. An Indian woman speaks out on woman's place in the new India.

96 CHAUDHURI, N. M. "Were the Rig-Vedic Aryans Proto-Nordics?" *Science and Culture* (Calcutta) 12 (Ag '46) 64–69. The author appraises the various views in support of the thesis and comes to the conclusion that races were already mixed even at this early date.

97 COHEN, DAVID L. "Fireside chat on the Persian Gulf." *Tomorrow* 5 (Ap '46) 44–47. Witty account of life and living conditions in Bahrain, with particular reference to the war period.

98 EPSTEIN, ELIAHU. "Demographic problems of the Lebanon." *Royal Cent. Asian J.* 33 (Ap '46) 150–4.

99 FARAJ ALLĀH, BAHĪYAH. "Al-'Irāq." (in Arabic) *Al-Kātib al-Miṣrī* (Cairo) 2 (Ap '46) 481–5. Impressions of the present renaissance of Iraq, with particular stress on education and feminism.

100 GABRIELI, FRANCESCO. "L'Islām contemporaneo e l'Europa." *Idea* (Rome) 1 (Je '46) 38–44. An excellent outline of the major areas of modern Islam, with emphasis on the religio-philosophical factors, by a noted scholar.

101 GARDET, LOUIS. "Humanisme musulman et humanisme chrétien." *La Nouvelle Relève* (Montreal) 5 (Je '46) 111–143. Islam is lacking in certain concepts such as distinction between the natural and supernatural, the spiritual and the temporal, which are part of the essence of Christian humanism. Islam thus has no humanism in the Western sense.

102 GARROD, OLIVER. "The nomadic tribes of Persia today." *Royal Cent. Asian J.* 33 (Ja '46) 32–46.

103 HOLLISTER, JOHN N. "The Shiite community in India today." *Moslem World* 36 (O '46) 319–30. A discussion of their numbers, political and social organizations, relations with the Sunnis, laws and customs, with a pessimistic opinion as to their future.

104 KING, ARCHIBALD. "Further developments concerning jurisdiction over friendly armed forces." *Amer. J. Internat. Law* 40 (Ap '46) 257–79. In its first part this article deals critically with a number of decisions of the Mixed Courts of Egypt rendered during this war in regard to the jurisdiction of Egyptian courts over offenses on Egyptian soil committed by foreign troops while off duty.

105 KHADDURI, MAJID. "Human rights in Islam." *Annals Amer. Acad. Polit. and Social Science* 243 (Ja '46) 77–81. Analysis of such rights granted by customary and

sharī'ah law and the impact of the West thereon.

106 LUDLAM, DR. MARTIN. "Lathyrism in the central provinces." *Indian Medical J.* 40 (Ap '46) 102–4. Diagnosis and suggested treatment.

107 NEUSTADT, DAVID. "The plague and its effects on the Mamlūk army." *J. Royal Asiatic Soc.* 1 and 2 (1946) 67–73.

108 NERSESSIAN, SIRARPIE DER. "Image worship in Armenia and its opponents." *Armenian Quart.* (New York) 1 (Spring '46) 67–81. Richly-annotated account of Armenian iconolatry.

109 ROSENTHAL, FRANZ. "On suicide in Islam." *J. Amer. Orient. Soc.* 66 (Jl–S '46) 239–59. A brilliant examination of the sources, theological and non-theological, including a translation of part of one of the *Muqābasāt* of Abū Ḥayyān al-Tawḥīdī, which contains the only detailed treatment of suicide known in Arabic literature.

110 ṢALĀḤ AL-DĪN, MUḤAMMAD. "Politics and education." (in Arabic) *Al-Kātib al-Miṣrī* (Cairo) 1 (Ja '46) 466–73. How education has been influenced since Muḥammad 'Alī's time by political, military, and economic considerations. Also a statement of present aims.

111 SATHAYE, DR. V. D. "An outline of health services for the Poona district." *Indian Medical J.* 40 (Ap '46) 108–10. Statistics of institutions and personnel; statement of aims; tables of results.

112 ZWEMER, SAMUEL M. "The Allah of Islam and the God revealed in Jesus Christ." *Moslem World* 36 (O '46) 306–18. An historical sketch of the Moslem conceptions, featuring the judgments of Western scholars and theologians.

ART

(Archaeology, epigraphy, numismatics, minor arts, painting and music, manuscripts and papyri)

113 "The Cairo of a thousand years revealed." *Illust. London News* 208 (Mr 9 '46) 251. Pictures showing recent work by the Department of Arab Antiquities.

114 "Two Sassanian seals." *J. Royal Asiatic Soc.* 1 and 2 (1946) 85.

115 "Antiquities of the Sudan." *Gt. Brit. and East* 62 (Jl '46) 55–6. Ancient sites in Shendi district visited on a recent tour by the Commissioner for Archaeology and Anthropology in the Sudan by way of introducing Thabit Eff. Hassan, newly appointed Antiquities officer and the first Sudanese to be appointed to a full-time post of protecting the historic monuments of the Sudan.

116 ABBOTT, NABIA. "An Arabic papyrus in the Oriental Institute." *J. of Near East. Stud.* 5 (Jl '46) 169–80. Able reconstruction of text, facsimiles, translation, and comments on a third century A.H. fragment that may be the original or copy of the now lost *Kitāb al-Mubtada'* of 'Abd al-Mun'im (d. 228/843).

117 BELLINGER, ALFRED R. "A note on the Sassanian Mint Monograms." *Numis. Rev.* 3 (Ap '46) 48. The author suggests the following attributions: Ctesiphon for NIHC; Ispahan for AS; and Weh-Ardashir (Seleucia) for VH.

118 BOULAD, JEAN. "Regards sur les débuts de la poste en Égypte." *L'Orient Philatélique.* 4 (Ja '46) 438–9. Gives postal rates prevailing at establishment of the Egyptian postal administration in 1865.

119 BROCKLEBANK, HUGH. "The Persian earthenware of Kermān." *Burlington Mag.* 88 (Je '46) 147–51. Discussion of a 17th-century Persian pottery type.

120 BULCH, DONALD. "Some eastern and western musical instruments." (in Arabic) *Al-Adab wa-al-Fann* 3 (1946) 39–53. The lute, rebec, flute, and others. Illustrated.

121 CHAUDHARI, M. I. "A note of some copper coins of Persia." *J. Numis. Soc. India* 7 (1945, issued Je '46) 67–8. The author suggests the reading *maḥrūsah* instead of *Muḥammad Shāh* on a type of autonomous copper in Persia.

122 CHAFTAR, IBRĀHĪM. "Un point d'histoire philatélique." *L'Orient Philatélique* (Cairo) 4 (Ja '46) 421–4. Contains texts of documents relating to the postal service between Egypt, the Turkish Empire, Greece, the Hijaz, and East Africa, 1872–74.

123 CHAFTAR, IBRĀHĪM. "Un point d'histoire philatélique." *L'Orient Philatélique* (Cairo) 4 (Ap '46) 502–4. Reproduces documents concerning forwarding of Egyptian mail on ships of the Austro-Hungarian Lloyd. The eight Egyptian post offices in Turkey were suppressed as of July 1, 1881.

124 DĀ'ŪD, Y. "The Amery collection of Persian pictures." (in Arabic) *Al-Adab wa-al-Fann* 3, no. 4 (1946) 77–84. Short description of oil paintings, with general observations on Persian art. Illustrated.

125 EDWARDS, W. BUCKLAND. "The early air stamps of Egypt and Sudan." *L'Orient Philatélique* (Cairo) 4 (Ja '46) 428–31. Contains information on early air mail flights from Egypt. Illustrated.

126 FARMER, HENRY GEORGE. "'Ghosts' — an excursus on Arabic musical bibliographies." *Isis* 36 (Ja '46) 123–30. On false attributions of existent Arab musical works and on non-existent works.

127 GARROD, OLIVER. "Iranian tribes are famous for their rugs." *Gt. Brit. and East* 62 (Ag '46) 45. The author, who spent several years living among western Iranian tribes, describes the rug-making achievements of some of them.

128 ḤASAN, DR. ZAKĪ MUḤAMMAD. "Umayyad style in the Islamic arts." (in Arabic) *Al-Kitāb* (Cairo) 1 (Ap '46) 806–17. A review of the development of religious architecture in early Islam, with special reference to the mosques of Medina. al-Kūfah, Basra, Damascus, al-Fusṭāṭ, Jerusalem, and al-Qayrawān. Illustrated.

129 HOLLIS, HOWARD. "Page from an automata manuscript." *Bull. Cleveland Mus. of Art* 33 (Je '46) 85–87. A page with a hand-washing automaton from an al-Jazarī MS dated A.D. 1315.

130 HOLLIS, HOWARD. "A Sassanian pottery jar." *Bull. Cleveland Mus. of Art* 33 (Mr '46) 26.

131 HOLLIS, HOWARD. "Two inlaid brasses." *Bull. Cleveland Mus. of Art* 33 (Ap '46) 39–40. Discusses a Persian ewer and a Syrian tray, both of the 13th century.

132 JAWĀD, MUṢṬAFĀ. "Famous buildings of the sixtn century A.H. in Iraq." *Sumer* 2 (Ja '46) 55–76.

133 KNOBLOCH, FREDERICK S. "Inedited and rare coins of Petra in Arabia." *Numis. Rev.* 3 (Ja '46) 13. Unpublished Petra issues of Septimius Severus, Caracalla, and Elagabalus. Illustrated.

134 KOHZĀD, AḤMAD 'ALĪ. "Ghaznavid metalwork." (in Persian) *Āryānā* (Kabul) 4 (Thōr 1325) 863–68. Significant chiefly for its discussion of the metalwork collection in the Ghaznah room of th Kabul Museum and photographs of the material contained therein.

135 LANE, ARTHUR. "Traces of Mogul taste in Islamic pottery." (in Arabic) *Al-Adab wa-al-Fann* 3, no. 4 (1946) 2–12. Many illustrations of Chinese influence, including some taken from the *Jāmi' al-Tawārīkh* of Rashīd al-Dīn.

136 LLOYD, SETON. "Discovery in the Madrasat al-Mirjānīyah." (in Arabic) *Sumer* 2 (Ja '46) 10–12. Illustrated. A 14th-century mosque whose *muṣalla* is said by Creswell to be the only surviving example of its type in Iraq (see also vol. 1 of same journal).

137 LLOYD, SETON. "Some recent additions to the Iraq Museum." *Sumer* 2 (Ja '46) 1–9. Illustrated.

138 MAZLOUM, AHMED. "Les timbres des bureaux étrangers du Levant." *L'Orient Philatélique* (Cairo) 4 (Ja '46) 412–15. Deals with the Polish, Romanian, and Russian post-offices in the Turkish Empire and the stamps they issued. Illustrated. Concludes a series of articles which appeared in the three preceding numbers of this publication.

139 MUMFORD, F. S. "The history of the foreign post offices in Egypt." *L'Orient Philatélique* (Cairo) 4 (Ja '46) 416–20. Contains map of the Austrian sea mail routes in the eastern Mediterranean.

140 MUMFORD, F. S. "The history of the foreign post offices in Egypt: the posts of Austria in Egypt." *L'Orient Philatélique* 4 (Ap '46) 487–92. Deals with the stamps and cancellations used in the Austrian postal service in Egypt. Illustrated. Continued from previous issue.

141 AL-NAQSHABANDĪ, NĀṢIR. "The Mirjaniya Madrasa." (in Arabic) *Sumer* (Arabic section) 2 (Ja '46) 33–54. Illustrated. See article by Seton Lloyd on same theme in the English section of this journal.

142 PIPERINO, GINO and BOULAD, JEAN. "Les émissions des colonies françaises libres: forces françaises libres au Levant." *L'Orient Philatélique* (Cairo) 4 (Ja '46) 433–6. Detailed information on these stamp issues, with sizes of printings. Illustrated.

143 RĀSIM, AḤMAD. "Egyptian artists." (in Arabic) *Al-Hilāl* (Cairo) 54 (My '46) 375–80. Some modern Egyptian women painters and sculptresses.

144 RUSHDĪ, KĀMIL. "Impressions of the Egyptian cinema." (in Arabic) *Al-Kātib al-Miṣrī* (Cairo) 3 (S '46) 736–8. A criticism of the unsuitable plots, miscasting and lack of attention to detail prevalent in Egyptian moving pictures.

145 STANISLAWSKI, DAN. "The origin and spread of the grid-pattern town." *Geog. Rev.* 36 (Ja '46) 105–20. A paper on the history of town planning; includes Near Eastern material in relation to India, Greece, and Rome.

146 SOMMER, F. E. "Material for Oriental research in Cleveland." *J. Amer. Orient. Soc.* 66 (Jl-S '46) 261–4. The Cleveland Public Library contains 199 catalogues of the Arabic, Persian, and Turkish MSS. found in the leading European institutions, with Constantinople being especially well represented. These catalogues are listed in alphabetical order by locality and can be secured through interlibrary loan.

147 UNVALA, J. M. "Numismatic notes." *J. Numis. Soc. of India* 7 (parts 1 and 2) ('45, issued Je '46) 36–40. A description of: a) three unusual Hephthalite coins, b) a Sassanian-Arab copper of Jayy, A.H. 113, c) some coins of the Sultans of Delhi.

148 WEIBEL, ADÈLE COULIN. "A Persian astrolabe." *Bull. Detroit Inst. of Arts* 25 (1946) 59–61. Discussion of an astrolabe signed by 'Abd al-A'immah of Isfahan and dated A.H. 1121 (A.D. 1709).

149 ZYGMAN, EDMUND. "An over-struck Sassanian bronze." *Numis. Rev.* 3 (Ap '46) 49–50. A coin of the third issue of Ardashir I overstruck with a die of Shapur. Illustrated.

LANGUAGE

150 AGAIAN, E. "The progress of linguistics in Armenia during the last 25 years." (in Russian) *Izvest. Akad. Nauk SSSR, otdel. lit. i yaz* (Moscow) 5 (1946) 69–76. A discussion of the contributions made by native Armenian scholars in the field of Armenian philol-

ogy during the past twenty-five years, and an evaluation of important works such as Prof. G. Kapantsian's *Chetto armeniaca* (1935), Prof. P. Acharian's seven-volume *Etymological Dictionary of the Armenian Language* (1926–1935), and Prof. A. Garibian's *Newly-Discovered Armenian dialects* (1939).

151 BAILEY, H. W. "Asica." *Trans. Philol. Soc.* (London) (1945) 1–38. Language of the ancestors of the modern Ossetes.

152 BENVENISTE, E. "Études Iraniennes." *Trans. Philol. Soc.* (1945) 39–78. 1) Notes sur les inscriptions Achéménides; 2) Noms propres perses en transcription grècque; 3) Emprunts iraniens en arménien.

153 BONFANTE, GIULIANO. "Armenians and Phrygians." *Armenian Quart.* 1 (Spring '46) 82–97. A linguistic discussion of the origins of the Armenians and the Phrygians; somewhat polemic, especially in the notes.

154 BECK, EDMUND. "'*Arabiyya, sunna*, und '*āmma* in der Koranlesung des zweiten jahrhunderts." *Orientalia*, n. s. 15 (1946) 180–224. Supplements Bergsträsser's *Geschichte des Korantextes* with a description of the role played by these three principles. Sībawayhī's *Kitāb* and al-Farrā's *K. ma'ānī al-qur'ān* are the main sources.

155 FREIMAN, A. A. "A few remarks on the Armazi bilingual of G. V. Tsereteli." (in Russian) *Izvest. Akad. Nauk SSSR, otdel. lit. i yaz.* (Moscow) 5 (1946) 157–64. In 1940 G. V. Tsereteli, Georgian philologist and paleographer, unearthed in the region of Armazi two stelae bearing one inscription in Aramaic characters and another in Greek and in Aramaic characters. Freiman reviews Tsereteli's findings, published in 1941, as a contribution not only to the history of writing in Georgia, but also to the cultural relations in antiquity between Georgia and Iran.

156 GERSHEVITCH, ILYA. "Sogdian compounds." *Trans. Philol. Soc.* (1945).

157 KÖBERT, R. "Gedanken zum semitischen Wort und Satzbau. 8–9." *Orientalia*, n. s. 15 (1946) 150–4. '*ibar* = *i'tibār*, i.e., the use of a *qital* form for an eighth stem infinitive is illustrated by the title of Ibn Khaldūn's best-known work.

158 LESLAU, WOLF. "The present state of Ethiopic linguistics." *J. Near East. Stud.* 5 (Jl '46) 215. A valuable review of what has been accomplished in the field since the publication of Ludolf's Amharic grammar in 1698.

159 MARKWART, J. "Die Sogdiana des Ptolemaios." *Orientalia*, n. s. 15 (1946) 123–49.

160 AL-RĀWĪ, ṬAHĀ. "The difference between the words '*arab* and *a'rāb*." (in Arabic) *Al-Adab wa-al-Fann* 3 (1946) 69–76. Arguments, some Koranic, to show that the word '*arab* may include both settled and nomadic peoples of the peninsula, but that *a'rāb* can refer only to the Bedouin. Thus every *a'rābī* is an '*arabī*, but not vice versa.

161 RIḌĀ', AḤMAD. "Aqrab al-mawārid." II (in Arabic) *Maj. al-Majma' al-'Ilmī al-'Arabī* 21 (My–Je '46) 218–26. Corrections, often on the basis of the classical lexicographical works, to this dictionary of al-Shartūnī.

162 WINNETT, F. V. "A Himyaritic inscription from the Persian Gulf region." *Bull. Amer. Schools Orient. Res.* 102 (Ap '46) 4–6.

LITERATURE

163 "A quarter-hour with Dr. Ṭāhā Ḥusayn." (in Arabic) *Al-Mustami' al-'Arabī* 7 (1946) 4, 26. Appraises the state of Arabic letters today, concluding that in all fields except poetry the modern product is superior to the medieval and urging modern Arab writers to seek their inspiration not in medieval Islam, but in the present-day West.

164 AL-AHWĀNĪ, AḤMAD FU'ĀD. "Abū al-Ḥasan al-Qābisī." (in Arabic) *Al-Mashriq* (Beirut) 1 (Mr '46) 37–44. A description of this treatise *al-Mufaṣṣilah li-aḥwāl al-mu'allimīn*, which is extant in a unique MS in the Bibliothèque Nationale.

165 BARANNIKOV, A. P. "The poetics of the *Ramayana* of Tulasi Das." (in Russian) *Izvest. Akad. Nauk SSSR, otdel. lit. i yaz.* (Moscow) 5 (1946) 95–128. An analysis of the "Bible of India" in the light of Indian poetics. The author maintains that while Tulasi Das (1532–1623) in many respects adhered to the strict tenets of Indian poetics, he is original in his creation of new images and the variegated application of old forms. Noteworthy for extensive extracts in Russian translation.

166 BĪNAVĀ, 'ABD AL-RA'ŪF. "Sayyed Fatḥ 'Alī Ḥoseynī Gardīzī." (in Persian) *Āryānā* (Kabul) 4 (Sarṭān 1325) 976–81. Sketch of the life and works of this Persian-Urdu author, who died in A.H. 1224 (A.D. 1809).

167 CHAPMAN, J. A. "Eastern poetry." *English* (London) 6 (Spring '46) 17–20. Translations and comments on translations of Persian poetry.

168 DAS, RASVIHARY. "The present plight of philosophy in India." *Modern Rev.* (Calcutta) 80 (Jl '46) 62–4. Author claims that Indian contact with Western philosophy through English education has produced a form of spiritual hybridism without native validity or vitality. He believes that students should study Indian philosophy under masters of Sanskrit.

169 DAVIES, JOHNSON. "Books and writing — translations and translators." (in Arabic) *Al-Adab wa-al-Fann* 3 (1946) 19–28. Contains a special section on Arab translators, old and modern, and a brief discussion of their effect on the renaissance of Arabic literature.

170 GRAY, LOUIS H. "The Armenian Acts of the martyrdom of S. Ignatius of Antioch." *Armenian Quart.* 1 (Spring '46) 47–65. Scholarly, richly annotated translations of the Armenian text.

171 AL-HAJARĪ, ṬAHĀ. "Abū 'Ubaydah I, II, III." (in Arabic) *Al-Kātib al-Miṣrī* (Cairo) 2 (Mr '46) 276–89. A critical study of biographical fragments dealing with this outstanding Basran scholar of the second century A.H. and evaluation of his talents as historian and story teller.

172 HĀRŪN, 'ABD AL-SALĀM. "Kitāb al-Murdifāt min Quraysh." (in Arabic) *Al-Kitāb* (Cairo) 1 (Ap '46) 838–44. An edition of the text of the *Kitāb al-Murdifāt* of Abū al-Ḥasan al-Madā'inī, after the unique MS in the library of the late Aḥmad Taymūr Pasha.

173 ḤUSAYN, ṬAHĀ. "Somber literature." (in Arabic) *Al-Kātib al-Miṣri* (Cairo) 3 (S '46) 567–89. Indicates that the somber character of modern European literature represents a phase which has occurred before in the history of the West and that it has its parallels also in the literature of Islam.

174 AL-ḤUSAYNĪ, DR. ISḤĀQ MŪSĀ. "Literary life in Palestine." (in Arabic) *Al-Mustami' al-'Arabī* 7 (1946) 12–13. Sketch of the present state of the Arabic literary scene in Palestine; concludes that only the press has attained a position of importance.

175 AL-KĪLĀNI, KĀMIL. "Jiḥā, master of wit." (in Arabic) *Al-Hilāl* (Cairo) 54 (My '46) 369–71. A short discourse on the origin of Jiḥā (Nasrettin Hoja) and other characters of the same name.

176 KHALĪL, LOUIS. "The new poetry reconsidered." (in Arabic) *Al-Mashriq* (Cairo) 1 (Ja–Mr '46) 1–9. A critical note on contemporary poetry.

177 KHALĪL, MUḤAMMAD IBRĀHĪM. "Nadīm-e Balkhī and Nadīm-e Kābolī." (in Persian) *Āryānā* (Kabul) 4 (Thōr 1325) 903–12. Sketch of the lives and works of these two poets, with samples of their writings.

178 KRACHKOVSKY, I. Y. "Arabic literature and the Arabs in the works of Gorky." *Izvest. Akad. Nauk SSSR, otdel. lit. i yaz.* 5 (1946) 47–50. While Gorky utilized Arab fables and proverbs, he was not concretely acquainted with Arabic literature. His noteworthy contribution in the field of Russo-Arab literary relations is his fine introductory essay to the first Russian translation from the original of the "Nights."

179 LEVY, REUBEN. "The letters of Rashīd al-Dīn Faḍl-Allāh." *J. Royal Asiatic Soc.* 1 and 2 (1946) 74–8.

180 MALOV, S. YE. "Turkisms in 'Slovo o polku Igoreve'." *Izvest. Akad. Nauk SSSR, otdel. lit. i yaz.* 5 (1946) 129–39. "The word of the Campaign of Igor" is an old Russian rhythmical prose work of the 12th century, discovered in 1795, giving a substantially historical account of Prince Igor's ill-fated campaign against the Polovtsi in 1185. Malov attempts to interpret certain unintelligible terms in the text of the *Slovo* by tracing them to Turki origins.

181 NAKHLAH, AL-ĀB RŪFĀ'ĪL. "Modern lyrical poetry in Turkey." (in Arabic) *Al-Mashriq* (Cairo) 1 (Mr '46) 51–62. Modern poets have not limited themselves to traditional themes. Religious fervor, woman, etc. are among the newer types which are illustrated by translated poems and excerpts.

182 PADWICK, CONSTANCE E. "Literature in the Muslim world today." *Moslem World* 36 (O '46) 331–6. A survey of the possibilities for expanding the publication of Christian literature.

183 QUṬB, SAYYID. "Imagery and meaning, or feeling and perception in Arabic poetry." (in Arabic) *Al-Kitāb* (Cairo) 1 (Ap '46) 850–56. States that the difference between the Arabic and English poetic style is that the former deals with abstractions, while the latter is more concrete in its expression and makes less appeal to the emotions.

184 RIZZITANO, UMBERTO. "I danni dell'imitazione della poesia araba preislamica secondo il critico Aḥmad Amīn." *Oriente Mod.* 26 (Ja–Je '46) 42–49. A summary and analysis of Aḥmad Amīn's critical articles on Arabic literature in general and pre-Islamic poetry in particular as they appeared in the Cairo journal, *al-Thaqāfah*, 1939, nos. 19, 21, 27, 30, and 37.

185 RIZZITANO, UMBERTO. "Nuove pubblicazioni arabe in Egitto." *Oriente Mod.* 26 (Ja–Je '46) 57–61. A review of the recent productions of Haykal, al-'Aqqād, Ṭāhā Ḥusayn, Tawfīq al-Ḥakīm, Taymūr, Aḥmad Badawī and others.

186 ROBERTSON, D. S. "The date of Jāmī's *Silsilat al-dhahab*, supplementary note." *J. Royal Asiatic Soc.* 1 and 2 (1946) 84.

187 ṢALĪBĀ, JAMĪL. "Abū al-Hudhayl al-'Allāf II." (in Arabic) *Maj. al-Majma' al-'Ilmī al-'Arabī* (Damascus) 21 (My–Je '46) 205–17. A discussion of the beliefs of this early Mu'tazilite philosopher, the "literary founder of *kalām*," with a detailed bibliography.

188 SHĀ'ŪL, ANWAR. "My recollections and impressions of Jamīl Ṣidqī al-Zahāwī." (in Arabic) *Al-Adab wa-al-Fann* 3 (1946) 85–94. Part of a lecture delivered before the Iraqi Pen Club to memorialize the poet-philosopher al-Zahawī (1863–1936), with excerpts from his verses.

189 AL-SHAYYĀL, JAMĀL AL-DĪN. "Naḥl 'ibar al-naḥl." *Al-Kitāb* (Cairo) 1 (Ap '46) 886–9. A description and résumé of the contents of the Damietta MS of al-Maqrīzī's *Naḥl 'ibar al-naḥl* dated A.H. 1229. The author of the article states that he is preparing an edition of this work.

190 ṬALAS, AS'AD. "Ḍarb al-Ḥūta 'alá Jamī' al-Ghūṭah II." (in Arabic) *Maj. al-Majma' al-'Ilmī al-'Arabī* (Damascus) 21 (My–Je '46) 236–47. A text edition of this treatise of Ibn Ṭūlūn, with an account of his life and writings. (To be continued.)

191 ÜNVER, A. SÜHEYL. "Avicenna explains why the stars are visible at night and not during the day." *J. of History of Medicine* 1 (Ap '46) 330–4.

192 AL-WĀ'ILĪ, IBRAĪHM. "The literary renaissance in Iraq." (in Arabic) *Al-Kātib al-Miṣrī* (Cairo) 2 (Ap '46) 505–8. A brief survey of the various literary schools which have appeared in Iraq during the last two centuries.

BIOGRAPHY AND OBITUARIES

193 "In honor of the late professor R. A. Nicholson." (in Persian) *Rūzgār-e Nō* 5 (1946) 2–19.

194 "The Middle East's new king." *Gt. Brit. and East* 62 (Jl '46) 46–7. Sympathetic description of the life and interests of King Abdullah I of Transjordan.

195 BYRD, HUBERT. "The queen of Tadmur." (in Arabic) *Al-Mustami' al-'Arabī* 7 (1946) 8–9, 27. Illustrated sketch of the career of Lady Hester Stanhope in Syria and Palestine.

196 COHN, WILLIAM. "Friedrich Sarre." *Burlington Mag.* 88 (F '46) 46. Obituary on the German historian of Persian and Islamic arts.

197 DAHMĀN, MUḤAMMAD AḤMAD. "Tāj al-Dīn al-Kindī." (in Arabic) *Maj. al-Majma' al-'Ilmī al-'Arabī.* (Damascus) 21 (My–Je '46) 247–55. A biographical sketch.

198 ETTINGHAUSEN, RICHARD. "Friedrich Sarre." *College Art J.* 5 (My '46) 359–60. Obituary on the German historian of Persian and Islamic arts.

199 GABRIELI, FRANCESCO. "L'autobiografia scientifica di Ignazio Kračkovskij." *Oriente Mod.* 26 (Ja–Je '46) 37–41. A moving tribute to "perhaps the greatest living Arabist" in the form of a review of the latter's recently published semi-autobiography, *Over Arabic Manuscripts.*

200 AL-ḤUSĀMĪ, MUNĪR. "Artistic life of Ibrāhīm al-Mahdī." (in Arabic) *Al-Kātib al-Miṣrī* (Cairo) 3 (S '46) 676–82. A study of the musical accomplishments of the Abbasid Caliph al-Mahdī.

201 MACDONALD, DUNCAN B. "Autobiographical notes." *Bull. Hartford Seminary Foundation* 1 (Je '46) 2–21. An evaluation by the author of his major contributions. He regards his work on the *Arabian Nights* and his *Life of al-Ghazzālī* as his most important efforts.

202 ROSSI, ETTORE. "Michelangelo Guidi." *Oriente Mod.* 26 (Ja–Je '46) 50–3. Contains a fairly complete bibliography.

203 SALĀMAH, MŪSÁ. "Some littérateurs I have known." (in Arabic) *Al-Kātib al-Miṣrī* (Cairo) 3 (S '46) 632–40. The author's recollections of Jurjī Zaydān, Faraḥ Anṭūn, Ya'qūb Ṣarrūf, Amīn Ma'lūf, May [Ziyādah] 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Barqūqī, Ṭāhā Ḥusayn, Shawqī, and Ḥāfiẓ Ibrāhīm.

204 TARAKĪ, QADĪR. "Death of a great Turkish scholar." (in Persian) *Āryānā* (Kabul) 4 (Jōza 1325) 958–61. A sketch of the life and works of the recently-deceased Professor Ismail Hakkı Izmirli.

MISCELLANEOUS

205 BEMONOV, G. F. "The Academy of Sciences of the Azerbaijan SSR." (in Russian) *Vestnik akad. nauk* (Moscow) 1 (1946) 69–72. An interesting summary of the first half year's work of the Academy of Sciences of the Azerbaijan SSR, emphasizing the research in geology, oil, etc., and a brief account of the history that led to its founding in 1945.

206 DEMIDOV, M. "Oriental studies in the USSR." *Royal Cent. Asian J.* 33 (Ja '46) 94–6.

207 'AWAḌ, JURJĪS. "Pre-Islamic libraries in Iraq." (in Arabic) *Sumer* 2 (Ja '46) 106–24. Assyrian, Jewish, and Christian (monastic) libraries, the last of which overlaps into the Islamic period. Seems to have a good bibliography of Western sources.

BOOK REVIEWS

208 ARCHER, JOHN CLARK. *The Sikhs in relation to Hindus, Moslems, Christians, and Ahmadiyyas.* **Moslem World** 36 (O '46) 359–61. (Malcolm Pitt).

209 'AṬĪYAH, EDWARD. *An Arab tells his story.* **Polit. Quart.** 17 (Jl '46) 270–2. (R. H. Soltau).

210 BODLEY, R. V. C. *The Messenger.* **Moslem World** 36 (O '46) 344–51 (William Thomson).

211 CASTELLANI, F. E. *Méthode pour trouver la correspondance entre l'ère Chrétienne et l'ère Musulmane.* **J. Pal. Orient. Soc.** 20 (1946) 51–2. (S. H. Stephan).

212 COON, CARLETON S. *The Kabyle people.* **Amer. Anthropologist** 48 (S '46) 454–5. (Gloria M. Wysner).

213 DER NERSESSIAN, SERARPIE. *Armenia and the Byzantine empire.* **Amer. Hist. Rev.** 51 (Ja '46) 354–5. (A. O. Sarkissian).

214 DE VILLARD, UGO MONNERET. *Lo studio dell Islām in Europa nel XII e nel XIII secolo.* **Speculum** 21 (Jl '46) 346–7. (Philip K. Hitti).

215 DEVRESSE, ROBERT. *Le patriarcat d'Antioche depuis la paix de l'église jusqu'à la conquête arabe.* **Oriente Mod.** 26 (Ja–Je '46) 62–3. (Ugo M. de Villard).

216 GHOSE, BIMAL C. *Planning for India.* **Internat. J.** 1 (O '46) 376–7. (Charles J. Woodsworth).

217 GHOSHAL, U. N. *The beginnings of Indian book historiography and other essays.* **Amer. Hist. Rev.** 52 (O '46) 132–3. (Elmer H. Cutts).

218 HAAS, WILLIAM. *Iran.* **Moslem World** 26 (O '46) 352–4. (John Elder); **Amer. Hist. Rev.** 51 (Jl '46) 712–3. (A. C. Millspaugh).

219 HILL, A. V. *A food plan for India.* **Internat. J.** 1 (O '46) 376–7. (Charles J. Woodsworth).

220 HOURANI, A. H. *Syria and Lebanon.* **Polit. Quart.** 17 (Jl '46) 270–2. (R. H. Soltau).

221 JACKH, ERNST. *The Rising Crescent.* **Mirovoye Khozyaistvo i Mirovaya Politika** (Moscow) (B. Danzig).

222 KONIKOFF, A. *Transjordan: An economic survey.* **Oriente Mod.** 26 (Ja–Je '46) 63–4. (Maria Nallino).

223 MAR IGNATIUS AFRAM I BARSAUM. *Al-Lu'lu' al-Manthūr fī Ta'rīkh al-'Ulūm wa-al-Ādāb al-Sūryānīyah.* **J. Pal. Orient. Soc.** 20 (1946) 52–4. (Constance E. Padwick).

224 RAO, RAMACHANDRA. *Tribunes of the people.* **New Times** (Moscow) 10 (My 15 '46) 27–9. (A. Dyakov).

225 ROBINSON, EDWARD. *Lawrence the rebel.* **Gt. Brit. and East** 62 (S '46) ME 53. (Reviewed by J. M. B. under the title of *Light on the Desert Campaign.*

226 ṢABBĀGH, T. *La métaphore dans le Coran.* **Orientalia** n. s. 15 (1946) 226–8. (S. Moscat).

227 SCHRAM-NIELSEN, ERIK. *Studier over Erstatningslaeren i Islamisk Ret.* **Moslem World** 36 (O '46) 362–3. (S. M. Zwemer).

228 SHRIDHARANI, KRISHNALAL. *The Mahatma and the world.* **Internat. J.** 1 (O '46) 375–6. (P. L. Bhandari).

229 STEVENS, BERTRAM. *New horizons: a study of Australian-Indian relations.* **Internat. J.** 1 (O '46) 375–6. (P. L. Bhandar).

230 SWEETMAN, J. WINDROW. *Islam and Christian theology.* **Moslem World** 36 (O '46) 361–2. (John E. Merrill).

231 ṬŪQĀN, K. H. *Turāth al-'arab al-'ilmī fī al-riyāḍīyāt wa-al-falak.* **Isis** 36 (Ja '46) 140–2. (George Sarton).

NEW PUBLICATIONS

The Armenian Quarterly (New York).

SUSPENDED PUBLICATIONS

Al-Adab wa-al-Fann, vol. 10, no. 3.
Rūzgār-e Nō, vol. 5, no. 4.

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